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This dissertation offers a robust philosophical examination of a phenomenon that is morally, 
socially, and politically significant – microaggressions. Microaggressions are understood to be 
brief and routine verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities that, whether intentional or 
unintentional, convey hostility toward or bias against members of marginalized groups. 
Microaggressions are rooted in stereotypes and/or bias (whether implicit or explicit) and are 
connected to broader systems of oppression.  
Microaggressions are philosophically interesting, since they involve significant ambiguity, 
questions about speech and communication, and the ability for our speech to encode and transmit 
bits of meaning. Microaggressions prompt reflection about the nature of blameworthiness and 
responsibility, especially for unintended acts and harms. They involve questions about how we 
perceive and treat one another, and whether or not people are treated as true equals in our social 
and political worlds. For all of these reasons, microaggressions are a critical area in need of 
philosophical reflection, specifically reflection in feminist philosophy, philosophy of language, 
moral philosophy, and social and political philosophy. 
This dissertation seeks to advance the philosophy of microaggressions through three distinct aims: 
a conceptual aim (chapters 2 and 3), an epistemological aim (chapters 1 and 2), and a moral aim 
(chapters 4 and 5). The conceptual aim involves clarifying how we should understand and 
categorize microaggressions. The epistemological aim involves identifying some of the 
epistemological assumptions undergirding discussions of microaggressions in the literature, 
including assumptions made by critics of microaggression theory, and arguing for an alternative 
epistemological framework for theorizing about microaggressions. The moral aim involves better 
understanding the harms of microaggressions, including their role in reinforcing structures of 
oppression and unjust social hierarchy.  
Taken together, these chapters make some progress on the conceptual, epistemological, and moral 
questions that microaggressions generate, and which philosophers have not yet adequately 
analyzed. It thus offers a meaningful contribution to the conversations philosophers are beginning 











Summary for Lay Audience 
My research focuses on the power that language has to shape our social and political worlds, often 
in subtle and difficult to detect ways. Our society is stratified along lines of race, ethnicity, religious 
affiliation, socioeconomic class, gender identity, sexual orientation, dis/ability status, body size, 
and more. I am interested in the ways that our linguistic practices (e.g., how we use speech and 
engage in communication with one another) contribute to, or reinforce, problematic forms of social 
stratification and hierarchy. One speech phenomenon that I argue contributes to oppression and 
reinforces social hierarchy is what has been called “microaggressions.” Microaggressions are 
frequent and subtle comments (or gestures or features of our social environments) which function 
to reinforce stereotypes or biases about members of structurally marginalized groups. My work 
aims to get clear on what microaggressions are, how we should understand and study them, in what 
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I. The Value of Philosophy to Thinking About Microaggressions  
 
Broken sticks and broken stones 
Will turn to dust just like our bones 
It’s words that hurt the most now, isn’t it?  
-Brandi Carlile, “Again Today”  
 
Let me begin with a quote that I believe captures a sentiment at the very heart of this thesis. The 
quote, which comes from the fictional character Albus Dumbledore of the Harry Potter fiction 
franchise, goes as follows: “Words are, in my not-so-humble opinion, our most inexhaustible 
source of magic – capable of both inflicting injury, and remedying it” (Rowling 2007, 708). The 
core of Dumbledore’s statement, here, is that words contain immense power. What we do with our 
words can have a profound influence in our social worlds, and importantly, on the lives of others. 
Our words can lift people up, empower them. But – and this will be the focus of this thesis – our 
words can also bring about tremendous harm.  
The focus of this thesis is on one particular speech phenomenon, microaggressions, which have, I 
contend, significant power in shaping our moral, social, and political relationships to one another. 
The term “microaggression” refers to brief and routine verbal, behavioral, or environmental 
indignities that, whether intentional or unintentional, convey hostility toward or bias against 
members of marginalized groups (definition adapted from Sue 2010).1 Microaggressions, although 
quick and easy to commit, and seemingly benign from the perspective of those committing them 
(hence the “micro” prefix), are, as I will go on to argue, significant from the perspective of those 
 
1
 Here, and throughout the thesis, the use of the word “convey’ should not be taken to imply anything about the 
speaker’s intention. To the contrary, as will become clearer throughout the thesis, my view holds that speaker intention 
is not relevant to whether a microaggression has occurred, or whether a microaggression is consequential. The use of 
“convey” here should be taken in the ordinary sense: to suggest, communicate, or express some bit of information, in 




on the receiving end, and for their role in perpetuating systems and structures of social inequity 
and injustice.2 
Microaggressions, as myself and others understand them, are frequently occurring in the lives of 
socially marginalized people. In other words, those who experience microaggressions tend to 
experience them often, in a variety of settings (e.g., in academic settings, in medical settings, in 
legal settings, and beyond). Microaggressions are also widely understood to be tightly connected 
to social oppression, and specifically widely held stereotypes and biases about oppressed groups.3 
Microaggressions function by picking up on, and reproducing, bits of prejudice and bias that exist 
in the broader social landscape (or, as Fricker 2007 calls it, the “social imagination”). 
Microaggressive speech (verbal or otherwise) or actions are rooted in these stereotypes and biases, 
which can be either implicitly or explicitly held by the microaggressor (i.e., the stereotypes or 
biases can be explicitly and consciously endorsed by the microaggressor, or can be the result of 
implicit bias).4  
I present this thesis as an integrated article thesis, which brings together five chapters to offer a 
robust philosophical picture of microaggressions. The thesis, as I will discuss in section IV below, 
has three distinct aims: a conceptual aim, an epistemological aim, and a moral aim. The conceptual 
aim involves clarifying how we ought to understand and categorize microaggressions. The 
 
2 For more justification for the use of the term microaggression, see discussion in chapter 3 of this thesis. Also see 
Rini (2020, 29-31) for a discussion of the “micro” prefix. As Rini sees it, the “micro” prefix needn’t be about relative 
size, but rather can denote a certain sort of relation, specifically, a part-whole relation (e.g., in the way microeconomics 
refers to part of the system or study of economics; Rini 2020, 30). Rini writes: “The point is this: a microeconomy is 
not a little economy in the way that a micropig is a little pig. Rather, a microeconomic actor is a part of a more 
complete system. Similarly, a microaggression needn’t be simply a little aggression. It is a part of a more complete 
system – in this case, a system of oppression” (Rini 2020, 30).  
3 I follow Blum (2004) in understanding stereotypes as “false or misleading generalizations about groups held in a 
manner that renders them largely immune to counterevidence.” As Blum argues, stereotypes “powerfully shape the 
stereotyper’s perception of [the] stereotyped groups,” making stereotypers more apt to only see stereotypical features, 
to ignore non-stereotypical characteristics or counterevidence, and to homogenize all members of the group. 
Microaggressions, as I will be understanding them, are in a feedback loop with stereotypes: microaggressions are 
rooted in stereotypes (e.g., the more deeply embedded the stereotypes, the more pervasive the microaggressions are 
likely to be) and microaggressions reflect and reinforce stereotypes (e.g., microaggressions encode and reify the 
content of the stereotypes). Microaggressions and stereotypes, then, are closely related.  




epistemological aim involves identifying some of the epistemological assumptions undergirding 
discussions of microaggressions in the literature, including assumptions made by critics of 
microaggression theory (e.g., Lukianoff & Haidt’s 2017 claim that microaggressions are not that 
serious, which assumes the perspective of those who are not likely to be impacted by 
microaggressions) and also assumptions made by other microaggression theorists (e.g., the 
assumptions underlying Sue’s 2010 account and taxonomy of microaggressions, which, not unlike 
Lukianoff and Haidt (2017), presupposes the perspective and standpoint of those committing 
microaggressions, at the expense of the standpoint of those on the receiving end). The second 
component of the epistemological aim involves defending a particular epistemological approach ‒ 
what is called “feminist standpoint epistemology” ‒ for guiding our theorizing about 
microaggressions (on feminist standpoint epistemology see, for example, Toole 2019). Adopting 
the epistemological approach of feminist standpoint theory helps justify a transition in 
microaggressions theory and research that places more explicit attention on the perspectives of 
those on the receiving end of microaggressions (i.e., structurally oppressed people) and what they 
claim to be true about their experiences with microaggressions. The moral aim involves better 
understanding the harms of microaggressions, including their role in reinforcing structures of 
oppression and unjust social hierarchy.  
The main theme unifying the articles in this dissertation is microaggressions. However, as I will 
discuss in section V below, certain concepts are of central importance to the dissertation as well. 
These include harm and oppression. Discussions of harm and oppression are woven throughout 
each of the chapters, and, given their central importance to the thesis, I will make clear how I am 
understanding and employing the concepts of harm and oppression in section V below.  
In the remainder of this introduction, I will do the following. In section II, I will offer a general 
overview of the development of microaggression theory within the field of psychology, from the 
origin of the concept in the 1970s through research in the present day. In section III, I will explain 
how philosophy is valuable to the study and understanding of microaggressions, despite the fact 
that, until quite recently, philosophers have paid very little attention to the phenomenon. In section 
IV, I will clarify the aims I hope to achieve in the dissertation, and offer summaries of the chapters, 




assumptions that I make in the thesis, and also clarify how I am understanding central concepts 
(e.g., power, privilege, oppression, and harm). Finally, in section VI, I offer brief concluding 
remarks to the introduction. 
II. Background on Microaggression Theory  
Before I begin laying some of the theoretical groundwork for my dissertation, it might be of use 
to say something about my interest in this topic, and how I think it fits within the domain of 
philosophy. To do so, some background on microaggression theory is in order.  
The term “microaggression” was first coined by a Black psychologist at Harvard University by the 
name of Chester Pierce in the 1970s. Pierce came to the concept of microaggression rather 
creatively. Specifically, he began observing the Harvard football team and thinking about what 
made a significant impact in game play. In examining what, for example, the coaches focused on 
and grilled players about, he noticed that, perhaps contrary to what many might assume, much of 
the emphasis was not on the macro-elements or major, overarching strategies of the game, but 
rather on the more minor, or micro, dimensions of the game. For example, there was focus on 
slight changes in body position or foot movements, or in the angle or spin of the ball. These 
seemingly minor adjustments resulted in macro level effects – points gained or lost, and thus games 
and championships won or lost. There was a recognition, among the coaches and players, that the 
seemingly small-scale actions had an immense impact on the big picture (Pierce 1970, 269-270). 
And yet, for those observing the game – especially those untrained in the technical aspects of the 
game – these minor changes are hardly noticed (while the macro-scale things are quite obvious to 
all watching the game).5 Thinking about the significance of these micro-elements of game play in 
football, Pierce began to think about how this related to his own experience as a Black faculty 
member at an elite academic institution. He thought about the daily, subtle, seemingly minor acts 
of discrimination that he encountered. He thought about how, while noticeable and impactful for 
 
5 This is a matter of perspective, or standpoint, specifically regarding what one is trained to (and thus better able to) 
see and appreciate in a given situation. Though the facts might be the same for all observing them, different people 
(in light of their different training or experiences) will be more or less able to pick out certain features of that situation. 




him, they are likely to go unnoticed to other, outside observers. In pulling this thinking together, 
Pierce coined the term “microaggression.”  
In reflecting on his own experience, Chester Pierce identified an important, previously unnamed 
phenomenon, likely to register to many structurally marginalized people. Consider Pierce’s 
description of an interaction with a subtly hostile white student, about which he writes the 
following:   
One could argue that I am hypersensitive, if not paranoid, about what must 
not be an unusual kind of student-faculty dialogue. This I concede. What I 
cannot explain, but what I know every black will understand, is that it is 
not what the student says in this dialogue, it is how he approaches me, how 
he talks to me, how he seems to regard me. I was patronized. I was told, 
by my own perceptual distortions perhaps, that although I am a full 
professor on two faculties at a prestigious university, to him I was no more 
than a big black n*****. (Pierce 1970, 277; N-word edited out by me). 
Pierce thought this was how racist aggression could be done well: how it could withstand civility 
culture and elite desires for “multiculturalism” and “color-blindness.” Instead of the overt, old-
fashioned forms of racist aggression, aggression could be achieved in more savvy ways – ways 
that could happen right out in the open, even by “nice white folks.” It was the subtle build up and 
repetition of minor acts and comments, which could fly under the radar of even the most well-
intended bystanders. But, at its core, it was still a way of asserting racial superiority and, in Pierce’s 
case, making him feel as if he didn’t, and never really could, belong at a place like Harvard. And 
this is at the core of how we now understand microaggressions. Through these seemingly minor 
acts, people can act in ways that reflect white supremacy, misogyny, homophobia, or transphobia, 
but still have the protective guise of ignorance and/or innocence. And, these acts build up over 
time to reinforce these unequal power relations. Pierce notes that: 
Most offensive actions are not gross or crippling. They are subtle and 




only when one considers that these subtle blows are delivered incessantly 
(Pierce 1970, 265).  
In recognizing this feature of oppression – that it often happens in “broad daylight” by those who 
can lay claim to their ignorance and/or innocence – Pierce was onto something incredibly 
insightful and important. He was articulating one way in which oppressive social hierarchies can 
remain so firmly intact, even in our contemporary society that, for the most part, rejects overt and 
explicit instances of racist macro-aggression or violence. However, despite his astute observations, 
Pierce’s work, and the concept of microaggression, didn’t really gain much traction in the 
academic literature. The concept sort of faded into the background. That remained the case for a 
few decades until a Chinese-American psychologist at Columbia University, Derald Wing Sue, 
put the spotlight back on the concept.  
Though Sue and his colleagues began publishing on microaggressions around 2007 (see Sue et al. 
2007), it wasn’t until 2010 that the concept of microaggressions really gained steam. This was, 
primarily, the result of Sue’s 2010 monograph, Microaggressions in Everyday Life. In this book, 
Sue launched what is now a robust research agenda for microaggressions. He overviewed the 
concept and illuminated it with a number of examples and developed a now widely-cited taxonomy 
for classifying microaggressions as one of three distinct types: microinsults, microassaults, or 
microinvalidations. He also described three different mechanisms for microaggression (verbal, 
non-verbal (behavioral), and environmental).  
In order to illuminate the phenomenon of microaggressions, and the three mechanisms by which 
they occur, let’s consider a few examples. There will be a number of additional examples 
throughout the thesis. I offer these examples now to get us thinking about the broad range of cases 
which can be described as instances of microaggression. I will follow Sue’s lead here and describe 
microaggressions which are verbal, behavioral, and environmental.6  
 




a. Verbal Microaggressions:  
These are microaggressions which are spoken aloud, most often in the forms of comments or 
questions. Consider the following:  
• Femme-Erasure: A femme-presenting woman is chatting with a group of people at a 
social event and is asked about her dating situation. She responds that she identifies as gay 
and has recently been seeing a new woman. A person standing in the circle immediately 
blurts out, “Really!? But you don’t look gay!” Such a statement invalidates her identity as 
gay, because (as a result of stereotypes about what gay women look/dress/act like), it 
assumes and suggests that she couldn’t really be gay. It also undermines her testimony, 
insofar as it casts doubt on an assertion she just made, about her own identity. On account 
of each (having her identity invalidated and her testimony undermined) she might cease to 
feel welcome or included in that particular conversation or environment or feel as if her 
sense of self-worth has been compromised. This is a microaggression, rooted in 
stereotypical assumptions about what gay people (and specifically, gay women) “look” 
like, as well as biases against femme-presenting queer women.7 It reflects the pernicious 
ignorance (cf. Dotson 2011) in society about queerness and the many varieties of queer 
identity, experience, and presentation.  
• International Student: An international graduate student from China arrives at a new, 
predominantly white North American academic institution. Upon arriving, he finds that 
very few people attempt to talk to him at the new graduate student orientation. The time 
comes for the new students to go around the room and each share their names. When it is 
his turn, he says his name, “Wei Xin.” Immediately the professor says, “That one is tough! 
Say it again?” to which Wei Xin complies, stating his name a second time. After repeating 
his name for the second time, the professor responds, “I am going to have a tough time 
with that one!” The professor never tries to address Wei Xin by name again, instead calling 
on him by pointing at him or saying “hey!” Mostly, he just ignores him outright and calls 
on the white students, always by name. This is a microaggression because it singles out the 
 




student as “different” or “exotic”, which can have the consequence of making him feel like 
an Other, or outsider, in the classroom space. There is no effort made to include him or 
make him feel as if he genuinely belongs.  
b. Behavioral Microaggressions:  
These are microaggressions which take the form of unspoken actions, gestures, or body language. 
Let’s consider a few examples: 
• Needing Directions: A Black man is visiting a new city and isn’t sure where to find the 
transit station. Unfortunately, after long hours of travel, his cell phone has died. He sees a 
white woman across the street, preparing to get into her car, and thinks that she must be 
from around there. He calls out to her “Excuse me!” and starts crossing the street to ask 
her for directions. She immediately scrambles to quickly unlock her car door, jumps in, 
locks her doors, and starts her car. She does not wait to roll down her window and see what 
he needs. She pulls off, leaving him standing on the sidewalk. This is a microaggression 
because it signals that, although he hasn’t given her any explicit reason to feel unsafe, she 
nevertheless feels fearful of him. This automatic tendency to fear (and flee from) Black 
men is rooted in pervasive social stereotypes that Black men are violent or dangerous.  
• Bus Seat: There is a pandemic going on that is broadly thought to have originated in 
Wuhan, China. As a result, there has been significant anti-Chinese rhetoric and fear-
mongering, including from high profile politicians and celebrities. An older Japanese man 
is sitting on a crowded bus and the only remaining seat is next to him. A young white man 
gets on the bus, looks around, sees the empty seat next to the Japanese man, and instead 
goes and stands in the aisle. The Japanese man pats the seat next to him to offer it up, in 
case the white man had not seen the available seat. The white man shakes his head and 
continues to stand. This is a microaggression because it suggests that the white man is made 




tendency for North American people to lump all Asian people together, reinforcing them 
as non-white Other.8  
c. Environmental Microaggressions:  
Environmental microaggressions are interesting because they lack a direct agent (e.g., they are not 
the result of the speech or action of a particular, identifiable agent). Rather, this final type of 
microaggression involves features of our built environment or the aesthetics or design of our 
physical spaces. Consider the following examples: 
• Toy Shop: A young Black girl receives a gift card for her birthday to a new toy shop in 
town. On the drive to the shop to pick out her gift, she tells her mom how she really wants 
a doll that looks like her. As she sits in the seat, she imagines playing with the doll’s hair, 
braiding it, and taking the doll to church with her on Sundays. She gets really excited. 
When they arrive at the toy store, she looks around at the dolls on display. There are many, 
many different dolls, however, they are all of fair complexion. Almost all of the dolls are 
peach skinned, with blonde hair and light eyes. A few have light skin and straight, brunette 
hair. There is no doll with dark skin or curly hair like her own. She looks the aisle up and 
down and eventually asks her mom if she can get a basketball instead. This is a 
microaggression because it reflects a world in which she is not represented, and in which 
she is made to feel as if she does not fully belong. Girls like her have not been considered 
or valued in the design of toys. They are not reflected or represented in the world more 
broadly. She cannot see herself in the toys, or in the world they are meant to represent.  
• Dream Proposal: A lesbian woman has just had the proposal of her dreams. Her partner 
got down on one knee atop their favorite hiking destination, overlooking the mountains 
that remind her of her family and her home. She is over the moon, and, when they return 
home for their trip, she is eager to jump into wedding planning. She texts her friends who 
have recently been married for their wedding planning recommendations. They send her 
 
8  As Blum (2004) makes clear, stereotypes (and I would add microaggressions) worsen this tendency to erase 
differences due to their flattening effect. In other words, stereotypes (and the microaggressions rooted in them) tend 




all of their favorite bridal websites and catalogs. Back at home, she sets up a station at her 
desk to start pouring over them, finally ready to plan her dream wedding. However, when 
she starts turning the pages and scrolling the sites, she feels a bit uneasy. Not only are there 
no lesbian couples represented at all within the pages of photos, but virtually everything is 
packaged as “his and hers” and “bride and groom” sets. Suddenly, her excitement turns to 
a knot in her chest – her eagerness to plan her wedding transforms into anxiety about 
whether she will be able to find venues and vendors willing and able to meet her and her 
partner’s needs. This lack of representation is a microaggression because, in centering 
heterosexuality and representations of heteronormative love, it erases and fails to recognize 
the love between queer people – even in the most special and intimate of times. It makes 
her feel as if these companies, oriented toward celebrating love, are unable or unwilling to 
celebrate her love. She feels left out of something really deeply important to her – 
something that was easy and natural for all of her heterosexual friends.  
Though each of these examples might strike you as quite different, they all share some underlying 
features. One feature they appear to share is that, in each case, the intention of the person (or 
company, or institutions in the latter examples) committing the microaggression is unclear or 
ambiguous, perhaps even to those committing the microaggression. For example, in “Needing 
Directions,” the woman who quickly jumps in her car and locks the door instead of seeing what 
the Black man needed might not have done this on purpose; rather, she might have acted 
automatically and unreflectively, driven by implicit associations that link together Black men and 
violence or danger. The same can be said for the white guy who doesn’t take the seat next to the 
Japanese man on the bus (“Bus Seat”); it is entirely possible that he didn’t even think about his 
decision as to whether he should take the seat or not, but rather acted automatically. In either case, 
we can give the benefit of the doubt that these people did not intend to send racist or xenophobic 
messages or to reinforce stereotypes or biases against Black men or Asian Americans respectively. 
And yet, in both cases, this is precisely what happens. Similarly, in “Toy Shop,” the toy companies 
producing toy dolls might be responding to social demand (e.g., for toys resembling white 
children) which itself is informed and driven by racial hierarchy and white supremacy. As Young 




Another commonality between the examples above is that, regardless of the intentions involved, 
they send deeply problematic messages to the recipients (and reinforce problematic social 
stereotypes, or ideals, along the way). Consider the examples of “Needing Directions” and “Bus 
Seat.” Though, from the prospective of the white woman in the “Needing Directions” example or 
the white guy in the “Bus Seat” example, these actions might seem insignificant or benign, a 
number of things nevertheless happen: the person on the receiving end internalizes the message 
(“I am frightening,” or “I am Other”); the person committing the microaggression acts on (and 
thus fails to challenge or compensate for) their internalized biases or stereotypes; and, when others 
are present and bystanders witness or overhear these things happening, that can reinforce, or 
function as confirmatory evidence for, their own biases. Importantly, all of these things can happen 
in incredibly subtle, difficult to detect ways (or, at least ways that are difficult to detect for the one 
committing them). But, even when we are not fully aware of them, microaggressions contribute to 
broader systems of oppression, propping up the stereotypes and biases that reinforce social 
hierarchy and keep perverse relations of power, privilege, and oppression in place. And this is 
precisely why I believe microaggressions are ripe for philosophical analysis, a point to which I 
will return below.  
III. Why a Philosophy Dissertation Devoted to Microaggressions?  
As I have just indicated, I believe that microaggressions offer fertile ground for philosophical 
inquiry. I believe this for a number of reasons. One reason is because microaggressions involve 
vast ambiguities of the sort that philosophers enjoy puzzling over (e.g., “Did that person mean “X” 
in the way I have understood it?” “What is being conveyed here?” “What is encoded in this 
particular bit of speech?”). Microaggressions involve questions about how we communicate with 
one another, often in subtle ways. Microaggressions prompt reflection about the nature of 
blameworthiness and responsibility, especially for unintended acts and harms. Microaggressions 
involve questions about how we perceive and treat one another, and whether or not people are 
treated as true equals in our social and political worlds. For all of these reasons, and likely for 
many more, microaggressions are a critical area in need of philosophical reflection, specifically 
reflection in philosophy of language, moral philosophy, and social and political philosophy. And 




I suggest that philosophers are arriving late here because, as I have indicated in the previous 
section, the concept of microaggressions has been around since the 1970s and has been studied 
rather extensively in disciplines such as psychology and sociology for the past decade following 
the publication of Sue’s 2010 monograph (see for example Dominguez & Embrick 2020; Levchak 
2018; Owen et al. 2014; Williams 2019, Williams 2020; Wong et al. 2014). Philosophers, however, 
have (until very recently) mostly ignored the concept. For the reasons mentioned above (e.g., on 
account of the sorts of questions about language and morality that microaggressions generate), I 
think this is a mistake. I believe philosophers can, and should, have a lot to say about the 
phenomenon of microaggressions, as well as a role to play in shaping and refining the research 
agenda that is mostly carried out through social science research. Though I think there is much 
more for philosophers to say about microaggressions, I will briefly canvas the work that 
philosophers have done on this topic so far. I will then suggest what sort of work remains for 
philosophers to do on the concept of microaggressions, and how I see this thesis as making some 
strides in this domain.  
To my knowledge, the first philosophical article to offer sustained engagement with the 
phenomenon of microaggressions is Jeanine Weekes Schroer’s article, “Let’s Give Them 
Something They Can Feel: On the Strategy of Scientizing the Phenomenology of Race and 
Racism” (2015). In that article, Schroer examined connections and overlap between the empirical 
research on microaggressions, and that of a separate phenomenon, stereotype threat (on the 
phenomenon of stereotype threat, see Spencer et al. 2016). In this piece, she warns that the attempts 
to “scientize” the study of race and racism, and to quantify the harms that result from such 
phenomena as microaggressions and stereotype threat, can have the perverse effect of excluding 
the testimonies and direct knowledge of those on the receiving end of these phenomena. Her call 
is for research and attempts to understand oppressive (here: racist) phenomena to center the 
testimonies of those who live and experience racism directly, and to center those testimonies when 
trying to understand and give texture to the “what it is like” of living as a non-white person under 
white supremacy. Importantly, this is not to say that we should abandon our empirical study of 
phenomena such as microaggressions and their consequences, but rather that we should not reduce 




our understanding of oppressive phenomena by appealing to the voices, testimonies, and 
experiences of those on the receiving end of them.  
Though much more research (including robust qualitative research) has been done on 
microaggressions (and stereotype threat, for that matter) since the time Schroer’s article was 
published, I think the heart of Schroer’s critique stands. Indeed, her central point coincides with 
an underlying research commitment you will find throughout this dissertation – that is, that we 
must center the rich testimonies of those who experience microaggressions directly, and not try to 
minimize or erase them in the name of “objective, empirical” evidence. Testimonial evidence, I 
believe, is a valuable source of evidence, specifically in regard to the “what it is like” of oppression 
(i.e., what it feels like to be oppressed or to live as a target of oppressive systems and structures). 
This is why you will find numerous first-hand testimonies throughout this dissertation. Centering 
the relevant perspectives and voices, I believe, is a key component of doing ethical research on, 
and philosophizing about, oppression.9  
Following Schroer’s 2015 article, philosophical articles on microaggressions remained sparse for 
the next few years. They include articles from Mark Tschaepe (2016), Saba Fatima (2017), Emily 
McTernan (2018), and Christina Friedlaender (2018). All of these articles make important 
philosophical contributions to thinking about microaggressions. However, one interesting point of 
unity in them is that they all offer an uncritical engagement with Sue’s theory of microaggressions, 
and his taxonomy for classifying microaggressions. Until the publication of an article by Lauren 
Freeman and myself (included as chapter 3 in this dissertation), there had been no critical challenge 
of Sue’s theoretical framework itself. Sue’s general theoretical orientation, and his specific 
tripartite taxonomy for classifying microaggressions, had been uncritically adopted and taken for 
granted in the budding philosophical literature on microaggressions. Since the publication of our 
2018 article, Lauren Freeman and I have continued to build our challenge of Sue’s work across a 
series of journal articles and book chapters, as well as a book manuscript currently in progress (see 
for example Freeman and Stewart 2019, 2020, 2021). We believe that this sort of methodological 
 




critique – and a calling of attention to theoretical assumptions in research – is one important 
contribution that we, as philosophers, can make to this growing research program.  
There have been more articles and chapters written by philosophers since 2018, and, there are now 
two book length treatments of the topic by philosophers. This includes an edited collection by 
Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer, Microaggressions and Philosophy (2020) and a 
recently published monograph by Regina Rini, The Ethics of Microaggression (2020). I see this 
dissertation as contributing to a young but rapidly growing philosophical literature on the concept 
and phenomenon of microaggressions.  
Though philosophers are starting to weigh in on microaggressions, many questions remain 
unanswered. As I will contend in this thesis, there is still a lot of conceptual work to do to clarify 
the meaning and scope of the concept (see chapter 2). There is also more work to be done to 
illuminate the specific harms experienced as a result of microaggressions (see chapter 3) and the 
status of microaggressions in various applied contexts, such as medical contexts (see chapters 3 
and 4) and academic contexts (see chapter 5).  
Reflection about the nature and impact of microaggressions makes use of machinery in the 
philosophy of language, as well as insights from moral, social, political, and feminist philosophies. 
Moreover, it is an area of research that is inherently interdisciplinary – one that requires seeking 
out constructive dialogue with researchers in psychology, sociology, and beyond, and listening to 
those with different areas of expertise. It is for all of these reasons that I find the philosophical 
study of microaggressions fruitful and enriching. But beyond the intellectual fruitfulness of the 
project, I believe it is an area in which philosophical reflection can be translated into a positive 
impact, aimed at improving our moral, social, linguistic, and communicative practices. That is why 
I have chosen to pursue this project and this line of philosophical research.  
IV. Aims of This Dissertation and Overview of Chapters  
As noted above, this dissertation has three main aims. These are the conceptual aim, the 
epistemological aim, and the moral aim, respectively. In what follows, I will offer a brief overview 




of each chapter and draw some connections regarding how the chapters connect to one another, 
and to each of these three aims.  
Chapter 1, “Sticks and Stones Can Break Your Bones and Words Can Really Hurt You: A 
Standpoint Epistemological Reply to Critics of the Microaggression Research Program,” aims to 
develop a systematic reply to the main critics of microaggression theory (e.g., Lukianoff and Haidt 
2017; Lilienfeld 2017). The critics’ main claim is that microaggressions do not cause any serious 
harm, and, as a result, are not worth paying attention to, researching, discussing, or trying to 
intervene on. In order to respond to these critiques and defend the value of microaggressions 
research, chapter 1 makes use of the concept of structural and systemic oppression (of which 
microaggressions are a part) and also advocates for feminist standpoint epistemology as the best 
epistemological starting point for theorizing about microaggressions. With a concept of 
oppression, and the commitments of feminist standpoint epistemology in hand, microaggression 
theory is defended as an important theoretical and practical pursuit. In offering a sustained defense 
of microaggression theory against critics, this first chapter justifies the rest of the thesis, i.e., this 
chapter gives us a sense of why it is of value to theorize about microaggressions at all, despite how 
critics might (mis)understand and (mis)represent the concept. Moreover, in highlighting the 
epistemological assumptions inherent in the critics’ understanding of microaggressions, and 
arguing for a different epistemic starting point, chapter 1 goes some way toward the 
epistemological aim of the dissertation, that is, to clarify and refine the epistemic assumptions 
underlying and guiding microaggression theory.  
Chapter 2, “Making Sense of “Microaggression”: On Family Resemblance and Standpoint 
Epistemology” aims to make some progress on the conceptual aim of the dissertation. It does so 
by responding to concerns about the clarity and coherence of the microaggression concept. By 
appealing to a family resemblance approach of concepts, I demonstrate that the microaggression 
concept is perfectly coherent, even in the face of definitional challenges (e.g., challenges locating 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept). In addition to shedding light on the conceptual 
aim, chapter 2 makes use of the defense of feminist standpoint epistemology provided in chapter 
1. Specifically, I argue that although microaggressions are difficult to pin down in practice, some 




experience with structural oppression), are generally epistemically advantaged when it comes to 
recognizing and identifying microaggressions in practice. This argument aligns with the 
epistemological aim, insofar as it helps to clarify an important point about our ability to 
appropriately understand microaggressions. The main claim is that microaggressions are generally 
best understood from the perspective of those most likely to be on their receiving end.  
Building on the commitment that microaggressions ought to be understood from the perspective 
of those most likely to be on the receiving end, chapter 3, “Microaggressions in Clinical Medicine,” 
develops a novel conceptual approach to microaggressions that takes as its starting point the 
perspectives, experiences, and testimonies of those who experience microaggressions directly, 
viz., structurally oppressed people. This novel approach constitutes a significant departure from 
the dominant approach to microaggressions (cf. Sue 2010). Instead of being “act-based” (e.g., 
classifying microaggressions on the basis of the actions undertaken by the person committing 
microaggressions), this novel approach, which is developed within the context of medical practice, 
is “harm-based.” This means that the focus on how to conceptualize and categorize 
microaggressions is placed on the harms that they cause for their recipients, instead of on the acts 
that are undertaken by those who commit microaggressions. This shift in focus helps illuminate 
the moral seriousness of the short- and long-term harms of microaggressions and centers the 
perspectives of those on the receiving end. Chapter 3, then, makes progress on two of the main 
aims of the dissertation: the conceptual aim and the moral aim. With regards to the former, the 
chapter helps clarify how microaggressions should be understood and theorized. With respect to 
the latter, the chapter helps illuminate the moral significance of microaggressions for those who 
experience them.  
Chapter 4 constitutes a shift in the thesis. While the first three chapters are more conceptual, the 
final two chapters (chapters 4 and 5) are more applied. Chapter 4, “Hearing Queer Voices in the 
Clinic: On the Prevention of Clinical Microaggressions for Better Communication and Care,” 
zeroes in on one group that is likely to be on the receiving end of microaggressions – LGBTQ+ 
patients in medical settings. Applying many of the insights developed in chapter 3 about the short- 
and long-term impacts that microaggressions can have on patients, this chapter focuses on the 




experiences significant health vulnerabilities and health disparities). In an effort to reduce and 
offset the harmful impacts of microaggressions, this chapter advocates for a number of strategies 
that can be developed to better listen to, respect, and include patients in clinical encounters.  
Finally, Chapter 5, “Paving the Road to Truly Free Speech: Establishing a More Just Free Speech 
Infrastructure on Campus and Beyond,” uses the phenomenon of microaggressions as a focal point 
for thinking through debates about free speech on college and university campuses. Though some 
microaggression skeptics and free speech absolutists contend that efforts to reduce 
microaggressions on campus constitute a violation of their free speech and/or academic freedom, 
I argue, contrarily, that efforts to reduce microaggressions on campus are in fact an essential part 
of developing a free speech infrastructure that is more just, more equitable, and more attentive to 
the distorting impacts that power and oppression have on speech norms and practices. Reducing 
microaggressions is one necessary step in creating the conditions that allow certain (read: 
structurally marginalized) community members to speak and be taken seriously when they do so. 
As such, efforts to reduce these acts are not an affront to free speech, but rather a boon to it. This 
chapter, then, suggests that we have a moral obligation to consider the impacts that 
microaggressions have on our broader speech climates, and who is truly free to speak (and be 
heard) within them.  
Taken together, these chapters aim at a philosophical analysis of different dimensions of 
microaggressions, and specifically, the ways in which microaggressions factor into our moral, 
social, and political lives, and shape our linguistic norms and practice in tangible ways. I hope that 
these chapters help us get clearer not only on how we should think about and understand 
microaggressions, but also why we should care about them in the first place. To this end, this thesis 
goes some way toward the project of clarifying and justifying microaggressions research, and also 





V. Guiding Assumptions  
In order to achieve my three aims – the conceptual aim, the epistemological aim, and the moral 
aim – I will make a number of theoretical assumptions and draw on several philosophical concepts. 
I will now introduce these in turn.  
First, I will say something about my guiding commitments. This dissertation is guided by a deep 
commitment to intersectional, queer and trans-inclusive, feminist, anti-racist scholarship. I follow 
in the tradition of Black feminist, and queer and trans scholars, and take many claims as given 
(that is, I do not argue for certain baseline assumptions about the existence of social stratification, 
the existence of structural and systemic oppression, and so on). For my purposes, it is taken as 
given that the context of writing this dissertation is a society with a history and present situation 
of colonialism, white supremacy, and cis-heteropatriarchy. None of these background assumptions 
are up for debate, as far as I am concerned. Neither is the legitimacy of queer and trans experiences, 
or the value of Black, Brown, and Indigenous lives. I operate with all of these assumptions, and 
with the assumption that these background social and political conditions influence our social and 
political lives: e.g., the ways we perceive and treat one another, and the stereotypes and biases that 
pervade our social world.  
With these background commitments in mind, I will now set out some of the concepts that I will 
use and refer to throughout the dissertation, which I will not necessarily define again upon each 
subsequent use. Since the nature of these concepts can be contested, I want to make clear precisely 
how I am understanding and employing them throughout the dissertation.  
First, I rely on an understanding of power, and the way power informs social relationships and 
dynamics, including communicative dynamics and linguistic exchanges. Put most simply, power 
involves who has control over whether or not they can actualize their desires and pursuits and who 
doesn’t. The more power one has, the more they can shape their world in accordance with their 
own desires and ends. The less power one has, the more they are subjected to the desires and ends 
of others (see Allen 1998; 2016). Power is relevant to microaggressions because, generally, 




exchange) to a person with lesser social power (in that context or exchange). Microaggressions are 
both a manifestation of power imbalances, and also serve to reinforce them.  
The concept of power is related, in many important respects, to the concept of privilege. Privilege, 
as Peggy McIntosh (1989) explains it, is like an invisible knapsack of benefits that one carries with 
them, and which they can draw upon whenever necessary. Benefits of privilege that one might 
carry with them include “special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, 
visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank checks,” which make one’s navigation of the 
world much easier (McIntosh 1989, 29). Although privilege is often invisible to those who have 
it, and thus often goes unrecognized and unacknowledged, it influences how one sees and moves 
about the world. As Alison Bailey explains, privilege confers a whole host of “unearned 
advantages” on people, who have not earned, and thus do not deserve them (see Bailey 1998). 
When it comes to microaggressions, I believe that privilege not only makes one more immune to 
microaggressions and their harmful effects than those who lack it, but also makes 
microaggressions more difficult to see and recognize. Insofar as microaggressions are not 
something that the comparatively privileged have to worry about as a routine feature of their 
existence, microaggressions are less “on the radar” of those who have significant social privilege.10 
This point factors into the argument made in chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation; specifically, I 
think those with more privilege generally lack the appropriate standpoint from which we can best 
understand and generate robust knowledge about microaggressions.  
Related to power and privilege is the concept of oppression. In thinking about oppression, I borrow 
heavily from feminist philosophers Marilyn Frye (1983) and Iris Marion Young (1990). Both help 
us to see the way that oppression is structural and systemic. In her well-known and often-cited 
 
10 I qualify this point and say “significant social privilege” here because, privilege is not something that one necessary 
has (or lacks) in all domains. Taking intersectionality seriously, I accept that a person can be privileged in some regards 
(e.g., on the basis of race) while lacking privilege in others (e.g., on the basis of gender or sexual orientation). So, one 
who is privileged in some respects might experience microaggressions on account of those other dimensions of their 
identity which are lacking in privilege. While someone with more limited privilege (e.g., someone who benefits from 
white privilege but lacks gender, sexual orientation, or class privilege) might experience microaggressions frequently 
on the basis of gender, sexuality, or class, while someone who is more privileged (e.g., privileged in most, or all social 




account of oppression, Marilyn Frye likens oppression to a birdcage, where the experience of 
oppression is one of being caged in by a system of interconnected and interlocking forces. On 
Frye’s metaphor, it becomes clear that oppression can be difficult to see and recognize because the 
structure – the connections between all of the parts – is often obscured from sight (e.g., because 
one gets caught up examining a single wire, or barrier, at a time, losing focus on the larger 
structure), and/or because the structure comes to be viewed as normal or benign. Iris Marion Young 
(1990) adds further development to the view that oppression is structural, arguing that oppression 
becomes deeply embedded into our everyday social norms and practices, so as to render it 
invisible, and to make it something that even well-intentioned actors, going about their daily lives, 
come to perpetuate (for a longer discussion of the views of Frye and Young on oppression, see 
chapter 1).  
Adding to the difficulty of seeing and recognizing oppression (both for oppressors and the 
oppressed themselves) is the fact that oppression can become “mystified” (Bartky 1979). When 
oppression becomes “mystified,” it becomes obscured from sight, increasingly difficult to see, 
understand, and intervene on. One reason that oppression becomes obscured in this way is because 
oppression, and oppressive beliefs, can become internalized by those on the receiving end. To be 
psychologically oppressed, Bartky writes, is “to be weighed down in your mind; it is to have a 
harsh dominion exercised over your self-esteem” (Bartky 1979). Importantly, those experiencing 
psychological oppression become their own oppressors, that is, they come to exercise harsh 
dominion over their own self-esteem. Putting this point succinctly, Bartky writes: “psychological 
oppression can be regarded as the internalization of intimations of inferiority” (Bartky 1979). I 
believe that this sort of psychological oppression (and the mystification of oppression that results) 
is a symptom of pervasive microaggressions. Microaggressions are so routine, so subtle, and such 
a normal feature of our everyday lives, that they become increasingly harder to detect. Moreover, 
the messages, especially to the extent that they are repeated, often become internalized by the 
targets. The targets can even, over time, adopt and integrate these stereotypical and biased beliefs 




In addition to becoming internalized and mystified, oppression can be what Jean Harvey (1999) 
calls “civilized.”11 Harvey argues that oppression is “civilized” when its violence is not overt nor 
clear to victims, perpetrators, or bystanders, and thus is particularly harmful because the actual 
impact of the harm is obscured. In many ways, this claim is similar to Bartky’s claim that 
oppression becomes mystified, but the significant difference here is that on Harvey’s view, it isn’t 
entirely because of the internalization of oppression that oppression becomes obscured from sight, 
but also because of how… normal it is in our daily social interactions. In other words, when 
oppression is civilized, it comes to feel like a perfectly normal, acceptable even, part of our society 
and social lives. Microaggressions, I believe, are like this; they are routine, common-place, and 
even seem benign, and yet, they are an important force for perpetuating oppression and 
maintaining systems of power and domination. Their “normalness” within society, paired with the 
fact that they are often committed by well-intended people (even those close to us) makes them 
harder to see. They seem, in this regard, more ‘civilized’ than other, more overt or obvious, 
mechanisms of oppression. The “civilized” nature of microaggressions (that they are something 
that we see as acceptable in our academic, clinical, legal, and neighborhood spaces) is part of what 
obscures their significance and allows their harms to continue.  
Microaggressions are a mechanism of oppression, one that is often mystified and is often 
interpreted as civilized. Oppression, and the condition of being oppressed, is a harm. It follows, 
rather straightforwardly, that microaggressions, insofar as they reflect and perpetuate oppression, 
are harmful. I will be making the claim that microaggressions are harmful in various places 
throughout the dissertation, that microaggressions are harmful. As such, it is worth saying some 
general things about how I am understanding harm.  
First and foremost, I believe that, for feminist ends, we need a working conception of harm that is 
broader than many dominant understandings of harm, and which can capture important, non-
physical categories of harm, whether emotional, epistemic, or otherwise. Following Carolyn 
 
11 Harvey (1999) describes civilized oppression as serious but subtle forms of oppression which involve neither 
physical violence nor the use of law, but which nevertheless have serious implications for those on the receiving end. 




McLeod (2010; 2020), I first contend that the concept of harm can be teased apart from the concept 
of wrong (where a wrong is when one is deprived of something to which they are entitled; McLeod 
2020, 50). McLeod (2010; 2010) argues that it is a mistake to assume that all harms are wrongs; 
the concept of harm is broader (McLeod 2010, 16).12 But, like McLeod, though I believe that the 
concept of harm is broader than many theorists do, I also believe the concept of harm is still 
constrained (e.g., not all instances of disappointment or unpleasantness amount to harm (McLeod 
2020, 51))13. Following Joel Feinberg (1984), McLeod describes harm as a “setback to an interest,” 
where an interest is something in which we have a stake (e.g., our families, our reputations, our 
ability to provide testimony and receive uptake, our equal social standing, our self-respect). For 
most people, an instance of frustration or disappointment isn’t sufficient to set back their interests 
(though, repeated instances of disappointment might be, a point which McLeod acknowledges).  
It is notable that McLeod’s account (following Feinberg) allows for non-normative harms, namely, 
harms which are not (or are not obviously) wrongs. Such a view of harm is valuable for feminist 
projects, including my own, and in particular can help make sense of how certain phenomena such 
as implicit bias, stereotype threat, and microaggressions can be harms without necessarily being 
wrongs. As many forms of oppression are subtle in these ways, a notion of harm which can capture 
the harmfulness of such phenomena without needing to prove that they also constitute moral 
wrongs is invaluable. Importantly, I believe, a non-normative account of harm such as the one 
McLeod endorses is better equipped to make sense of harms which are cumulative in nature. There 
are many types of harm for which any single instance might not constitute a wrong, but which, 
taken together over time and across multiple instances, might.  
 
12 McLeod gives some examples of things that, though they would be excluded from some accounts of harm, are 
plausibly harmful (even if not wrongful). These include, for example, being driven out of business by someone who 
sets up shop across the street and lures over one’s customers, or being driven to tears by someone who implies unjustly 
that one is a reprehensible person (McLeod 2020, 51). I agree that the situations described in these examples, while 
perhaps not constitutive of moral wrongs, cause the subjects harm.  
13 Marilyn Frye (1983) makes a similar point in “On Oppression,” namely, that not all instances of bad luck or 
misfortune reflect oppressive harms. For example, a rich white guy who breaks his leg skiing in Aspen has certainly 
experienced a setback, but not one that is reflective of structural and systemic oppression. In this dissertation, I am 
interested in harms that do share this link to oppression. In order to find out when harms are connected to oppression, 
Frye says we are too look at those harms “in context” to see if they are part of an “enclosing structure” that works 




A second noteworthy feature of McLeod’s account is that it allows for the possibility of one’s 
causing harm to another without their express intent to do so, and irrespective of their explicitly 
held attitudes or beliefs. For example, when discussing pharmacists’ conscientious refusals of 
emergency contraception (EC), McLeod discusses the potential, given features of our social 
context, for pharmacists’ refusals to reify sexist and/or racist stereotypes. Importantly, this could 
occur despite, and indeed in spite of, pharmacists’ intentions to contribute to such stereotypes, and 
indeed, without their explicitly endorsing those stereotypes. These mechanisms of reinforcing 
social structures by reinforcing stereotypes – without the explicit intention to do so – are certainly 
harmful and need to be accounted for in feminist accounts of harm. As such, feminists need an 
account of harm that can make sense of harm which is not necessarily intentional.  
The ability to cause harm without intending to do so might sound, at first blush, counterintuitive. 
But, upon reflection, I think that many things that we would all likely intuitively agree are harmful 
can be unintentional. Take a really easy example. You come to visit my house. Upon leaving, and 
while backing out of my driveway, you hit my beloved dog. My beloved dog dies. You did not 
intend this. But my dog is now dead. I have been harmed by this. Your intention is not relevant to 
the question of whether harm is caused. It might be relevant for the question of whether you are 
blameworthy, but it is not relevant to the question of whether your action (e.g., backing up the car) 
brought on an action that caused harmed to me (e.g., my dog dying). For the sake of identifying 
harm, intention and impact can come apart.   
McLeod’s broadening of the concept of harm is useful for her specific purposes (specifically, her 
focus on whether or not women are harmed by the conscientious refusals of health care providers 
to provide them with reproductive care, such as emergency contraception). I believe this 
broadening, and this understanding of harm, is useful for my objectives as well. Feminist and anti-
oppressive projects, such as the one I am undertaking, need an account of harm with at least the 
two traits I have identified. Specifically, an account of harm which is useful for feminist and anti-
oppressive theorizing demands the ability to capture and make sense of (1) harms which do not 
necessarily constitute wrongs, and (2) harms which result independent of the intentions of the 
agent who causes the harm. Such an account is better able to account for more subtle mechanisms 




types of non-physical harm which feminists are concerned with (e.g., epistemic harm, emotional 
harm, and others).  Such an account, then, fits well for my purposes.  
Going beyond McLeod’s account of harm, I will add a final point about how I am understanding 
harm in this thesis. Harms, I contend, can be objective. This is a contentious claim, so I will unpack 
it and offer at least some reasoning for making it. While some might be inclined to think that 
something is only harmful if one consciously perceives and/or experiences the harm as such, I 
believe, contrarily, that one can experience a harm without being fully aware of it. I think this can 
happen in two types of situations.  
The first type of situation in which one can be harmed without being aware of it is when one is 
harmed by something that is slow and cumulative in nature. Consider a slow poisoning by leaking 
carbon monoxide in my home. It makes good sense, I believe, to say that I am being harmed by 
this poisoning, long before I realize it. Another case might be climate change. There is a sense in 
which I am being harmed by the build-up of climate change, long before I personally feel (in a 
direct and obvious way) the impacts of climate disaster. I believe in cases like this, harm is 
occurring, even if I am not (yet) aware of it. In some ways, microaggressions are like this. They 
chip away at one’s self-esteem, self-trust, and sense of who they are. But they are often degrading, 
or causing one to internalize oppression, in slow, building ways; importantly, this can happen 
without one being aware of it. It is still, despite this lack of immediate awareness, harmful.14   
The second type of situation in which we can be harmed without our awareness is the sort of case 
in which something sets back our interest without our knowing it, and we are unlikely to ever find 
 
14 In her recently published book on the ethics of microaggression, Regina Rini (2020) makes a similar point in order 
to offset the critique that microaggression simply cause hurt feelings, not harm. To respond to this, Rini points out 
that the harm lies in the repeat nature and the systematicity of microaggressions. She writes: “Ordinary rudeness 
happens randomly, unpredictably, without any pattern or regularity. But microaggression happens to certain people 
again, and again, and again. For example, consider the way that some strangers insist upon touching black women’s 
hair, often without asking. Just once, this might happen to almost anyone, and then it might be best to shrug off the 
discomfort. But some black women are approached by curious hair-touchers all the time. When an uncomfortable 
experience becomes systemic, the nature of the discomfort changes. You might begin to worry that you are never 
completely free to just be among other people, interacting as people, without some ignorant person treating you like 
a pet. Writer Maisha Johnson puts it this way: ‘Everyone who asks me if they can touch follows a long line of people 
othering me – including strangers who touch my hair without asking. The psychological impact of having people 




out that this has been the case. (Note that this is different from the examples above, in which the 
harm builds up slowly toward some tipping point, at which point I am likely to realize I have been 
harmed: e.g., when I start to feel the effects of the poisoning or experience climate disaster). 
Consider the following as an example of the second sort of case (one in which my ever becoming 
aware of the harm is unlikely). I have a lot of money in my bank account.15 A very savvy thief 
begins slowly withdrawing micro-increments from this account, so slowly that I do not notice at 
first. Indeed, I never catch on. They go on doing this for so long that they end up enjoying a great 
benefit. Each seemingly insignificant withdraw adds up for them (and thus, adds up the overall 
loss for me). You might think that, in this loss, I have suffered a harm – despite my lack of 
awareness. Insofar as maintaining and building my wealth, and not having someone steal my hard-
earned money from me, are interests that I have, the thievery constitutes a setback to meaningful 
interests that I have. This, I believe, would be harmful. And I think the harm occurs regardless of 
my awareness or recognition of it.  
Take another example. I am a queer identified woman. I apply for a job that I am incredibly 
qualified for in the deeply conservative, Bible-belt south. Upon reading my personal statement, 
members of the hiring committee find out that I am queer. Previously, based on my CV, they 
thought they would offer me an interview. The knowledge that I am queer then changes several 
members of the committees’ mind, and they do not, in the end, offer the interview. The hiring 
committee chair sends an email saying I was less qualified than the other candidates. I have, in 
many relevant senses, experienced discrimination, although I will never find out that this has taken 
place. This is an unjustified setback to an interest I have in being fairly considered for the job, for 
which I am qualified. In this setback to this significant interest, I am harmed. This is true even if I 
do not come to find out.  
Consider one final example. OB/GYNs in training are taught how to administer routine pelvic 
exams on young women who are under anaesthetic for unrelated procedures (see Goldberg 2020; 
Green 2019). In going in for a minor surgery, I sign an “informed consent” form agreeing to allow 
 




this procedure to be a “teaching procedure.” To my knowledge, I am allowing medical students in 
the room to observe and learn from the surgical process. I am not explicitly informed that the 
learning might go beyond the procedure that I have come in for. While I am asleep, multiple 
students take turns practicing how to give pelvic exams upon my unconscious body. When I wake 
up from my scheduled procedure, I am never made aware that this has taken place. Multiple people 
have seen, and had physical contact with, my genitalia, without my knowledge. I have a significant 
interest in my own bodily integrity, and especially as it pertains to my sexual and sexed body. Am 
I harmed by what has taken place? I think so. And, as in the savvy thief example, I believe that the 
harm has occurred irrespective of my ever becoming aware of what has taken place.  
My contention is that microaggressions can be like this – they can be sources of undetected harm. 
For the reasons indicated above (microaggressions being an example of “civilized oppression,” 
oppression becoming “internalized” and “mystified”), microaggressions are not always readily 
obvious or detected, even by those at whom they are directed. And yet, the harm(s) can take place. 
So, throughout the remainder of the thesis, it will be assumed that, as a mechanism of oppression, 
microaggressions are harmful. This harm can occur regardless of the intention of the person 
causing it, and this harm can (and often does) occur without the awareness or recognition of the 
person(s) experiencing it.  
These are the central theoretical commitments and underlying conceptual assumptions that will 
factor into the forthcoming arguments in this dissertation. I hope that they help to clarify the 
arguments to come.  
VI. Concluding Remarks 
As the quote that I opened this introduction with reflects, I believe that words have immense power. 
Microaggressions are no exception. Microaggressions play a role in many important social 
phenomena: they set norms (e.g., of permissibility, of how we see and treat one another), police 
boundaries (e.g., of communities, and who is treated as welcome or included within them), and in 
very tangible ways, shape our (social and political) worlds. I hope to have made clear in this 
introduction why microaggressions are important – both in general, and more specifically, as an 
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Chapter 1  
1. Sticks and Stones Can Break Your Bones and Words Can Really Hurt 
You: A Standpoint Epistemological Reply to Critics of the 
Microaggression Research Program 
 
Abstract: 
This chapter responds to a series of objections that have been raised against 
what has been called the “microaggressions research program” (MRP) 
(e.g., Lilienfeld 2017a; Lilienfeld 2017b; Haidt 2017; Lukianoff and Haidt 
2018). These objections aim to challenge the legitimacy of continued 
research on and advocacy around microaggressions in addition to calling 
into question whether or not so-called victims of microaggressions are 
indeed experiencing any real or significant harm. This chapter introduces 
the conceptual tool of structural oppression and the epistemological 
framework of feminist standpoint epistemology as a way to respond to 
these objections, by arguing that members of historically and systemically 
marginalized groups are generally epistemically advantaged with respect 
to recognizing and identifying instances of oppression. As such, members 
of structurally oppressed groups can know different things—and/or know 
them better—than those who are comparatively privileged or possess 
greater social power (Wylie 2003). Developing replies to the critics’ 
objections is an important part of both legitimizing the claims of those in 
structurally oppressed groups who are harmed by repeated experiences of 
microaggression, and of justifying continued academic and public 
discussion of, and research around, microaggression theory. Our approach 
to the MRP critics, rooted in feminist standpoint epistemological 





This chapter aims to respond to a cluster of objections that have been raised against what has been 
called the “microaggressions research program” (MRP) (see for example Lilienfeld 2017a, 2017b; 
Haidt 2017; Lukianoff and Haidt 2015, 2018).16 Taken together, the objections call into question 
whether or not self-proclaimed victims of microaggressions are indeed experiencing any real, 
substantial harm. In broad strokes, critics of MRP advance the following argument: 
microaggressions are often committed via the expressions of words and because words cannot 
constitute a real form of violence or inflict serious harm, microaggressions are not serious 
infractions worthy of our empirical study, time, or moral attention (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015; 
Campbell and Manning 2018; Lukianoff and Haidt 2018, 204-205; Pinker 2018).  Furthermore, 
even if words could result in real harm, we cannot demonstrate this empirically (at least not yet) 
(Lilienfeld 2017). On the basis of this argument, critics have called for a moratorium on 
microaggression awareness campaigns and trainings, as well as any further discussion of 
microaggressions, until there is firm research to confirm that microaggressions are indeed 
damaging to their recipients and can be empirically measured as such (ibid.). 
This chapter offers a two-fold response to the first part of this objection concerning the legitimacy 
and seriousness of harm caused by linguistic expressions of microaggressions. In order to do so, 
we provide a working conception of systemic oppression and introduce feminist standpoint theory 
as a way of arguing that members of historically and systemically marginalized groups generally 
have an epistemic advantage with respect to recognizing and identifying instances of oppression, 
relative to their comparatively privileged counterparts. We take this conception and methodology 
 
16 This chapter is a revised version of a published chapter, co-authored with Lauren Freeman. The citation for the 
published version is as follows: Freeman, Lauren and Heather Stewart, “Sticks and Stones Can Break Your Bones and 
Words Can Really Hurt You: A Standpoint Epistemological Reply to Critics of the Microaggression Research 
Program,” Microaggressions and Philosophy (Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer, eds.), Routledge Press, 
pp. 36-66, 2020.  
We contributed equally to the research, development, writing, and editing of the original published version of the 
chapter. I have revised this chapter on my own for inclusion in the thesis. Prior to original publication, we presented 
the research and received helpful comments from audience members at the 2019 Central Division Meeting of the 
American Philosophical Association and the 2018 meeting of the Midwest division of US SWIP. This chapter has also 
received helpful feedback from Andreas Elpidorou, Jeanine Weeks Schroer, Monnica Williams, Carolyn McLeod, 




as premises of our argument. In other words, we will not argue for the existence of structural and 
systemic oppression, experienced by certain groups on the basis of race, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, or other marginalized identity categories. Nor will we argue for the validity of feminist 
standpoint epistemology as an epistemic approach, though such defenses have been offered (see 
for example Collins 1990; Harding 1993; and Wylie 2003, 2012). With both of these assumptions 
in hand (e.g., the existence of structural oppression and the validity of the feminist standpoint 
theory approach to understanding oppression), we develop a response to the growing criticisms 
against MRP. We do so in such a way that situates recipients of microaggressions and the harms 
they experience at the centre of our understanding of the phenomenon, and by legitimating the 
kinds of knowledge one’s social position and daily experiences of oppression grant them.  
This chapter unfolds in five parts.  In section 1.2, we define what microaggressions are and provide 
an example of the phenomenon. In section 1.3, we reconstruct the grounding claims of the main 
objection against MRP outlined above (that is, that microaggressions aren’t that serious). In section 
1.4, we develop an argument as to why an understanding of oppression is relevant to this 
discussion, insofar as oppression is a form of harm (also see the introduction to this thesis). We 
present two methodological tools – the concept of structural and systemic oppression and an 
account of feminist standpoint theory – that will allow us to properly respond to the MRP critics. 
Using these concepts, in section 1.5, we respond to each objection. Our chapter only claims to 
offer a theoretical grounding for reconceptualising the harms of microaggressions and does not 
discuss in detail how to measure those harms empirically. Nevertheless, we conclude the chapter, 
in section 1.6, by mentioning some of the philosophical and empirical work that has already begun, 
and which holds great promise for responding to the second part of the objection (that is, that 
microaggressions cannot be studied empirically). Our main claim is that responding to these 
objections by pointing to the larger context of structural and systemic oppression in which 
microaggressions occur is of paramount importance. Moreover, theorizing microaggressions via 
an alternative epistemology – feminist standpoint epistemology – offers a fruitful way forward for 
justifying the continuation of the MRP, and doing so in a way that centers and legitimizes the 





Before getting started, two clarificatory points are in order. One might be wondering why serious 
philosophers should address these critiques at all. They are, after all, not made by philosophers, 
nor are they very philosophically sophisticated arguments (e.g., there is slippage between terms 
that philosophers tend to use with precision, lack of clarity about how terms such as “harm” are 
being employed, and there is shallow and superficial engagement at best with philosophical 
concepts and ideas, such as “intersectionality”). With respect to the first point, it is worth 
responding to this line of critique because it is having a social and political effect. As a result of 
their reach on multiple platforms (popular press articles, YouTube videos, podcast appearances), 
the critics’ views have infiltrated popular consciousness, including students in our classrooms. 
Insofar as the position the critics advocate is getting mainstream uptake, it warrants address. With 
respect to the second point, it is worth noting that, methodologically, we are extrapolating their 
arguments and giving them philosophical form, based on what appears across a series of popular 
books and articles. We attempt to formalize their arguments in order to offer a systematic response. 
Such a response helps justify ongoing concern about microaggressions in our social, political, and 
academic realms.  
 Microaggressions 
Microaggressions refer to brief, commonplace, often subtle verbal, behavioral, and environmental 
indignities. They can be either intentional or unintentional and are rooted in (implicit or explicit) 
prejudice and/or racial, ethnic, gender, sexuality, religious, disability, or other stereotypes that are 
directed at members of marginalized groups (see for example Sue et al., 2007; Sue 2010; Nadal 
2013, 2018; Nadal et al. 2011; Torres et. al 2010; Torres et. al 2019). A common example of a 
microaggression occurs when a person of color is asked “Where are you from?” and when they 
respond with, “New York, just like you,” the questioner persists in asking, “But where are you 
really from?” This exchange is considered to be a microaggression, since it presupposes that 
there’s an important difference between a white person and a person of color who are both from 
the United States. Even if unintentional, such a line of questioning sends the message to the person 
of color that they aren’t a “true” American, or that they are really a foreigner or “Other” in their 
own country. Microaggressions also occur when people of color, people of lower socioeconomic 




so articulate!” Here, though the speaker might think they’re complimenting their interlocutor, they 
in fact send the message that members of these groups aren’t expected to be articulate and that 
their being articulate comes across as surprising and anomalous (see Ayala 2020). Importantly, 
microaggressions of this sort are never one-offs. Rather, when members of these groups routinely 
hear such comments and questions, microaggressions can compound to create significant harm 
(see Pierce 1978; also see Evans and Mallon 2020). In the first example regarding country of 
origin, the harm is their resulting feeling that they don’t belong, even in their birth country. 
Microaggressions are directed toward members of marginalized groups not because of who they 
are as individuals but because of their membership in a systemically oppressed social group that 
is defined on the basis of race, ethnicity, class, gender identity, sexual orientation, dis/ability status, 
body size, or any combination thereof. The person of color who is asked “But where are you really 
from?” is asked that question precisely because they are a person of color.  Microaggressions are 
subtle (yet highly effective) means of reinforcing the oppression of members of socially 
marginalized groups, a point to which we return below. 
 Objections to Microaggression Research Program 
In the past decade, there’s been heightened attention to microaggressions in popular and academic 
venues, largely following the publication of psychologist Derald Wing Sue’s book, 
Microaggressions in Everyday Life (2010). While many scholars and activists have found the 
concept of microaggression to be helpful for explaining this strikingly common phenomenon and 
have engaged in fruitful developments of the concept in the bourgeoning microaggressions 
literature, there remain some vocal critics who deny the reality and/or seriousness of 
microaggressions, and thus the value of researching or discussing them in academic and other 
contexts. 
In the introductory remarks above, we provided a sketch of a central argument that has been 
launched against MRP, both in popular media outlets (Mac Donald 2014; Campbell & Manning 
2015; Friedersdorf 2015a, 2015b; Lehmann 2018; Lukianoff and Haidt 2015; Harper 2018) and in 
the academic literature (Haslam 2017; Lilienfeld 2017; Nagai 2017). The general idea is that 
microaggressions do not cause serious and enduring harm, and that concerns over them are 




account of various other concerns, such as threats to free speech, apparent obsession with “political 
correctness,” and the creation of a culture of “victimhood.” A particularly noteworthy piece in this 
vein is Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt’s 2015 piece in The Atlantic, “The Coddling of the 
American Mind.” This piece forms the basis for their 2018 popular book, The Coddling of the 
American Mind: How Good Intentions and Bad Ideas Are Setting Up a Generation for Failure.17 
Their treatment of microaggressions in this book will be our main focus, since it builds the detailed 
foundation upon which the more general argument discussed above is based.  
In what follows, we reconstruct and assess four claims that are central to their critique: (1) the 
concept “microaggression” is being taught to students on college campuses in order to police and 
take down well-meaning professors and students (40-41, 46), thereby building both a problematic 
call-out culture (71, 77) and a culture of victimization that is both dangerous and detrimental to 
the aims and goals of higher education (46; also see Campbell and Manning 2015, 2017); (2) 
students have a choice as to how to interpret so-called slights against them and the pervasive 
microaggression culture is encouraging them to choose to interpret actions incorrectly, namely, as 
harms that were intentionally committed toward them, when in fact, they were really just harmless, 
unintentional actions that could just as easily be interpreted as such (40-42); (3) recipients of 
microaggressions are wrong (verging on pathological) in their interpretation and understanding of 
what they call “microaggressions” and the so-called harm they claim to experience as a result (38-
38, 41-42), and (4) there is only one worldview in the context of which microaggressions can be 
understood, namely, the worldview of the agent committing them (40-46, 206) and that those who 
do not occupy that worldview and who think otherwise are suffering “cognitive distortions” that 
demand psychological intervention (39). Taken together, these four claims constitute the general 
critique. Let us now expand upon each claim.  
 
17 Note, their critique of microaggressions offered in the book is just one strand of a broader investigation into what 
they think is “going wrong on college campuses.” They also criticize things such as content warnings, safe spaces, 
identity politics, and the like, all on the grounds that they are forms of “overprotection” which have net negative 





Claim 1: Professors and Administrators are Teaching Marginalized Students to See Slights Where 
They Do Not Exist  
It is clear throughout their discussion of microaggressions that Lukianoff and Haidt believe that 
students who are members of marginalized groups arrive at university, naïve and inexperienced, 
and upon their arrival are being indoctrinated about microaggressions and even encouraged by 
(certain) professors and administrators to level the charge that (other) well-intentioned professors 
and students have committed microaggressions against them (40-41). For example, they write the 
following about what they take university professors and administrators to be doing, namely 
“[t]eaching people to see more aggression in ambiguous interactions, take more offence, feel more 
negative emotions, and avoid questioning their initial interpretations” (42). They suggest that this 
is part of a plot to “scrub campuses clean of words, ideas, and subjects that might cause discomfort 
or give offense” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015).18,19  
Claim 2: Recipients of Microaggressions Choose to Interpret Actions Incorrectly, as 
Microaggressions 
Building upon (1), their account states that students who are members of marginalized groups who 
believe that they have experienced a microaggression have a choice: they can interpret such 
 
18 This is directly related to the free speech concerns raised in academic contexts that I discuss in chapter 5 of this 
thesis.  
19 It is worth flagging the irony here that Lukianoff and Haidt are discouraging a certain type of speech here, namely, 
teaching about microaggressions, implicit bias, and the like. As such, they might not really be the robust free speech 
advocates that they take themselves to be, at least not if the speech being exercised is about these phenomena (e.g., 
microaggressions).  
One additional point worth mentioning here is that the way Lukianoff and Haidt characterize microaggressions, and 
what professors teach about microaggression, doesn’t always seem to track how microaggression theorists understand 
the concept, or how professors tend to teach about it. As such, at times we can simply be talking past one another, as 
we might not be on the same page about what microaggressions are and how we should talk to students and others 
about them. A parallel tension exists between critics of “critical race theory” and those who teach it. Specifically, the 
recent panic around “critical race theory” seems, in many cases, not only to mischaracterize critical race theory itself, 
but also to misunderstand how it is taught in classroom settings. So, the accusations of critics (e.g., about what they 
believe professors are teaching students) might not have anything to do with what professors are teaching students 
(e.g., about structural racism) in practice. When concepts like “microaggression” and “critical race theory” get taken 
outside of the academy and unleased into our incredibly polarized social and political domain, good faith debates 
about them get more difficult to have, as the debates are always already obscured by bad press and misinformed 




comments or actions “uncharitably” (41), that is, as microaggressive slights; or, just as easily, they 
can interpret them more charitably, as benign comments.20 They write: “If a student feels a flash 
of offense as the recipient of such statements, is he better off embracing that feeling and labeling 
himself a victim of microaggression, or is he better off asking himself if a more charitable 
interpretation might be warranted by the facts?” (41-42). 21 , 22  Moreover, they claim that by 
encouraging students to develop an “extra thin skin,” we fail to teach them to “question their own 
emotional reactions” and to “give people the benefit of the doubt” (ibid.). They write: 
Yes, one certainly could interpret these everyday questions and comments 
in this way, as tiny acts of aggression, rebuke or exclusion – and sometimes 
that is exactly what they are. But there are other ways to interpret these 
statements too. More to the point, should we teach students to interpret 
these kinds of things as acts of aggression? (66).  
Claim 3: Talk of Microaggressions and Harm is the Product of a Distorted Worldview  
 
20 See Schact (2008) and Thomas (2008) for a similar claim, namely, that microaggressions are no different from 
interpersonal slights that all people experience, regardless of marginalized identity. Importantly, their criticism has 
not been supported by empirical research (see, for example, Huynh 2012; Ong et al. 2013) 
 
21 A key point of Lukianoff and Haidt’s critique of MRP (40-42) involves a discussion of the role of intentions in 
microaggressions (and a critique of the shift of emphasis on college campuses away from “intent” to “impact” (43ff)). 
Following a common understanding of aggression in psychology – which requires there to be intention behind the 
action in order for it to count as an instance of aggression – their claim is that the concept of microaggression is 
nonsensical since most instances of them do not involve the explicit intention by the agent to cause harm to the 
recipient. Thus, their claim is that not only is this not an instance of aggression (or “microaggression”) but additionally, 
the agent is not morally responsible for the consequences (since the action was not intentional), and therefore should 
not be blamed or called out for their behavior. We do not have the space to respond to this point in full here; we do so 
extensively in our longer response to the critique of MRP by Lukianoff and Haidt and others (Freeman and Stewart, 
manuscript in progress). Suffice it to say that it is a mistake (phenomenologically, conceptually, and morally) to 
understand aggression in the way that they do; as a result, and once again, their critique of MRP falls apart since they 
are making a strawman argument.  
22 In another attempt to take the emphasis (and potential blame) away from those who commit microaggressions, they 
write: “Wouldn’t our relationships be better if we all did a little less blaming and dichotomous thinking, and 
recognized that we usually share responsibility for conflict?” (39, our emphasis). But what this really amounts to is an 
instance of victim blaming, making it seem as though somehow members of marginalized groups are equally 
responsible for the harms they experience, or, claim to experience, on account of microaggressions as those who 





Their third main claim is that recipients of microaggressions are wrong in their interpretation and 
understanding of what they call “microaggressions” and the so-called harm or “hurt feelings” (42) 
they claim to experience as a result. Lukianoff and Haidt’s critique of microaggression is preceded 
by a discussion of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) which is introduced as a method to “combat 
maladaptive core beliefs” that lead to the development of schemas that “interfere with realistic and 
adaptive interpretations of social situations” (38).23 Within the context of discussing CBT, they 
claim that recipients of microaggressions both make unfair assumptions and also unfairly interpret 
what’s occurred: “But it is not a good idea to start by assuming the worst about people and reading 
their actions as uncharitably as possible” (41). They go even further to claim that such misreadings 
of people’s actions are pathological: “This distortion is known as mindreading; if done habitually 
and negatively, it is likely to lead to despair, anxiety, and a network of damaged relationships” 
(ibid.). Lukianoff and Haidt’s position is that those who claim to have experienced 
microaggressions have a skewed perception of reality, are sick, and need psychological 
treatment/therapy in order to set themselves right (9, 40-43).24  
Claim 4: There is only One Correct Worldview from Which to Understand Microaggressions: That 
of Those Committing Them 
 
23 They also discuss the need for students who perceive microaggressions to receive CBT in their 2015 article, writing 
that “[t]he goal is to minimize distorted thinking and see the world more accurately. You start by learning the names 
of the dozen or so most common cognitive distortions (such as overgeneralizing, discounting positives, and emotional 
reasoning…). Each time you notice yourself falling prey to one of them, you name it, describe the facts of the situation, 
consider alternative interpretations, and then choose an interpretation of events more in line with those facts. Your 
emotions follow your new interpretation. In time, this process becomes automatic. When people improve their mental 
hygiene in this way—when they free themselves from the repetitive irrational thoughts that had previously filled so 
much of their consciousness—they become less depressed, anxious, and angry” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015). It should 
be noted that theirs is a very thin, at times questionable, articulation of CBT and mindreading that is not even consistent 
within their own discussion. For a description of how they understand CBT, see Lukianoff and Haidt 2018, 36. 
Importantly, we do not deny the importance of CBT in some cases, we just think the prescription of CBT in response 
to subtle acts of oppression is misguided – certainly when offered as a solution to the problem.  
 
24 It is also worth noting that they recommend CBT – in their thin sense (see footnote 7) – to everybody, as a means 
of “improving critical thinking skills” and “counteracting the effects of Great Untruths” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2018, 
14). They explicitly state that since “everyone engages in [cognitive] distortions from time to time… CBT is useful 
for everyone” (ibid., 39). They even go so far as to include a guide for their readers to self-practice CBT on themselves 
(ibid., appendix 1, 275-278). Again, we think this is a fairly thin, potentially problematic conception of CBT, as it 
tends to be understood as a clinical tool used to treat diagnosed or diagnosable mental health conditions, by trained 




Following from what Lukianoff and Haidt explicitly state in claim 3, the upshot of their account 
of microaggressions is that that there is only one correct worldview on the basis of which such 
interactions can be understood, namely, the worldview of those who are in positions of social 
power (those who are white, male and though they do not discuss any identity categories other 
than race (and marginally, gender), we can assume a normative status of physical ability, 
heterosexuality, being cisgender, and so on).25 This position can be seen most clearly in a pattern 
they set up throughout their discussion (i.e., 39, 41-42, 43, 46) where options for interpreting 
microaggressions are boiled down to only two: the correct or “charitable” view (that of those in 
dominant social positions) and the incorrect view of recipients (as discussed in claim 3, and also 
in claims 1 and 2). Their point is that there is only one correct worldview in the context of which 
microaggressions can be understood and (as discussed in 3) if you are a member of a marginalized 
group and do not share this (dominant, and thus correct) world view, then you are simply wrong, 
possibly even pathologically wrong, and need to be set straight, in some cases, even by CBT or 
other professional measures (40-46).  
Before moving on, in order to be as charitable as possible, it is worth trying to imagine the 
perspective that leads the critics to their skeptical position. In this regard, a few things come to 
mind. First and foremost is the sheer difficulty, or perhaps impossibility, of fully understanding 
either the moral significance or the phenomenological “what it is like” of situations we have not 
experienced first-hand. Consider a somewhat neutral example: one that is about the significance 
of lived experience but is not about the specific experience of living under conditions of 
oppression. The example is as follows: Heather has never experienced the condition of being 
pregnant. Though she has read and listened to many accounts of what pregnancy is like, such that 
she can get some indirect sense of this experience, she can never know, fully, what it is like from 
the perspective of a pregnant person. There are certain (epistemic, phenomenological) dimensions 
of the condition of pregnancy that are off limits to Heather, regardless of how much she tries to 
listen and be empathetic to others who have had this lived experience.  
 
25 Not necessarily coincidentally, this is precisely the worldview that both Lukianoff and Haidt inhabit, given the 




Conditions of oppression are like this too; being oppressed is a robust phenomenological and 
psychological experience that cannot be fully understood – in a direct way – by those who have 
not been on the receiving end of oppression. It is only from the perspective of one who is oppressed 
that one can understand the full moral scope and seriousness of oppression, as well as the ways in 
which being oppressed impacts one’s experience of the world. When we cannot experience such 
things directly, there are strong moral reasons to defer to the testimony of those who have (cf. 
Thomas 1993 on “moral deference.”). Here, it seems as if Lukianoff and Haidt have failed to 
recognize the limits of their experience, and moreover, have failed to observe deference to those 
with the relevant experience.  
In addition to failing to recognize and respond to one’s own epistemic limitations (those which 
arise on account of one’s lived experiences), another relevant factor that might explain the 
perspective from which the critics are coming to the issue of microaggression is the following. 
There tends to be a reluctance by those with social power or privilege to acknowledge and respond 
to this power or privilege, or the ways in which their power or privilege might implicate them in 
systems and structures of social injustice. Moreover, it can be really psychologically difficult to 
grapple with, and ultimately take accountability for, the harms we cause to others. As such, there 
is a tendency to doubt or deny our role in structures that cause harm. For example, many have 
pointed to the phenomenon of “white guilt” (cf. Steele 2007; also see DiAngelo 2018 on “white 
fragility”), or the tendency of white people to collapse into self-defeating and unproductive 
feelings of guilt in the face of racial injustice. Experiences of such guild can lead white people to 
shut down in the face of injustice, instead of stepping up and taking accountability for their role, 
or complicity, in racial injustice and harm. Moreover, because guilt is an uncomfortable feeling, 
many try to avoid this negative feeling by denying their involvement in racist systems or structures 
that uphold white supremacy, and instead try to absolve themselves from responsibility as a self-
protective mechanism.  
Acknowledging one’s complicity or participation in structures that cause harm is not easy, nor is 
it comfortable. It is easier to try to absolve oneself of responsibility and claim “clean hands” than 
to engage in the difficult work of self-reflection and moral growth. As such, people do not want to 




wrongdoing. This puts people on the defensive, especially when they feel as if the conclusion to 
be drawn (e.g., from claims that they have committed microaggressions) is that they are bad 
people. Correcting this misconception – namely, that acknowledging the moral seriousness of 
microaggressions and recognizing the harm one causes in committing them makes one a bad 
person – is at least part of the challenge of responding to critics and challenging the broader 
skeptical attitude toward microaggressions. 
In suggesting these possible explanations for why the critics make the assumptions and draw the 
conclusions about microaggressions that they do, the intention is not to let them off the hook. 
Rather, the idea is to illuminate how these skeptical ideas regarding microaggressions – ones which 
are informed by power and privilege – can emerge, and what sorts of responses might be necessary 
to help respond to them. And, because this position is likely to arise as a result of power and 
privilege, and a lack of direct experience with oppression, it remains relevant to engage with. 
Doing so involves illuminating the connection between microaggressions and structural and 
systemic oppression, and clarifying how microaggressions connect to, or are continuous with, 
other mechanisms of oppression – many of which are deeply embedded into the very fabric of our 
social lives (see Young 1990). An alternative epistemological framework is also needed – one that 
can account for the differences in lived experiences, and how they shape and inform one’s 
perspective on oppression. Specifically, a framework of feminist standpoint epistemology can help 
to reinforce the importance of understanding this phenomenon from the perspective of those with 
the relevant lived experiences. With both of these methodological tools in hand (the concept of 
oppression and the alternative epistemological framework), we will be in a position to demonstrate 
precisely how and why Lukianoff and Haidt’s objections to microaggressions fail.  
  
 Oppression and Standpoint Theory 
1.4.1. Oppression  
Microaggressions are, in many ways, tightly connected to conditions of oppression (see 




hand, because microaggressions are rooted in widely held prejudicial stereotypes and biases, social 
stratification and social oppression are the very preconditions that make microaggressions possible 
and forceful (see chapter 2 of this thesis on the social context-dependency of microaggressions). 
Moreover, insofar as microaggressions convey hostility toward or bias against marginalized 
groups, microaggressions are one ubiquitous mechanism for more deeply embedding such bias 
and hostility, and indeed rendering it so commonplace so as to seem socially normal or acceptable. 
In this way, microaggressions contribute to the reinforcement of certain forms of social hierarchy 
and subsequently, the oppression of some social groups.  
In order to get clearer as to precisely how microaggressions are related to larger forms of structural 
oppression, we need to have in hand a working concept of oppression. Most broadly, oppression 
refers to "the existence of unequal and unjust institutional constraints,” where these constraints 
involve harm to some social group and simultaneously benefit another social group (Cudd 2006, 
25, 52). Such institutionally structured constraints can include "legal rights, obligations and 
burdens, stereotypical expectations, wealth, income, social status, conventions, norms, and 
practices" (ibid., 50).  
In her famous chapter “The Five Faces of Oppression,” Iris Marion Young refers to oppression as 
“structural phenomena that immobilize or diminish a group (1990, 42). Oppressive phenomena are 
structural insofar as they are not the result of a few people’s choices or policies; rather, their causes 
are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, symbols, and policies, and in unquestioned 
assumptions underlying institutional rules and of often ordinary, well-meaning people. Oppressive 
phenomena are systemic insofar as an oppressed group need not have a correlate oppressing group. 
That is to say, oppression need not always fit the paradigm of conscious and intentional oppression 
of one group by another. Rather, it is far more insidious than that. Given that oppression is 
structural and systemic and is not, first and foremost, about individual oppressors, the individual 
intentions behind any given act should be bracketed out of the equation as mostly irrelevant. 
Because of its structural and systemic nature, one can indeed be a well-meaning individual and 
still perpetuate oppressive norms. 
To further parse Young’s claim mentioned above, a social “group” is “defined…by a shared sense 




produces…that define the group as a group” (ibid., 44).  Members of the same social group share 
a common experience or way of life (ibid.), though importantly, groups are not homogeneous. 
Groups are multiple, cross-cutting, and fluid and can be differentiated by race, age, gender, class, 
sexuality, region, nationality, and so on. Moreover, all persons have multiple group identities. 
Young places such emphasis on groups because oppression does not affect individuals qua 
individuals; rather, it affects individuals insofar as they are members of a marginalized group or 
groups.  
Building on its structural and systematic nature, and in addition to the idea that individuals 
experience oppression insofar as they are members of a marginalized group or groups, “all 
oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their capacities 
and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings” (ibid., 40). In other words, oppression hinders 
members of marginalized groups from achieving their goals, fulfilling their projects, or even 
simply navigating the world with ease (or, at all). Young develops this position by elaborating 
upon five “faces” of oppression which represent the myriad ways in which members of 
marginalized groups can be oppressed. The faces she develops – exploitation, marginalization, 
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence – often overlap with one another to create 
complicated matrices of oppression.  
The first three faces of oppression – exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness – refer to 
structural and institutional relations of power and oppression that occur by virtue of the social 
division of labor: who works for whom, who does not work, and how the content of work defines 
one’s institutional position. Each of these faces pertains to our material lives, resources, and the 
concrete possibilities we have or do not have in order to develop and exercise our capacities. Each 
has to do with concrete power in relation to others.  
But the fourth face of oppression, cultural imperialism, differs from the previous three. For our 
purposes and anticipating our response to the objections that have been leveled against MRP, we 
focus primarily on cultural imperialism as a face of oppression. Before doing so, it is worth noting 
Young’s final face of oppression, violence. As Young notes, some groups experience routine 
physical violence, and, as a result, members of those groups have to live with the constant threat 




brutality experienced by Black communities in America. Because this sort of violence is 
heightened for members of the Black community, Black people live with constant anxiety that 
themselves, or someone they love, will become a target of this sort of violence. The specter of 
violence hangs over Black communities and informs how Black people interact with the world 
(e.g., Black mothers often prepare their Black children for interactions with the police, and train 
them on how they should or shouldn’t respond in order to minimize such risks). Another example 
is sexual violence against women. Awareness of the pervasive sexual violence faced by women 
and girls can lead women to move about the world differently (e.g., differently than their male 
counterparts). The awareness of this sort of threat – namely, that members of one’s group are at 
heightened risk for certain sorts of physical violence – is oppressive. Though this last face of 
oppression (violence) might be relevant to microaggressions in some ways (e.g., some argue that 
certain sorts of epistemic oppression, which might include some microaggressions, constitutes 
“epistemic violence”; c.f. Dotson 2011), it can be set aside for now. This is because cultural 
imperialism has the greatest explanatory power for responding to the critiques at hand. Let’s now 
turn our attention back to the face of cultural imperialism.  
Cultural imperialism occurs when the experiences, cultural symbols, and perspective of the 
dominant cultural group are normalized and posited as universal for everyone, rendering other 
groups who do not embrace such norms to be invisible, inferior, deviant, and 'Other.' Cultural 
imperialism results in a situation in which those at the margins are defined from outside of the 
cultural mainstream and placed at the social margins, away from the [dominant] center (see hooks 
1984). Such placement as ‘Other’ becomes internalized insofar as the center constantly reinforces 
it. For example, consider the negative bias against hairstyles such as cornrows and dreadlocks, 
traditionally worn by Black people. Such hairstyles have been viewed as “unprofessional,” 
“unnatural,” “unruly,” “unkempt,” “excessive,” “distracting,” “urban,” and “messy” (see, for 
example, Jorie 2018; Nittle 2018; Sutton 2017) by (white) standards of professionalism; thus, 
people who tend to wear those styles (i.e., Black people) experience bias and discrimination in 
interviews and hiring processes.26 Internalizing this norm – or recognizing that failing to comply 
 
26 Recently, as of July 2019, California and New York have become the first two U.S. states to ban discrimination 




with the norm makes landing a job more difficult – can cause Black people to adopt more 
traditionally “white” hair styles (i.e., by straightening their hair, often in expensive, painful, and 
dangerous processes that have been linked to cancer and reproductive health problems (Nittle 
2018)) in an effort to conform to the dominant norms of professionalism (Janin 2016; Mar 2018; 
Allen 2019). Yet, in these same professional contexts, white people can co-opt or appropriate these 
hairstyles, and be celebrated for doing so (Blay 2015). 27  This is one example of cultural 
imperialism – the prioritization and promotion of dominant culture at the expense of marginalized 
identities and cultures, and the resulting double standards of who can engage in certain cultural 
practices without stigma or backlash.  
In order to further our understanding of cultural imperialism, Young draws upon the work of 
W.E.B. Du Bois who called this kind of culturally oppressed experience “double consciousness”: 
namely, “the sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s 
soul by the tape of a world that looks on in an amused contempt and pity” (cited in Young 1990, 
60). To experience double consciousness means that a subject who is a member of a marginalized 
group desires recognition as a human being who is capable of activity, thought, and personhood 
(among other things), yet from the dominant culture, they receive only the judgment that they are 
not only different, but inferior. According to Young, the injustice of cultural imperialism is “that 
the oppressed group’s own experience and interpretation of social life finds little expression that 
touches the dominant culture, while that same culture imposes on the oppressed group its 
experience and interpretation of social life” (60). This dominant interpretation is one that demeans 
the group in question, seeing them as inferior.  
One final point that we’d like to introduce in order to better understand the phenomenon of 
oppression and to explain how and why it can often be difficult for members of dominant groups 
to see, is the classic birdcage analogy, introduced by Marilyn Frye in her 1983 book, The Politics 
of Reality. Frye describes the analogy as follows:  
 
27 For a photography project that explores this very point, see Endia Beal’s “Can I Touch It?” series, in which she has 
white women adorn traditionally Black hair styles and have traditional corporate photos taken. See Rosenberg 2013, 




Consider a birdcage. If you look very closely at just one wire in the cage, 
you cannot see the other wires. If your conception of what is before you is 
determined by this myopic focus, you could look at that one wire, up and 
down the length of it, and be unable to see why a bird would not just fly 
around the wire any time it wanted to go somewhere. Furthermore, even 
if, one day at a time, you myopically inspected each wire, you still could 
not see why a bird would have trouble going past the wires to get 
anywhere. There is no physical property of any one wire, nothing that the 
closest scrutiny could discover, that will reveal how a bird could be 
inhibited or harmed by it except in the most accidental way. It is only when 
you step back, stop looking at the wires one by one, microscopically, and 
take a macroscopic view of the whole cage, that you can see why the bird 
does not go anywhere; and then you will see it in a moment. It will require 
no great subtlety of mental powers. It is perfectly obvious that the bird is 
surrounded by a network of systematically related barriers, no one of 
which would be the least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their 
relations to each other, are as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon 
(Frye 1983, emphasis added).  
The analogy illustrates how, under conditions of oppression, the complex network of barriers 
(many of which, individually, are difficult to perceive on their own), function together to keep a 
person caged in, namely, restricted or immobilized. Oppressed people experience the world in a 
way that is confined and shaped by these forces and barriers, none of which are accidental, and all 
of which are related to one another in a systematic fashion to keep the cage intact. Frye notes that 
the cage metaphor helps to illuminate the reason that oppression can be so difficult to recognize 
for those who are themselves not targets of such forces (i.e., those outside the cage), namely, that 
when people try to study a singular element of an oppressive structure, and perhaps do so with 
great care and good will, they still fail to see the structure as a whole. They examine single wires 
(viz. a single phenomenon) but cannot see that there is a full cage of interlocking wires there (viz. 
the systemic and structural entirety of oppression). Thus, they fail to see the full picture of how 




entire structure, because it is the structure as a whole which prevents their mobility or freedom.28 
As Frye notes, “barriers have different meanings to those on opposite sides of them” (1983, 12). 
The ability to recognize the full structure is enhanced or compromised by one’s relationship to it 
and position within or outside of it.  
1.4.2. Standpoint Theory 
The central claim of standpoint theory is that those who are subject to oppression and systems of 
domination generally possess an epistemic advantage with respect to understanding experiences 
of oppression and subjugation. As such, members of structurally oppressed groups can know 
different things—or know them better—than those who are comparatively privileged (Wylie 
2003). While early articulations of standpoint theory were Marxist, arguing for epistemic privilege 
of the proletariat over matters concerning economics and sociology (Marx 1976, 1981), feminist 
epistemologists have developed the standpoint approach to account for the unique experiences of 
marginalized people who are oppressed on axes other than, or in addition to class, namely, 
oppression that occurs on the basis of sex, gender, and/or race (see Collins 1990, 2004; Harding 
1993; Hartsock 1998).  
Despite critiques of standpoint theory which question it as a viable approach to epistemology (see 
Longino 1993; Lugones and Spelman 1983), recent defenses and revised articulations of feminist 
standpoint theory have helped to clarify the theory’s aims and scope, as well as to respond to some 
early objections, iron out some initial misunderstandings, and make good on some of the original 
limitations of the theory (see, for example, Wylie 2012). According to Alison Wylie (2003), the 
central aim of feminist standpoint theory is to better understand how the systemic partiality of 
authoritative knowledge arises and to account for the difficulties of both drawing attention to and 
countering this partiality (26). In societies such as ours, which are stratified by race, ethnicity, 
 
28 The phrase “in many cases” is added here because, as is explained in the introduction to this thesis, oppression can 
be internalized by the oppressed, comprising, in some cases, the ability to see the forces at work in keeping one 
oppressed. However, even when oppression is internalized, this does not happen in a way that is totalizing or complete; 
oppressed people are still able to recognize, as a result of their lived experiences, that they are limited or restricted in 





class, gender, sexuality, ability, and so on, where one falls within those stratifications can greatly 
impact how one experiences the world, what one can see, and thereby, what one can know. As 
such, a central tenet of feminist standpoint epistemology is that knowledge of oppression ought to 
start from the position of marginalized lives (Collins 1990; Harding 1993; Wylie 2012). As Wylie 
explains, “to do social science as a standpoint feminist is to approach inquiry from the perspective 
of insiders rather than impose on them the external categories of professional social science, a 
managing bureaucracy, ruling elites” (2003, 27). This move is made because those who are 
systemically marginalized “have the especially salient advantage that they… [are] in a position to 
grasp the effects of power relations in their own understanding and that of others” (Wylie 2003, 
34). That is, those on the losing end of oppressive social systems are better suited to understand 
those systems because they are the most directly affected by them. In other words, those who 
occupy “the bottom” of a socially-stratified society have greater epistemic access to understanding 
oppressive human relations, and to identifying problems to be explained in our social words 
(Harding 1990, 443). Standpoint theory provides a framework for understanding how, based on 
this greater understanding, certain kinds of diversity (i.e., racial, cultural, gender, class, etc.) can 
enrich, rather than compromise, scientific and social inquiry (Wylie 2003, 26).  
Furthermore, according to standpoint theory, we must be concerned not only with the production, 
but also with the effects of systemically defined social locations (ibid., 31). What counts as social 
location is structurally defined:  
What individuals experience and understand is shaped by their location in 
a hierarchically structured system of power relations: by the material 
conditions of their lives, by the relations of production and reproduction 
that structure their social interactions and by the conceptual resources they 
have to represent and interpret these relations (ibid.). 
Standpoint theory is thus committed to the situated knowledge thesis: that “social location 
systematically shapes and limits what we know, including tacit, experiential knowledge as well as 
explicit understanding, what we take knowledge to be as well as specific epistemic context” (ibid.; 
also see Toole 2019). Importantly, standpoint theory does not endorse a thesis of automatic 




know more, or know better, based on their social location (ibid., 28).29 Rather, more moderately, 
the claim is that what we know is profoundly influenced and shaped by the social and material 
conditions of our lives, a claim that casts into relief the contingent and historical nature of what 
counts as knowledge and focuses attention on the processes by and in which knowledge is 
produced (ibid.). Where people fall in social arrangements (that is, the social positions and 
identities they occupy) can grant them epistemic privilege with respect to questions about those 
social contexts, and more precisely, about what it is like to be oppressed within those contexts 
(Toole 2019; also see chapter 1 of this thesis). Knowledge never happens in a vacuum; it is neither 
ahistorical, nor translocational (ibid., 30-31). Rather, knowledge is produced within the context of 
social structures and institutions where not all people occupy equal (social, political, material) 
positions and therefore, not all people are privy to the same kinds of first-personal knowledge. It 
is also worth noting that the first-personal knowledge of oppressed people is itself shaped by forces 
of oppression. For example, people can experience psychological oppression (cf. Bartky 1979), or 
other forms of self-doubt or self-deception, which is ultimately brought on by living under 
oppressive circumstances. So, while the epistemic advantage that oppressed people have is not 
perfect, complete, or infallible, oppressed people are, nevertheless, generally better positioned to 
know, as a result of their lived experience, what oppression is like and why it is significant.  
It is a perverse feature of oppression that knowledge systems are rendered distorted and partial. If 
we take seriously the kinds of knowledge that people in marginalized positions tend to possess, 
then, as Sandra Harding wrote, the result is the production of less partial, less distorted, ‘less false’ 
knowledge (1991, 185-187).  
For the purposes of responding to the objections that have been launched against MRP, we take 
the most significant theses of standpoint theory to be as follows:  
 
29 Importantly, standpoint theory is not committed to an individualist thesis: it does not make claims about what 
individuals qua individuals can know (Wylie 2003, 29). Rather, it is about what individuals qua members of 
marginalized groups can know. This does not imply that all individuals of a given social group will agree about all 
matters of oppression, nor that all members of oppressed groups will be right in all cases – all epistemic agents are 
fallible. The claim is about who is better positioned, in a general sense, to know, and how the relevance of lived 




(i) Those who occupy systemically oppressed positions are more reliable 
detectors of instances of oppression than those who occupy dominant 
social positions; 
 
(ii) People in systemically oppressed social positions are more likely to 
understand the moral significance of oppression;   
(iii) People in systemically oppressed social positions are better situated to 
identify connections between more subtle instances of racism, sexism, 
homophobia, etc. and larger, historical and ongoing systems of oppression. 
In what follows, we will draw on both tools – the concept of structural and systemic oppression 
and feminist standpoint epistemology – to respond to the criticisms against MRP.  
 Responses to Objections to the MRP 
Our general response to Lukianoff and Haidt’s critique of microaggressions and “microaggression 
culture” is that their objections fail for at least two reasons. First, they fail to take seriously the 
structural and systemic nature of oppression and the larger social context in which 
microaggressions take place, thereby failing to understand a condition for the possibility of the use 
of the concept. Second, throughout their account, they consistently commit the fallacy of begging 
the question; they assume, rather than argue for the position that the dominant epistemic location 
of those who commit microaggressions is not only correct, but the only position from which 
microaggressions can be reasonably understood. Employing the concepts of oppression and 
feminist standpoint theory, we now elaborate upon this position by responding in turn to each of 
the four claims that are central to their critique.30  
 
30 As noted above, we will not be arguing in defense of feminist standpoint epistemology here, but rather are taking it 
as a premise in our response. Others have argued for the validity of standpoint epistemology (see, for example, Collins 
1990; Harding 1993; Wylie, 2003, 2012) and we are taking those arguments as valid and therefore, as a valid starting 
point for our argument. Lukianoff and Haidt, on the contrary, neither provide, nor cite any justification for their 
epistemological starting point or assumptions. It’s also worth underscoring that the goal of this chapter is not, 
primarily, to defend the value of a standpoint theoretical approach to epistemology, but rather, to use that (previously 




1.5.1. Response to claim 1  
Lukianoff and Haidt’s first claim is that some professors and university administrators are 
indoctrinating marginalized students to see slights where they do not really exist. This is a 
strawman argument. Students who are members of marginalized groups do not need to be taught 
that they are experiencing microaggressions; rather, insofar as they are members of marginalized 
groups, and given the pervasiveness of microaggressions (Sue 2010), chances are very good that 
they’re already intimately acquainted with the phenomenon (even if they did not previously have 
the language or concept available to describe it).31 Being on the receiving end of microaggressions 
is not something that marginalized students are experiencing for the first time on university 
campuses (even if microaggressions become heightened or more prevalent in academic settings). 
As our account of oppression detailed above has indicated, oppression is both structural and 
systemic. As has been argued in the introduction to this dissertation (and will be reiterated in 
chapter 2), microaggressions are one of a variety of phenomena that bolster such oppressive 
structures. Though at times oppressed people need some consciousness raising to see their 
oppression (or, to have it “de-mystified”), they are not being taught to be oppressed or to 
misinterpret things that are not oppressive as such. If anything, they are being given the language 
and conceptual tools with which to name and frame something they already experience. In many 
cases, oppressed people already possess this knowledge (that is, the knowledge of their experiences 
with oppression) whether or not they have the term “microaggression” to name it as such. Such 
knowledge is the result of lived experience and daily interactions with oppressive systems and 
structures.32  
 
31 In a very counter-intuitive move (given their overall position), Lukianoff and Haidt concede this very point: “It is 
undeniable that some members of various identity groups encounter repeated indignities because of their group 
membership” (44). However, in keeping with their larger project, they go on to argue that even so, once members of 
these groups step back and see that these indignities were not intentional, and interpret them differently, that most of 
the initial, superficial harm associated with them falls away. Below, we discuss how and why this understanding of 
how microaggressions work fails to understand the nature of microaggressions and the context in which they occur 
such that it is almost never simply a choice for those on the receiving end as to interpret them otherwise.  
32 Still, a critic might argue that although members of marginalized groups have experienced oppression before, they 
are now being taught to recognize certain ambiguous remarks as instances of oppression. Even if we grant this point, 
that’s not the same as teaching students to be oppressed or to recognize oppression where it does not exist. Rather, it’s 
just a matter of giving students a name to a phenomenon with which they are already intimately familiar, but which 




Part of Lukianoff and Haidt’s first claim is that not only are professors and administrators teaching 
students about microaggressions, but that they are also teaching students to feel victimized when 
they have not in fact been wronged. 33  Recall, they suggest that professors and others are 
encouraging students to feel offended or to feel negative emotions in response to experiencing 
microaggressions. This claim is also false. Professors and administrators who have a stake in and 
who are committed to the wellbeing of their structurally marginalized students do not desire for 
their students to feel negative emotions, even when such negative emotions are perfectly 
reasonable responses. Rather, the opposite is true. The goal of professors and administrators who 
aim to bring attention to microaggressions and other such behaviors is not to encourage negative 
emotions (or otherwise feelings of discomfort) in those students, but rather to reduce or prevent 
those negative experiences by bringing awareness of microaggressions to those committing them.34 
The main target audience of most microaggression awareness campaigns is not marginalized 
students or people– since they do not need to be told what microaggressions are, how they feel, or 
the harms they cause; they already know this quite well as a result of their lived experiences. 
 
argued that the first step to liberation and empowerment is ‘naming’ an oppressive event. What occurs when students 
learn about “microaggression” is a rectification of a hermeneutical injustice, in Fricker’s sense of the term (2007). 
Recall that one of her examples of a hermeneutical injustice (pp. 149-152) is women gaining the concept of ‘sexual 
harassment,’ which helped make sense of what they were already experiencing, but previously did not have the 
language and conceptual framework to properly describe; moreover, without the commonly accepted language, it was 
far more difficult to see the systemic nature and frequency of the problem. Providing students with the language to 
better understand and conceptualize what they are experiencing can potentially help them to both understand what 
they are experiencing and also to avoid internalizing microaggressive messages (see Torino et al. 2019; 9, 15). For 
Derald Sue’s response to Lukianoff and Haidt’s 2015 article, see Sue 2019.  
 
33 For Sue’s response to this point, see 2019, pp. 238-240. I have also indicated in the introduction to this thesis that 
harms and wrongs come apart; to name something as a harm does not necessarily mean that it is wrongful. It is not 
clear that Lukianoff and Haidt are aware of or employing the distinction between harms and wrongs.  
34 A quick sampling of microaggression workshops makes it clear that there are primarily two types: the first is aimed 
at teaching people (who potentially or actually commit microaggressions) what microaggressions are, to identify when 
they have committed them, and how to respond so as not to exacerbate the harm caused (see, for example, Banks 
2015; Fine et al. 2018; Kite et al. 2013; Restorative Justice Center UC Berkeley; Microaggression Awareness 
Campaign at Metro State University Denver). The second type of workshop is for students who have been recipients 
of microaggressions, but the aim is not to teach students to identify harms where no harms exist, rather, they are to 
impart resilience building strategies to cope with the harms experienced (see, for example, The New School for Social 






Rather, attempts to draw attention to microaggressions and their harms are aimed at those who are 
not likely to be on the constant receiving end of microaggressions and other slights, and thus are 
likely unaware of the real harm they cause. The idea is to educate those with greater social power 
or privilege about the seemingly subtle ways in which they can reinforce and perpetuate structural 
and systemic oppression, and ideally to get them to avoid doing so as much as possible.  
Lukianoff and Haidt have missed the mark in their understanding and articulation of the aims of 
microaggression research, education, and advocacy; as a result, they have attacked a strawman. 
We contend that Lukianoff and Haidt make this strawman argument because of their fundamental 
lack of understanding of structural and systemic oppression, and because they don’t recognize that 
systemic oppression is the condition for the possibility of the occurrence of microaggressions. 
Without an understanding of what it is and how it works, one will never understand precisely what 
microaggressions are, and crucially, the enduring harms that they cause to those on the receiving 
end of microaggressions. As is evident in Marilyn Frye’s birdcage analogy detailed above, those 
caged in by the various dimensions of oppression (of which routine microaggressions are a part) 
do not need to be taught or told about the various pieces of that oppressive system; this is their 
everyday lived reality. It is those on the outside of the cage (Lukianoff and Haidt, for example) 
who are unable to see the full system and how the pieces connect to one another to create and 
maintain an oppressive structure. It is imperative to understand microaggressions within the 
broader context of oppression and in relation to other oppressive forces that work alongside of 
microaggressions.35 To fail to do so is to misunderstand the phenomenon entirely.  
1.5.2. Response to claim 2 
The second claim made by Lukianoff and Haidt is that marginalized people who claim to have 
experienced microaggressions have chosen to (mis)interpret someone else’s words or actions in a 
way that is uncharitable to the agent. Again, their position entirely misses the mark, underscored 
by their failure to understand what oppression is and how it works and the fact that they choose to 
 
35 For a description of the ways in which microaggressions connect via a spectrum of aggression to other forms of 




understand microaggressions atomistically, isolated from the larger context of oppressive systems 
in which they occur.36 In so doing, they make two assumptions. First, that microaggressions can 
be simply brushed off, that is, that the experience of microaggressions can be separated from the 
harm which results from them; second, that microaggressions tend to be one-off instances and 
therefore, do not result in any cumulative harm. Both of these assumptions are false.37 Members 
of marginalized groups experience microaggressions on a routine basis. As Sue writes, 
People of color do not just occasionally experience racial 
microaggressions. Rather it is a constant, continuing, and cumulative 
experience. Thus, racial microaggressions remind them that they live in a 
country where persons of color are not frequently represented in Fortune 
500 companies, that they continue to occupy the lower rungs of 
employment, that segregation continues in many facets of their lives, that 
they continue to receive inferior education and health care, and that they 
continue to fill the ranks of the unemployed. They may be reminded that 
history books never taught them about the contributions of their groups 
and when they are presented, it is often a dysfunctional or pathological 
portrayal (Sue 2010, 52-53). 
Failure to acknowledge this pattern of microaggressions and their connection to larger 
discriminatory acts might result in the notion that one can simply brush off a single slight or choose 
to interpret it differently. But, for example, when a student of color is constantly asked if they are 
 
36 Rini makes a similar point about how in Lukianoff and Haidt’s 2015 article on microaggressions, they ignore the 
systematicity of the phenomenon (2018, 336); also see Friedlaender (2017, 5-6). 
37 One can even return to Pierce’s original account of microaggressions to see that an emphasis in understandings of 
the concept of microaggressions has always been on their repeat nature and the cumulative harms that they cause. 
When he first introduces the term “microaggression,” Pierce writes that “[e]ven though any single negotiation of 
offense can in justice be considered of itself to be relatively innocuous, the cumulative effect to the victim and to the 
victimizer is of an unimaginable magnitude” (Pierce 1970, 266, our emphasis). Then several years later, he and his 
co-authors underscore that “the cumulative weight of their never-ending burden is the major ingredient in black-white 
interactions” (Pierce et al. 1978, 65). For an excellent account of the cumulative harms of microaggressions, see 
Friedlaender (2017), especially section II. Also see Brennan’s discussion of the aggregative effects and patterns that 





on a diversity scholarship, as opposed to a merit scholarship, or if a professor of color is mistaken, 
on a weekly or daily basis, for a janitor, it becomes more and more difficult not to internalize the 
message being sent – that one is getting a free ride to university because one is Black and not on 
the basis of one’s accomplishments and intelligence, or that one does not belong in academia, 
respectively.38 Here we are not at all concerned with the intentions behind the comments, which 
might have no maliciousness behind them. Such comments, and the kind of internalized oppression 
in which they result, are not easily brushed off, nor can one choose to interpret them more 
charitably, so to speak, as we discuss in what follows, in light of an abundance of empirical 
evidence.39 As Rini writes, “We need to keep in mind that when we ask how a victim ought to 
respond to a microaggression, we are not asking how they ought to respond simply to a single 
isolated incident. We are asking how they ought to respond to an incident which they know to be 
just one piece in a much larger pattern” (2018, 335). 
Second, their claim rests on the assumption that microaggressions can be brushed off because they 
do not result in any real harm. This too is false. While we’ve all likely been told when we were 
young that “sticks and stones can break your bones but words can never hurt you,” most of us 
know that words can hurt you in a variety of ways, with a variety of short- and long-term 
consequences, and that this is what Lukianoff and Haidt fail to take seriously. We have argued 
elsewhere that recipients of microaggressions experience real and serious harms, epistemically, 
emotionally, and in terms of their self-identity (see Freeman and Stewart 2018 and chapter 3 of 
this thesis), and there has been substantial empirical research measuring the extent to which 
microaggressions contribute to negative consequences (for an overview of such empirical work, 
see Williams 2019, 13-16). It is not a matter of mere “hurt feelings” as Lukianoff and Haidt write 
 
38 As O’Dowd notes, “[c]ritiques of microaggressions discourse has often ignored the lived reality of recipients and 
the cumulative nature of the damage caused, as well as mischaracterizing those who complain in ways that bear the 
hallmarks of epistemic oppression and injustice” (2018, 1231). Also see Tschaepe (2016, 88) for a contextualist 
approach to microaggressions.  
39 Bartky (1979) describes [internalized] psychological oppression as follows: “To be psychologically oppressed is to 
be weighed down in your mind; it is to have a harsh dominion exercised over your self-esteem. The psychologically 
oppressed become their own oppressors; they come to exercise harsh dominion over their own self esteem. Differently 
put, psychological oppression can be regarded as the ‘internalization of intimations of inferiority.’” For an account of 





(somewhat belittlingly, since even if recipients do feel hurt, we should still acknowledge and care 
about that). Moreover, there is an abundance of empirical research that shows that negative affect 
(such as that demonstrably brought on by microaggressions) is correlated with a myriad of 
psychological and probably physiological harms. 40  Some of the real harms that have been 
correlated with racial microaggressions as well as microaggressions that target other dimensions 
of identity include lower self-esteem (Nadal 2009; Nadal et al. 2014), lower emotional well-being 
(Ong et al. 2013), traumatic stress symptoms (Moody and Lewis 2019), feelings of alienation 
within university communities (Solorzano, Ceja, and Yosso 2001), underage binge alcohol 
drinking (Blume, Lovato, Thyken, & Denny 2012), increased depression (Nadal et al. 2014), being 
in a chronic state of “racial battle fatigue” (Smith et al. 2011), and even increased thoughts of 
suicide (O’Keefe et al. 2015). There is also empirical evidence of the harms associated specifically 
with microaggressions experienced by members of the LGBTQ+ community; including 
heightened self-scrutiny and internalized homophobia and/or transphobia among LGBTQ+ 
individuals (Nadal, Issa, et al. 2011; Nadal, Wong, et al., 2011); lack of belongingness in school 
settings (Linville 2018); as well as feelings of alienation, loneliness, and being unlovable as who 
one is (Munro et. al 2019).  
When someone is harmed in any or all of these ways, they are not able to make a conscious decision 
to “interpret” the actions committed against them differently (that is, as not harmful). Let’s 
consider the analogy of physical harm in order to underscore the absurdity of saying otherwise. 
When someone goes to the doctor with a leg that is clearly broken, rarely do health care providers 
debate whether or not that person’s leg is in fact broken, whether that person is really in pain, or 
whether they are suffering as a result of it. Nobody would tell that patient to simply choose to 
interpret their injury differently, or to imagine the pain away. Nobody would even suggest that 
 
40 For example, Watson and Clark (1988), demonstrate a correlation between negative affect and depression and other 
negative health outcomes. Conversely, the following studies show that the presence of positive affect is a good 
predictor of psychological health (Fredrickson et al., 2005; Ong et al., 2006; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004) and 
longevity (Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001; Levy, Slade, Kunkel, & Kasl, 2002; Moskowitz, 2003; Ostir, 
Markides, Peek, & Goodwin, 2001). Also see Sue (2010, chapter 5) for an account of the biological and psychological 
stressors that result from microaggressions, in addition to some of the more long-term consequences on one’s physical 





they should try. To do so would be absurd. Similarly, when one’s very identity is continually called 
into question and diminished or when their heritage is denigrated by microaggressive actions or 
comments – which can result in a different kind of non-physical pain, but pain nonetheless—it is 
non-sensical, even offensive, to tell that person to just grow thicker skin and interpret the 
microaggressor’s comment more charitably (e.g., as not harmful). Such a claim can only be made 
by someone whose identity has never been called into question and who has never personally 
experienced the harmful consequences of systemic oppression or discrimination. What Lukianoff 
and Haidt fail to see is that what we are talking about is not a matter of mere interpretation, mere 
“hurt feelings,” or merely “being offended” by a single comment or slight (6, 7). Microaggressions 
cause serious and enduring harm because they are recurrent (Levchak 2019). People cannot choose 
not to be harmed by comments that repeatedly call into question and diminish their identity and 
personhood. Contrary to the popular children’s rhyme, sticks and stones can break your bones and 
words can very much hurt you.  
Yet Lukianoff and Haidt state that if only recipients of microaggressions would “look at the facts” 
they’d see that their “interpretation” of the actions or comments was “uncharitable” (41-42). They 
even go further to say that those who have been charged with committing microaggressions should 
be given the benefit of the doubt.41 These are classic moves of privilege.42 Their view that the 
recipient’s understanding is necessarily wrong and theirs – born out of their position of social 
 
41 There are two additional issues here: (1) they assume that the feelings experienced aren’t real or reality-tracking in 
some way, that recipients feel this way but they shouldn’t because they are contrary to the facts (that is, that the 
feelings experienced on account of microaggressions do not meet some basic standards); and (2) even if one assumes 
that those feelings are not ‘correct’, it does not necessarily make the one experiencing those feelings wrong to 
experience them, nor does it show that one can easily disconnect the feelings from the causes. 
42 It is worth drawing attention to the main focus of Lukianoff and Haidt’s moral concern here: they are more 
concerned with the feelings and wellbeing of, and general fairness toward, those people who are committing 
microaggressions (more often than not, more socially dominant or privileged people vis-à-vis those being 
microaggressed), and they fail to consider the potential for harm to the person on the receiving end of those comments 
and actions who already occupy vulnerable positions. Their only worry is that microaggressors are being wronged by 
having their actions misinterpreted and their characters maligned (3). They write that recipients of microaggressions 
ought to “transform a victimization story into a story about [their] own agency, and it would make it far more likely 
that the interpersonal exchange would have a positive outcome” (42). (Positive, for whom, one might ask.) It is clear 
from their normative statement that their loyalties lie with those who committed microaggressions and not with 
recipients. This is resonant with Kate Manne’s (2017) conception of “himpathy,” where there is misplaced and 
disproportionate empathy and concern directed at the person causing harm, and minimal (or zero) empathy, care, or 




dominance or privilege – is necessarily correct, reflects their epistemically disadvantaged 
positioning with respect to this particular question.  Standpoint theory allows us to show just how 
problematic their lack of perception is, and how it leads to this extremely shortsighted analysis. 
Recall that Alison Wylie explains that “to do social science as a standpoint feminist is to approach 
inquiry from the perspective of insiders rather than impose on them the external categories of 
professional social science, a managing bureaucracy, ruling elites” (2003, 27). The reason why 
standpoint epistemologists make this move to prioritize the social positions of those who occupy 
the “bottom” of a socially-stratified society (the inversion thesis), is because those who occupy 
this marginalized position generally have greater epistemic access to understanding [oppressive] 
human relations, and to identifying problems to be explained in our social words (Harding 1990, 
443). If you have never been harmed on the basis of your identity, chances are that it will be more 
difficult for you to identify the nature, the consequences, and the severity of such harm. (Recall 
Frye’s birdcage analogy described above, and how difficult it can be for those on the outside of 
the cage to see the systemic ways in which the bars are interlocking, when they are only examining 
one bar in isolation from the others.) Based on standpoint epistemology, we have good reason to 
take seriously charges of microaggressions, since those who have systemically been on the 
receiving end of them are more likely to know what microaggressions are and how to identify them 
(thesis (i)), understand the significance of ongoing experiences with microaggressions and how 
harmful they are (thesis (ii)), and are better situated to recognize the role that microaggressions 
play in upholding oppressive structures, and how microaggressions relate to larger systems of 
dominance and oppression (thesis (iii)).  
1.5.3. Response to claim 3  
Lukianoff and Haidt’s third claim is that talk of microaggression and their harms is representative 
of a distorted worldview and that those who possess this world view need to be cured of it by CBT 
or other kinds of therapies and interventions. Importantly, and like their second point, this “claim” 
is actually an assumption that they make rather than a claim for which they argue; once again, this 
leads them to commit the fallacy of begging the question. In our overview of standpoint theory, 
we noted that contemporary feminist standpoint theory rejects the thesis of automatic epistemic 




(usually subdominant, oppressed, marginal standpoints) automatically know more, or know better, 
by virtue of their social location” (Wylie 2003, 28). However, from the reverse perspective (that 
is, from the perspective of those with greater social power and privilege), an assumption of 
automatic epistemic privilege is equally problematic and also exactly what Lukianoff and Haidt 
have done: they have assumed, rather than argued for, the automatic, necessary superiority of their 
epistemic position, not allowing for the possibility that those who receive microaggressions might 
have some valuable insight into their own experiences. On their view, any perspective from a 
marginalized position that deviates from their perspective is both wrong (as we discuss in our 
response to claim 4), and, even more strongly, on their view, potentially pathological. What we’d 
like to underscore is that they provide no argument for why their position is better, more correct, 
or the only reasonable perspective from which to approach the question of microaggressions and 
their harms. Rather, it is simply assumed.  
Their position fails based on theses (i) and (ii) of standpoint theory. Based on (i), they fail to 
recognize that those who occupy systemically oppressed positions are often more reliable detectors 
of instances of oppression, including microaggressions, than those who occupy dominant social 
positions. Based on (ii) they fail to recognize that people in systemically oppressed social positions 
are more likely to understand the moral significance of oppression, including the harms of 
microaggressions. When it comes to questions regarding the workings of oppression (including 
microaggressions), those who experience oppression directly generally have the epistemic 
advantage (acknowledging, in line with revised accounts of standpoint theory, that they are not 
infallible).  
Their position is also problematic for two additional reasons: first, it amounts to gaslighting 
marginalized people; and second, it is based on a racist and sexist assumption. To the first point, 
what Lukianoff and Haidt have engaged in by assuming their worldview is correct and leading 
anyone whose worldview departs from it to believe that they are not only wrong, but pathological 
is a textbook case of gaslighting. Kate Abramson defines gaslighting as “a form of emotional 
manipulation in which the gaslighter tries…to induce in someone the sense that her reactions, 
perceptions, memories and/or beliefs are not just mistaken, but utterly without grounds—




specifically epistemic harms of gaslighting). Telling members of marginalized groups that their 
perceptions are “distortions of reality” (40) and that they should not “trust their feelings” (41) is a 
clear case of this. Gaslighting is harmful because over time, it can cause people to lose their grip 
on reality, to lose their sense of self, and/or to doubt themselves as competent knowers. Arguments 
like the one Lukianoff and Haidt have provided have the consequence of making oppressed people 
feel crazy for accurately perceiving and experiencing microaggressions. This is incredibly 
damaging, both in the short and in the long term.  
In addition to being a textbook case of gaslighting, the assumption that Lukianoff and Haidt make 
has both racist and sexist undertones. This is because, the assumption that women, queer people, 
and people of color are “crazy,” or, to use Lukianoff and Haidt’s language, hold “distorted views” 
(40) and need to be subjected to various medical and psychiatric interventions has a long, painful 
history for those groups.43 Calling people “crazy” when they speak out against their oppression is 
a classic tool of power and privilege that has been long used to keep people in oppressed positions, 
and to prevent them from challenging the status quo. Furthermore, the historical tendency to take 
white, cis-men as the norm for intelligence, rationality, and epistemic agency has been incredibly 
damaging to women and other oppressed groups, and has functioned to keep them out of positions 
of power, status, and knowledge production (see, for example Harding 1982; Tallbear 2019; and 
the now feminist classic, A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity 
(Antony & Witt 2002)). These biases against the epistemic agency and credibility of women, 
people of color, queer people, and others have been critically scrutinized (e.g., in the growing 
 
43 For example, for centuries the label “hysteria” (which is actually derived from the ancient Greek word ‘hystra’, 
which means uterus) was attributed to women and used to justify isolating them from other people or using abusive 
“therapeutic” techniques on them (for an overview of this history, see Tasca et al. 2012; also see Kukla 2005). See 
also the The Atlantic feature (Blazevich 2019), which focuses on how in the 1800s, “insane asylums” were used to 
control women who had been deemed violent, difficult, or crazy, but who were likely just rebelling against the social 
constraints of their time. Psychiatry has also been used as a tool to discriminate against and harm other marginalized 
groups. Jonathan Metzl (2010) details how the schizophrenia diagnosis was weaponized against Black men who were 
vocal advocates of civil rights and resisting their second-class status. He suggests that, at least in part, the sudden 
influx of such diagnoses could be traced to a change in wording in the DSM-II which, compared to the previous edition, 
added "hostility" and "aggression" as signs of the disorder. For more on the history of institutionalized racism and the 
pathologization of Black people, see Fernando 2017. “Homosexuality” remained classified as a mental illness until 
1973, allowing LGBTQ+ community members to “treated” by various psychiatric methods, including painful shock 





literature on epistemic injustice; see, for example, Kidd, Medina, and Pohlhaus Jr., 2017) and 
Lukianoff and Haidt demonstrate a staggering lack of awareness of this harmful historical legacy, 
and the abundance of intellectual work that has been focused on combatting it.  
1.5.4. Response to claim 4 
Related to their third claim – that if you think microaggressions are real, you are living with a 
cognitive delusion that needs to be fixed – is Lukianoff and Haidt’s final point: that is the 
suggestion that there is only one appropriate worldview from which to understand and theorize 
about microaggressions, namely, theirs. Recall the problem is that these interpretations reflect a 
particular worldview most often fostered by those acting/thinking from the socially privileged but 
epistemically disadvantaged position (on this particular issue). So only minds ordered like theirs 
(i.e., people who occupy similarly socially-advantaged social positions) are in a position to see 
everything clearly. This is a classic case of the privileged eye (or as Marilyn Frye (1983) calls it, 
the “arrogant eye”). This is also, we contend, a clear instance of cultural imperialism (as Young 
(1990) understands the term, and as we outlined in section 1.4.1 above). Remember that cultural 
imperialism is a face of oppression that occurs when the experiences, cultural symbols, and 
perspective of the dominant cultural group are normalized and posited as universal for everyone, 
rendering other groups who do not embrace such norms to be invisible, inferior, deviant, and 
'Other.' It results in a situation in which those at the margins are defined from outside the 
mainstream and are subsequently placed at the social margins, away from center. 
As with the previous two claims, Lukianoff and Haidt do not argue for the superiority of their 
worldview; rather, they simply assume it.44 This allows them to act as if their worldview is the 
only possible one, simply because it is the one that they inhabit and, as a result of being at the 
cultural center, the only one they can see. But why should we readily accept the idea that there is 
only one worldview from which to understand microaggressions, or that their worldview is the 
correct one? Recall the three central theses of feminist standpoint theory outlined in section 1.4.2. 
and developed in response to Lukianoff and Haidt’s third claim above. These tenets of feminist 
 




standpoint epistemology have already given us strong reasons to doubt this (e.g., that the 
worldview of those with relatively greater social power and privilege is more likely to be correct 
when it comes to analyzing oppression).  
The tenets of feminist standpoint theory, as we have elaborated on them, have also give us strong 
reasons to trust and defer to the knowledge claims of those marginalized people who report their 
own first-hand experiences with microaggressions. Lukianoff and Haidt do not even consider the 
possibility that a different social location (and thus, a different worldview and different set of 
experiences from which to approach the question), could be epistemically valuable, giving us 
different information and better access to knowledge about the nature and harms of 
microaggressions than they have access to (from their relatively dominant social positions). 
Though they assume here, without argument, that there is an objective fact of the matter, and that 
those who perceive that they have experienced (and furthermore have been harmed by) 
microaggressions are simply getting those facts wrong, they fail to consider that it is indeed the 
alternative position – namely, that microaggressions do not exist or are not harmful – that does not 
align with the facts of the matter and the realities experienced by many oppressed people.45 
Returning to the birdcage analogy, for Lukianoff and Haidt, it is as though any insights that are 
made or feelings that are experienced from inside the cage are a priori false and thus ought to be 
discounted until that bird is freed and comes to see reality for what it is, on the outside of the cage. 
 Conclusion: Toward a Different Framework for Thinking About 
Microaggression 
In sum, our argument is this: understanding the systemic nature of oppression is crucial for 
understanding what microaggressions are and how they work; it allows us to see the structural 
context in which microaggressions occur, which in turn, foregrounds the fact that for members of 
 
45 See Clark and Spanierman (2019) for an account of how microaggressions can also negatively affect people in 
dominant social positions. One of their claims is that those who benefit from a system of privilege and oppression 
often have a skewed perception of social reality and are often unaware of how maintaining their privilege comes at 
the social and economic expense of members of oppressed groups. They specify that the false sense of social reality 
of those who occupy dominant social positions can lead to a denial of individual bias and an overreliance on an 




marginalized groups, microaggressions are never just one-off instances that one can choose to 
ignore or brush off, nor do they occur in a vacuum, disconnected from other structural and systemic 
forms of oppression. Without rooting microaggressions in oppression, one will never arrive at an 
accurate understanding of the concept/phenomenon. Additionally, standpoint theory provides an 
epistemological justification for prioritizing the knowledge and experiences of marginalized 
groups, which can legitimate the harms caused by microaggressions that are currently being called 
into question by critics of the MRP. Using standpoint epistemology underscores the important 
differences between trying to conceptualize microaggressions (or any oppressive phenomenon) 
from the perspective of the perpetrator (which often gets things very wrong) and conceptualizing 
it from the perspective of the recipients. It also provides a rationale for not only taking seriously 
the position of members of marginalized groups, but for starting the analysis of microaggressions 
from their perspective. Using oppression and standpoint theory to guide our understanding of 
microaggressions thus renders all of Lukianoff and Haidt’s critiques moot. Moreover, such a 
background for thinking about microaggressions can motivate the formulation of a revised account 
of microaggressions – one that is more explicitly grounded in a different epistemological starting 
point – which can then better assuage the concerns of critics like Lukianoff, Haidt, and Lilienfield. 
Such an account would be guided by and would theorize from the perspectives of the recipients of 
microaggressions, namely, structurally oppressed people, insofar as it puts the articulation and 
description of harms that recipients of microaggressions experience at the center of the analysis, 
as opposed to the actions or statements of those who commit microaggressions.46 In so doing, it 
reflects a better awareness of how social situatedness and relative differences in social power 
 
46 Though we do not have the space to elaborate upon it here, we have provided such an account in Freeman & Stewart 
(2018, included in this thesis as chapter 3) and are developing it more fully in Microaggressions in Medicine 
(manuscript in progress). Our overall aim in both is to reconceptualize microaggressions from the perspective of those 
on the receiving end, which motivates our development of a new, harm-based taxonomy of microaggressions: 
epistemic microaggressions, emotional microaggressions, and self-identity microaggressions, named as such for their 
corresponding harms, which are epistemic, emotional, and existential respectively. We contend that the defense of 
microaggression theory provided above also serves as a justification for such a revised conception of microaggression, 
namely, one which is more attentive to the harmful nature of microaggressions (and the precise nature of those harms), 




impact lived experiences and knowledge production, and centers those who, with respect to 
oppression, are better epistemically positioned to know microaggressions well.47 
While our argument here has focused on responding to the first part of the critics’ objection – 
namely, that microaggression theory is misguided insofar as microaggressions do not cause any 
real harm, and therefore, should not be taken seriously – we would be remiss were we not to briefly 
mention (and briefly respond to) the second part of the criticism, namely, that even if 
microaggression theory were worth doing, it cannot be done well, since microaggressions cannot 
be studied reliably in an empirical way.  
In a 2017 paper for the journal Perspectives on Psychological Science, Scott O. Lilienfeld argues 
that the MRP rests on a number of unfounded assumptions, for which there is negligible empirical 
support. His central claim there is that the concept ‘microaggression’ cannot be sufficiently 
operationalized. Insofar as this is the case, he argues, microaggressions cannot be studied with 
empirical accuracy, and thus, the harms of microaggression cannot be empirically measured or 
verified. On these grounds, he calls for a moratorium on microaggression theorizing, as well as 
microaggression awareness trainings and campaigns.  
While it is beyond the scope of our present project to develop a comprehensive reply to this latter 
point, we find it valuable to at least point the reader in the direction of growing literature that is 
doing precisely what Lilienfeld (2017) has argued cannot be done, namely, empirically measuring 
the harmful effects of microaggressions. (See, for example, Williams 2019).48 While our central 
aim here was only to respond to the first part of the critique of MRP, what motivated this project 
was the broader goal of defending the continuation of research and advocacy around 
microaggressions, in other words, of justifying this research by showing that we have good reason 
to believe that microaggressions are real, and that they cause real and enduring harm to those who 
 
47
 Note that I address possible objections to this standpoint-based claim in chapter 2 of this thesis. The defenses and 
clarifications of standpoint offered there should be taken to apply here, too.  
48 We also cited some of this empirical literature above in our reply to Lukianoff and Haidt’s second claim. We would 
also like to flag others who have responded to the claims made in Lilienfeld (2017), including Sue (2017), Parente & 




routinely experience them. We leave it to those trained in the social sciences to continue the 
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Chapter 2  




Concerns have been raised regarding the coherency and usefulness of the 
microaggression concept (Lilienfeld 2017a, 143-4). The primary concern 
is that the concept has not been clearly defined, and as such, is not 
practically (i.e., scientifically) useful. Despite the fact that philosophers are 
beginning to pay heightened attention to the phenomenon of 
microaggressions (e.g., their moral, social, and political impacts and 
implications), philosophers have not yet provided a robust accounting of 
the concept of microaggression. This is surprising, as philosophers are 
uniquely positioned to help clarify the concept of microaggression and 
explain its coherency in the face of such concerns. Specifically, 
philosophers have the necessary tools to explain how a concept like 
microaggressions can be useful, even where an exhaustive set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for defining the concept cannot be identified. In 
this chapter, I address the mounting concerns about the clarity and 
coherence of the concept of microaggression, and specifically the 
difficulty in offering a precise definition of the concept. I argue that, even 
in the absence of necessary and sufficient conditions, microaggression is a 
perfectly fine and useful concept; there are plenty other strategies available 
for explaining the concept without appealing to necessary and sufficient 
conditions. I illustrate the possibility of conceptualizing microaggression 
absent necessary and sufficient conditions by appealing to what Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1953) has called “family resemblance.” When applying a 
family resemblance approach to microaggressions, we can see that one 




that microaggressions share a set of common, overlapping features that 
link related instances together, but are not necessarily all present in all 
cases. We can recognize instances of microaggression insofar as they share 
resemblances with other clear instances. In other words, we recognize clear 
connections between phenomena called microaggressions, because they 
share in a set of relevant, overlapping features. I offer a preliminary 
accounting of such relevant features, which, taken together, can form the 
basis for a family resemblance account of the concept of microaggression. 
The ability to make sense of the concept of microaggression by way of 
family resemblance is but one possibility for responding to concerns about 
the inability to define microaggressions. The upshot is that even if we 
cannot define microaggressions with necessary and sufficient conditions, 
we can still make plausible sense of the concept and apply it meaningfully 
in practice. Finally, despite the difficulties involved in pinning down 
microaggressions in practice (e.g., determining what counts as an instance 
of the concept), I argue that some people, in virtue of their social and 
epistemic locations, are better suited to identify and name 
microaggressions in practice. I argue this by drawing on the vast literature 
in feminist standpoint epistemology (Alcoff and Potter 1993; Hill Collins 






The term “microaggression” was first coined by Chester Pierce (1970) and subsequently developed 
to refer to the phenomenon of “subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which 
are ‘put downs’” (Pierce et al.  1977, 66).49 In the past decade, the concept has experienced a 
renewed attention, particularly in the field of psychology, following the work of Derald Wing Sue 
(2010; Sue et al. 2007; 2008) and more recently that of his former student, Kevin Nadal (2013; 
2018; Nadal et al. 2011; 2012; 2014) and others (Kanter et al. 2017; Williams 2020).50 It is now 
widely accepted that “microaggressions” refer to brief and commonplace verbal, behavioral, or 
environmental indignities which signal bias against or hostility toward members of marginalized 
groups. They can be intentional (see Friedlaender & Ivy 2020) or unintentional, and are rooted in 
prejudice or bias that is implicitly or explicitly held. Importantly, microaggressions are thought to 
be a routine part of the experience of marginalized people. In other words, those who experience 
microaggressions do not experience them only once, or as a “once off.” Rather, those who 
experience microaggressions tend to experience them systematically (Rini 2020), from many 
different people in various social and institutional contexts.   
Let’s consider a few examples (and for additional examples, see the introduction to this thesis).  
Misgendering Professor: A professor, P, is made aware that one of his students is trans, and is 
told that, though the student has not yet been able to update their university profile, they go by a 
different name and pronoun. Though the professor is told this (and indeed, is reminded more than 
once in a faculty meeting), the professor continues to deadname and misgender the trans student. 
One time, a colleague says something about the student (using their appropriate gender pronouns), 
 
49 A shorter version of this paper is published in volume 37 of Southwest Philosophy Review (2021). I am grateful to 
my audience at the annual Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy (CSWIP) meeting in 2019, held at the 
University of Guelph, where a draft of this paper was presented. I am also grateful for endlessly fruitful conversations 
about the nature of microaggressions as well as the insights of feminist standpoint epistemology with my friend and 
collaborator, Lauren Freeman. Finally, I am grateful to Carolyn McLeod for helpful commentary and feedback during 
the development of this paper, as well as Rob Stainton for invaluable feedback and redirection that has greatly 
benefitted the paper.  




only to have the professor, P, interrupt to insert the wrong pronouns. This does not happen in front 
of the student this time, but has on several other occasions.  
“That’s So Gay!”: A group of friends are hanging out together. One friend in the group is openly 
gay. In listening to an account of a negative experience one of the friend’s is describing, one of the 
friends blurts out “That’s so gay!”. The gay friend hangs his head, saying nothing.  
Reductio: A student is dealing with mental health issues and has been called “insane” by their 
family members. While sitting in logic class, watching their professor demonstrate a reductio ad 
absurdum, the professor repeats, several times “that conclusion would be insane!” The word insane 
is used several times in the class, to describe what could otherwise be called a contradiction.  
“Real Mom”: A young Chinese girl is on a walk with her white adoptive mother. They stop to 
play at the park. While playing, a new friend asks the young Chinese girl where her mother is. The 
young Chinese girl points at her mother. The new friend asks, “Oh, but what about your real 
mom?” The young Chinese girl suddenly feels confused, and a bit sad.  
“That’s ‘Dr.’ To You”: A junior professor, who happens to be a woman, is thrilled to start 
teaching her first classes as a newly minted PhD. However, she finds that all of her students refer 
to her, in email and in person, as “Ms.” She is rarely, if ever, addressed as “Prof.” or “Dr.”, though 
her male colleagues always are.  
Purse Clutching: A white woman is walking down the street. As she passes an alley, a Black man 
who is taking a shortcut on his way home from work appears in the alley. Upon catching his eye, 
the woman quickly and tightly clutches her purse. The Black man sees this, drops his gaze to the 
ground, and decreases his walking pace so as to not further startle her.  
You might be asking yourself – what are the commonalities here? Or, what makes each of these 
distinct examples recognizable as instances of the same phenomenon: microaggression? Such 
questions motivate this chapter, and I will return to them below. They are all, I believe, examples 
that most microaggression theorists would want to call instances of microaggression. And yet, as 
I will show, they each have different aspects which complicate attempts to provide a neat and tidy 




the microaggression theorist to be able to explain how each of these examples fit together and fall 
within the extension of the concept of microaggression. This chapter will offer one way of unifying 
these examples and ones like them, namely, via an appeal to family resemblance theory. In so 
doing, I show that should it be difficult to find an exhaustive set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the concept of microaggression, this does not render the concept meaningless; 
rather, there are other possible ways for theorizing the concept, including by way of family 
resemblance.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. In section 2.2 I will set up the problem. Specifically, I will 
take seriously the concerns that the concept of microaggression is elusive and requires 
clarification. I will demonstrate the difficulty involved in pinning down necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the concept. In section 2.3, however, I will argue that the inability to identify 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept does not render the concept meaningless. Many 
perfectly useful and coherent concepts lack clear necessary and sufficient conditions, or otherwise 
face some of the same definitional challenges faced by microaggression. There are ways out of the 
definitional problem, namely, philosophers have conceived of additional ways for making sense 
of concepts that resist narrow and fixed definition. Though there are multiple such ways of 
understanding concepts, I will illustrate the coherence of the microaggression concept by drawing 
on one of them, namely, family resemblance theory. I will provide an overview of such an account, 
suggesting that understanding microaggression as a family resemblance concept is a perfectly 
reasonable way of making sense of the concept. Taking seriously the concern that 
microaggressions are elusive and hard to identify in practice, in section 2.4 I argue that one’s 
epistemic standpoint is relevant for how well suited one is to identify the central features of 
microaggression as described in section 2.3 (and ultimately, instances of microaggression), in 
practice. I raise and respond to some objections in section 2.5.  
 Setting Up the Problem: Definitional Challenges and Conceptual 
Confusion 
The phenomenon of microaggression is incredibly complex. As they are most often understood, 
microaggressions target a diverse range of marginalized identities, drawing on myriad stereotypes 




the range of things understood as falling within the extension of “microaggression” is incredibly 
broad. Moreover, there is debate, even amongst microaggression theorists, regarding what 
characteristics of microaggressions, if any, are essential and how we ought to conceptualize them 
(for some characteristic examples of attempts to identify what is necessary to the microaggression 
concept, see McTernan 2018; Rini 2020).  
Some have expressed concern that this amounts to a serious flaw with respect to the concept of 
microaggression, which threatens its scientific significance and practical usefulness. For example, 
psychologist Scott Lilienfeld (2017a) argues that the scientific basis of the microaggression 
research program hinges on the coherence and soundness of the microaggression concept, which 
he believes has not, to this point, been effectively demonstrated by microaggression theorists. He 
writes, “In the case of the microaggression concept, it is dubious whether its definition is 
sufficiently clear or consensual to permit adequate scientific progress. (143).  
Despite such challenges from critics of microaggression theory, there has been very little effort on 
the part of philosophers to engage in the project of clarifying the concept. Most philosophers 
working on microaggressions have focused their attention on the moral, social, and political issues 
that microaggressions raise. For example, Christina Friedlaender (2018) has taken up the project 
of elucidating how we can attribute moral responsibility for the harms of microaggressions. Emma 
McClure (2019) has ventured to make sense of how microaggressions fit on a “spectrum of 
aggression” with other acts of oppression and violence. Regina Rini (2020) has attempted to 
articulate strategies for combatting or offsetting microaggressions and their harms and has offered 
normative recommendations for how we ought to respond to microaggressions when they occur. 
This is all incredibly important work – work that philosophers are well-suited to do!  
However, despite the recent increase in attention to microaggressions among philosophers, they 
have not yet used their training and skills to attend to the concept of microaggression itself: to 
answer to the questions of how we ought to understand the microaggression concept and speak to 
concerns about its coherence. This general lack of engagement with the conceptual issues 
generated by microaggression registers as a mistake, or at least a serious oversight. The lack of 
conceptual clarity is one grounds for dismissal of the usefulness of the concept; to that end, these 




to. Put another way, if we cannot demonstrate that the microaggression concept itself is 
meaningful, the rest of the philosophical work on microaggressions seems empty, or unimportant, 
or unjustified. It is incumbent upon philosophers to do this work, as it is philosophers whose 
training prepares and positions them to undertake such conceptual work.  
In what follows, I will take steps in the direction of clarifying the concept of microaggression, 
though far more work is needed in this domain. My very limited aim will be to show that the 
concept of microaggression remains coherent, informative, and useful even if it lacks one hallmark 
of conceptual clarity: a definition comprised of an exhaustive set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. Future work must continue to query the concept and sharpen its conceptual boundaries.  
To move us in this direction, let me first illuminate the challenge of defining microaggression. To 
illustrate this difficulty, I will offer several initially plausible attempts at definition, and show how 
each is susceptible to an equally plausible counterexample.  
Definition 1: A microaggression is a bit of speech which subtly conveys hostility or bias.  
This first, initially plausible attempt to define microaggression is too narrow. We can see that it is 
too narrow by revisiting the “Purse Clutching” example above. Though most microaggression 
theorists would agree that a microaggression has occurred in that example, no bits of verbal speech 
took place. Instead, the microaggression was conveyed via body language. Let’s try again.  
Definition 2: A microaggression is a bit of speech or body language which subtly conveys hostility 
or bias.  
Though a valiant attempt, definition 2 also proves too broad: we must amend the definition again! 
Why is this the case? Because this second definition leaves the concept far too open. As written, 
this definition would include any subtle comments or body language which convey hostility or 
bias against anyone, on any basis. But this doesn’t fit with ordinary use of the term, nor does it 
map onto the phenomenon microaggression theorists want to single out. When thinking about the 
concept of microaggression, we want to zero in on hostility and bias which target not just anyone 
on any grounds, but rather which target specific people for specific reasons: members of 




sexual orientation, etc.) and on the grounds of some stereotype or bias about that group. This is the 
case in all of the examples provided above, namely, they draw on biases and/or stereotypes 
experienced by members of structurally marginalized groups.  
Definition 3: A microaggression is a bit of speech or body language which subtly conveys hostility 
or bias toward members of marginalized groups.  
We might worry that the above definition is still too imprecise. For example, it might be overly 
inclusive. Lots of speech and body language can subtly convey hostility toward or bias against 
members of marginalized groups, and not fit with our common understanding of microaggression. 
For example, the use of a slur might fit here. Or, the invoking of a stereotype. But microaggressions 
are different from the use of a slur or the invoking of a stereotype, even if they are closely related. 
We want to single out a distinct phenomenon. Let’s try again.  
Definition 4: A microaggression is a bit of speech or body language which subtly and 
unintentionally conveys hostility or bias toward members of marginalized groups.  
Perhaps the above definition avoids the issue of being overly broad and inclusive. For example, it 
might separate out intentional acts of discrimination, hate speech, or slurs by adding the 
“unintentionality condition.” But wait! Many microaggression theorists believe that 
microaggressions can be intentional or unintentional (Freeman and Stewart 2018; Friedlaender 
and Ivy 2020). Consider the example of “Misgendering Professor” above.  In that example, the 
professor was fully aware of his student’s appropriate pronouns but opted not to use them in a 
conversation about the student. This appears to be an intentional case of microaggression. We still 
haven’t pinned it down!  
We could continue on in this fashion, but I believe the result would continue to be the same: 
regardless of what definition we try, we can think of plausible counterexamples that prove the 
definition to be faulty. Moreover, there is disagreement from within microaggression theory 
regarding some of the characteristics in play, such as whether microaggressions are necessarily 
intentional (or, alternatively, necessarily unintentional). Pinpointing an exact definition of 
microaggression (and figuring out what exactly falls into its extension) is incredibly difficult. But 




You might think that running into these challenges shows that the concept itself is flawed; if it 
were a meaningful and useful concept, after all, pinning down a precise definition wouldn’t be so 
difficult, and there wouldn’t be so much internal dispute amongst theorists about that definition. 
However, I believe that drawing such a conclusion is too quick – moving to toss out the concept 
over such definitional challenges reflects a limited understanding of the available possibilities for 
theorizing concepts. Specifically, it assumes that the only way (or, at the very least, the preferred 
way) of making sense of concepts is by way of conceptual analysis aimed at identifying necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the concept under consideration. One such a view, the way we define 
a concept is by pinning down its clear set of necessary and sufficient conditions. (A necessary 
condition is one which must be present in order for that use to be appropriate. A sufficient condition 
(or set of sufficient conditions) produces the condition (e.g., all sufficient conditions must be met 
or realized for an appropriate use of the term or concept)). With respect to microaggressions, 
necessary and sufficient conditions would work in the following way:  
[Nec.]: If a characteristic, C, is necessary for a microaggression, M, to 
occur, you will only have an instance of M where characteristic C is 
present.  
[Suf.]: If characteristic, C, is sufficient for a microaggression, M, to occur, 
then M has occurred just in case C is present.  
[Def.]: On this approach, where C is the set of jointly necessary and 
sufficient conditions, a definition of microaggression would take the 
following form: An act, A, is an instance of microaggression, M, iff 
characteristic, C is present.  
Though this sounds rather straightforward, when applied to a wide-ranging concept such as 
“microaggression,” which needs to account for a vast array of related but non-identical 
phenomena, sorting out which characteristics are jointly sufficient to constitute microaggression 
becomes incredibly messy. The four failed attempts at definition offered above go some way 




In order to further illustrate this difficulty, let’s return to two of the examples introduced in section 
2.1 above. One example introduced above is the intentional misgendering of a trans person 
(“Misgendering Professor”). Another example involved someone using the phrase “that’s so gay” 
in front of their gay friend (“That’s So Gay!”). Both instances are, in both common (viz., non-
academic) and theoretical discourses, widely recognized as and referred to as instances of 
microaggression.51 Let’s start with characteristics they seem to share. Both of these examples 
involve brief remarks. Both remarks are likely common, repeated, or routinely heard by the person 
being microaggressed (e.g., the trans student might be misgendered regularly, and the gay person 
likely hears casual remarks such as “that’s so gay” often as well). Both reflect bias against a 
structurally marginalized identity (trans identity in the first instance; gay identity in the second). 
We seem to be getting somewhere. 
However, these two cases also depart from one another. In the first example, “Misgendering 
Professor,” the microaggression was delivered intentionally (e.g., the professor consciously and 
reflectively misgendered their student). In the second example, “That’s So Gay!,” we can assume 
that the person would not intentionally hurt their gay friend. In other words, we can assume that 
this microaggression was delivered unintentionally. This is one point of contrast, which illustrates 
a conceptual difficulty with microaggressions: they can be intentional or unintentional (cf. 
Friedlaender and Ivy 2020).  
There is yet another difference between the two examples that I think is worth highlighting, 
because I think it reflects a further challenge in pinning down the concept of microaggression. In 
the first example, the microaggression was directed at the target specifically. By “directed at,” I 
mean a comment that is either said to, or clearly stated about, a particular person (in this case, a 
particular, identifiable trans person). The second example doesn’t quite function like that. In the 
second example, the speaker makes a microaggresive comment that indirectly impacts the recipient 
 
51 I do not mean to suggest here that there is not active confusion, and debate, about where to draw the conceptual 
lines regarding what should be included and excluded in the concept of microaggressions. In other words, I do not 
mean to suggest that there might be some people, and perhaps some microaggressions theorist, who might disagree 
with one or both of these examples. (Hence the conceptual ambiguity under discussion). But, I think these are two 
relatively non-controversial examples, which have been discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature on 




(that is, the gay person who is present when the remark is made). Though the comment is general 
and is not directed at the gay person, it can nevertheless be impactful. An interesting feature of 
microaggressions is that they can impact people without being specifically directed at them (e.g., 
because people overhear microaggressions directed at someone else, or because some 
microaggressions come in the form of general comments (e.g., “That’s so gay!”), or because some 
microaggressions are built into our very environments (e.g., masculinist language that excludes 
non-men but is supposed to read as “universal,” such as “All men are created equal”))  
By looking at just these two examples of microaggressions, of the many, many possible examples 
to consider, it is evident that microaggressions can come in very different forms, with differing – 
even conflicting – characteristics. (The six examples included in the introduction above are 
provided to offer some initial sense of this variability and complexity).  
Upon reflection, most contenders for characteristics that might be necessary and jointly sufficient 
for the concept of microaggression to apply are vulnerable to counterexamples. Microaggressions 
can be intentional or unintentional; they can be rooted in implicit bias or explicitly held prejudicial 
beliefs; they can come in the form of verbal comments, gestures or body language, or be embedded 
within our physical environments; and they can target a wide array of marginalized identities (e.g., 
race, ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic class, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, 
dis/ability status, body size). As a result of all of this complexity, particular instances of 
microaggressions can, and do, look very different in practice. This makes the concept itself appear 
incoherent and obscure – the concept of microaggression feels so nebulous and inclusive of so 
many different things, without any obvious overarching unity to tie it all together (cf. Lilienfeld 
2017a). Moreover, this makes the project of determining necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the concept of microaggression appear doomed to fail.52 And yet, we still need a way of making 
sense of the many diverse examples of things that we call ‘microaggression,’ such as the six 
 
52 One could object here that I have not shown that this project of identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the concept of microaggressions is impossible, but rather that I have only shown that will be incredibly difficult. 
Whether or not identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of ‘microaggression’ is theoretically possible, all I 
have to show for my purposes here is that it is 1) difficult but 2) not essential to the project of legitimating the concept 
of microaggression as meaningful and useful. This is because, as I will show, there are other perfectly reasonable ways 




examples offered above and others, as well as a way of speaking meaningful about the concept 
itself. This is one important contribution to microaggression theory that philosophers are well-
positioned to make – philosophers have resources for understanding concepts that do not readily 
decompose into a clean set of necessary and sufficient conditions. We can appeal to other theories 
of concepts to make sense of the coherency and usefulness of the microaggression concept, thereby 
addressing the definitional concerns raised by microaggression critics (e.g., Lilienfeld 2017a). I 
will demonstrate this possibility with one plausible approach for theorizing the microaggression 
concept – namely, family resemblance theory – in what follows.  
 A Way Out of the Problem: Conceptualizing Microaggressions via 
Family Resemblance  
So far, I have set up the following problem: the microaggression concept is difficult to pin down, 
especially using certain methods that philosophers tend to rely on (e.g., conceptual analysis aimed 
at identifying necessary and sufficient conditions). This appears to threaten the usefulness of the 
concept, leading certain microaggression critics to suggest that the concept ought to be abandoned 
and microaggression theorizing and advocacy put on pause (cf. Lilienfeld 2017a). In what follows, 
I aim to offer one possible route for rescuing the microaggression concept and demonstrating its 
coherence. Specifically, my claim is that concepts do not need to be understood by appealing to 
necessary and sufficient conditions; philosophers have other ways of theorizing concepts. In this 
section, I will provide one such way, namely, I will offer a tentative family resemblance account 
of microaggression. In so doing I do not intend to claim, definitively, that this is the only way (or 
the best way) of theorizing the microaggression concept. Rather, I use an appeal to family 
resemblance to demonstrate my main claim: that the microaggression concept can be meaningful, 
useful, and coherent, even if it does not neatly parse into necessary and sufficient conditions. Let’s 
now turn to the approach.  
In Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) aimed to offer a challenge to the 
classical view of concepts, and instead offer an alternative way of thinking about and 
understanding language and concepts. Instead of seeking out an underlying and universal essence 
of a concept, he argued that we should instead look directly at our actual world and our practices 




of acceptable usage. What we do when we use concepts in language is set out conditions for the 
concept’s permissible use. It turns out that we often use the same concept to refer to a wide range 
of instances of a phenomenon, which are not identical, but are closely enough related to all of the 
other uses to be a sensible instantiation of that concept. The instances to which the concept is 
applied do not necessarily all relate to each other in the same way. Rather, they generally overlap, 
at least enough that competent language users can recognize their unity (albeit imperfectly). 
Understanding concepts in this way can be called “family resemblance.” 
Wittgenstein illustrates this point by using the concept of ‘game.’ Specifically, he argued that there 
is no singular essence which underlies all things that we apply the concept of ‘game’ to: some (but 
not all) games are played for fun; some (but not all) games are played professionally; some (but 
not all games) are played for gambling, or even as a result of an addiction; not all games have 
scores or points; not all games have teams; some games can be played alone while others cannot; 
not all games require equipment, and so on. Rather, we can identify instances of ‘game’ by their 
having some of these features, though not necessarily all of them. Games can relate to other games 
on some, but not all of these fronts. They are like a family in this way, in which different members 
of the family share some features with some members, and different features with other members, 
which together make them identifiable as a family unit. 
Wittgenstein’s articulation of family resemblance theory offers a promising route for explaining 
how it is the case that the concept ‘microaggression’ can be consistently and reasonably applied in 
practice, despite the seeming impossibility of finding some shared essence that unifies every 
discrete instance of it. In general, family resemblance theory offers a way of thinking about unity 
and cohesion for concepts that seem inherently varied and diverse, by rejecting essentialist 
tendencies and instead taking a more pragmatic route to understanding concepts. Scholars have 
found Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ approach beneficial for understanding what unifies 
various concepts, including “woman” (Munro 2006) and “genocide” (Snow 2015), and even as a 
model for machine learning (Vadera et al. 2008). It has been viewed as a valuable approach for 
understanding concepts that have meanings which shift, broaden, or otherwise change overtime, 




When applied to the concept of ‘microaggression,’ family resemblance theory can help us to avoid 
problems that arise from trying to provide a narrow and precise definition of a microaggression 
via appeal to necessary and sufficient conditions. The potential problems include that: (i) if 
construed too narrowly, a concise definition is likely to exclude things that common usage might 
include, including instances of what people report experiencing as a microaggression; (ii) new 
forms of microaggression that arise might not be captured by the definition (i.e., a static definition 
cannot adequately account for an inherently dynamic concept)53; (iii) essentialist definitions are 
often unable to account for context-dependency (i.e., people will experience and perceive 
microaggressions differently as a result of their identity and other features of the social situation); 
and finally, (iv) a static definition can contribute to people doubting the testimonies of already 
oppressed people when they report that they have been microaggressed, if their experiences do not 
conform to the singular definition.54 For all of these reasons (and likely others) the concept of 
‘microaggression’ does not lend itself to a universalizing or totalizing definition, aimed at 
capturing “the essence” of the concept and articulated as a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions. We ought to instead think about what unifies the varied and diverse instances of what 
we experience as microaggressions and draw our understanding of the concept from there. 
Importantly for my purposes, doing so shows that we can think meaningfully about the 
microaggression concept without needing to pin down necessary and sufficient conditions.  
Though I do not intend to offer a definitive accounting of the concept of microaggression here, I 
will offer a tentative framework for a family resemblance account of the concept. Again, in so 
doing, my claim is not that this is the only way to theorize the microaggression concept. Rather, 
 
53  I say that the concept of ‘microaggression’ is a dynamic one because the concept is responsive to social facts (i.e., 
various forms of bias, stereotyping, etc.). These will naturally shift with the social and political landscape. For a 
comparison, think of slurring terms that go in and out of being a slur (i.e., as a result of historical or social context, 
terms that were previously considered a slur can cease to be so, through processes of appropriation or otherwise, or 
can cease to be a slur for select ‘in-group’ users (see Anderson 2018)). I am suggesting that just as our social and 
political landscape is dynamic, what is experienced as microaggression will be as well. 
54 For a parallel problem, consider people who bring forward claims of harassment, or even rape, and are disbelieved 
or not taken seriously insofar as their experience does not conform to the given legal definition or the dominant social 
myths and narratives around those particular acts (see Alcoff 2018 on rape myths and narratives; see Fricker 2007 on 





my aim is to show that this is one plausible way to make sense of the meaning of microaggression. 
With that qualification in mind, let us now consider what features unify the many instances of what 
we call microaggression, viz., let’s develop a family resemblance account of the concept. 
I contend that the following set of features can be thought of as forming the basis of a family 
resemblance account of the concept of ‘microaggression.’ Microaggressions are recognizable as 
such because they generally share (albeit to different degrees) the following features: 
microaggressions are contextually-defined, subtle, attributionally ambiguous, usually 
unintentional, and often the result of implicit biases or otherwise non-conscious cognitive 
processes. Their harm is also likely to fly under the radar, and their harms are cumulative in 
nature. These seven features, I argue, form the basis of the concept; it is some combination of 
these features that we appeal to when we are discussing microaggressions theoretically, and which 
allow us to recognize when a microaggression has occurred in practice. To be clear, I do not 
identify these as necessary or sufficient conditions.55 Rather, I identify them as sources of overlap, 
commonality, and resemblance, which help tie microaggressions together into a recognizable 
phenomenon.  
Let us consider each in turn. First, microaggressions are contextually-defined. We are able to 
theorize about, and recognize in practice, how certain comments, gestures, or actions are 
inappropriate, offensive, or harmful vis-à-vis some particular social setting or political context.56 
Particular comments or actions, for example, are harmful as a result of taking place within the 
context of certain hierarchical power structures, where some groups experience oppression as a 
result of their group membership. That some group is oppressed (and thus that some comments or 
actions that are rooted in that oppression are harmful) is a contingent fact. It could be otherwise. 
As such, microaggressions and their harmful consequences are the product of socially-contingent 
 
55 I am not foreclosing the possibility that one, or even several, of these conditions might be necessary. However, my 
aim is not to decide this. Rather, my aim is to show that we can think and talk about the concept even if we cannot 
locate necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept.  
56  For example, ones like ours which are stratified by race, class, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, dis/ability 




facts and power relations. These social features differ, at least in some respects, across different 
social, cultural, and political contexts. Microaggressions pick up on and reflect dynamics of power 
and oppression, which are the product of specific social conditions and political arrangements that 
could (and can!) change.  
Consider the “Real Mom” example above (that is, the example of the young Chinese girl playing 
with a new friend at the park who is asked about her “real mom”). In that example, the 
microaggression picks up on socially contingent facts about the unequal valuing of non-biological 
parenthood (e.g., adoptive parents, step-parents, second-parents, guardians, or kin parents). This 
devaluing of non-biological parenthood is a product of social relations and meanings and 
reinforced by a lack of equal legal and institutional representation for non-biological families (see, 
for example, the following report on the impacts of unequal parental leave on non-biological 
parents, McLeod et al. 2019). That only biological parents are considered “real” is what gives this 
comment its microaggresive force. But this assumption is socially and contextually defined; it is a 
contingent fact that could change with more representation and recognition of non-biological 
parenthood and child-rearing.  
The context-specificity of microaggressions goes beyond broad scale social facts, however. 
Sometimes microaggressions are contextually-fixed in an even narrower sense: for example, where 
they only make sense or carry a certain force within the space of a particular community or 
institution with its specific norms. Here, I think of examples from my own life as a first-generation 
college student turned academic. As I have progressed through graduate school and have begun 
making my way into the profession of academic philosophy, I have realized that there are many 
norms and assumptions that are relatively unique to the academy, and in some cases to the 
discipline of philosophy. For example, among graduate students, there is often an assumption that 
one’s parents are also professors, or, at the very least, have some elite, white-collar profession. So, 
for example, when upon entering my MA program I was asked by a fellow incoming grad student 
“what my parents did?” this struck me as a class-based microaggression in that context (though it 
likely wouldn’t register the same way in some other, less elite, context). Similarly, when my ability 
to shut off my Southern accent betrays me, I get subtle microaggresive remarks about my accent 




that pervade the academy. The assumption is that Southern accents equate to stupidity or ignorance 
and attach to people who are not expected to be educated. I encounter this assumption, and the 
microaggressions rooted in it, in academic spaces. I would not readily encounter them in some 
other contexts such as, for example, the working-poor neighborhood in Kentucky that I grew up 
in.  So, microaggressions can be quite context-specific, even in a fairly narrow sense (e.g., not at 
the broader social level, but rather within sub-cultures and/or specific institutional settings). Put 
another way, some microaggressions get their meaning and force as a result of the narrow and 
specific norms found in sub-communities or contexts that are narrower and more specific than 
society writ large. This only adds to the difficulty of making sense of microaggression, especially 
when one is not familiar with all of the relevant and specific norms in some particular context.  
Second, microaggressions are characteristically subtle, especially when compared to other acts of 
explicit discrimination or violence.57 While microaggressions are (like discrimination and many 
other sorts of violence) properly thought of as manifestations of unjust background conditions and 
their subsequent power differentials, they are a more elusive mode of oppressive action. 
Consequently, microaggressions often pop up, and often pass by, in routine social interactions 
across a variety of contexts. They may at times even go unnoticed by some, or all, people present 
when the microaggressive comment or action was made. Consider again the “That’s ‘Dr.’ to You” 
example offered above. It is plausible to think that the junior professor’s being called “Ms.” (while 
her male colleagues are regularly referred to as “Dr.”) would go unnoticed by other students, and 
perhaps even her colleagues. This reflects the subtlety of even the most frequently occurring 
microaggressions.  
Microaggressions might remain “invisible” to those present until they are brought to the surface 
and made salient, often as a result of having the microaggression “called out” by the recipient of 
the microaggression or a bystander. At times, we might only realize long after the fact that 
 
57 See McClure (2019) for a discussion of how microaggressions fit on a “spectrum of aggression” that ranges from 
overt and intentional assaults to unintentional microaggressions (though, as I have noted above, microaggressions, on 





something we have said, or done, or heard constitutes an instance of microaggression. For 
example, we might realize, in response to education or personal reflection, that certain terms or 
phrases that we have used in the past are microaggresive. For example, many common phrases 
reflect ableist language or entrenched sexism or homophobia. We might think here of commonly 
used phrases, such as telling young boys that they are doing some activity, X, “like a girl” in the 
presence of girls, where “X” is something we are socialized to believe women and girls cannot do 
well. The “That’s So Gay!” example above of a friend casually using the phrase “That’s so gay” 
to denote something negative or unwanted is also an example of this. Upon serious reflection, we 
might come to find that much of the vocabulary and phraseology we use (or used to use in the past) 
frequently reflects and reinforces problematic assumptions and biases. This sort of reflection is 
encouraged in a variety of sensitivity trainings and workshops aimed at drawing attention to our 
implicit biases and stereotyping perceptions. Unfortunately, however, such opportunities for 
serious critical reflection are still too uncommon. Without serious reflection, the many subtle 
manifestations of stereotypes, prejudice, and bias can remain difficult to recognize (and thus 
difficult to prevent or resist).  
As a result of this marked subtlety, microaggressions can cause a confusing sense of attributional 
ambiguity for those who experience them and for others. Veronica Ivy (2014) describes 
attributional ambiguity as the feeling we experience when it is unclear why someone behaves a 
certain way toward us, such as when they provide a positive or negative evaluation of our actions. 
Ivy provides the example of a young, attractive undergraduate student being given the high mark 
of an A+ in a biology lab and being unsure whether the mark was given to her because she 
genuinely earned it or because the graduate teaching assistant was attracted to her (Ivy 2014, 867). 
The agent’s motivation for treating the undergraduate student in a particular manner is ambiguous, 
most of all to the student herself.  
This sort of ambiguity in motives, and the lack of clarity about how to appropriately interpret 
another’s comments or actions, is often present in the case of microaggressions. This is to say that 
microaggressions are often difficult to interpret by everyone – even those on the receiving end. 
Targets of microaggressions might wonder whether what they experienced really was an instance 




light of their level of knowledge, expertise, or whatever it may be. Microaggressions, as such, can 
cause targets to doubt themselves and their ability to accurately interpret their own experiences. 
(This is what Bartky 1979 describes as the internalization of oppression, or psychological 
oppression.) They can also lead targets to wonder about the intentions of those who they feel have 
microaggressed them. Not being sure how to interpret the words and actions (or the underlying 
intentions of others) can compound an overall sense of confusion. (There is good evidence that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the intentions of others; see for example Schwitzgebel 
2008; Pronin 2009; Williams 2020). In this way, microaggressions align with other forms of 
structural and systemic oppression (which, as I noted in the Introduction to this thesis, often 
become “mystified” or obscured). 
To the extent that people are able to understand their own intentions (although as agents we are 
generally quite bad at this, too58), we can give the benefit of the doubt that in most cases, 
microaggressions are unintended on the part of those who commit them. Indeed, microaggressions 
can be committed by people with good or even beneficent intentions (e.g., teachers, health care 
providers) and even those closest to us (e.g., family members, partners, allies, co-workers, 
neighbors, or friends). Given the frequency of microaggressions (see Rini 2020 on the 
systematicity of microaggressions), and especially those that are committed by people who 
generally do not desire to cause us harm, we can ascertain that microaggressions are often (albeit 
not always) committed without the intention to do so, and certainly without the intention to cause 
harm. It is a distinctive feature of microaggressions that they are a mechanism of oppression that 
is not always (and perhaps not even often) mobilized with the explicit intention of reifying 
oppression.59 They have this impact despite, and perhaps in spite of, the intentions of those who 
commit them.  
 
58 The vast empirical literature on the phenomenon of implicit bias seems to indicate that we are not always fully 
aware of the intentions behind our words or actions; we can act on implicit biases and beliefs which are not consciously 
available to us, and which we do not explicitly endorse. For an analysis of this point, see Saul (2012). There is also 
evidence to suggest that we are also quite bad at introspection. On this point, see Pronin (2009). 
59 I have set out, in detail, how I am understanding oppression in the Introduction to this thesis. Put simply here, I take 




We can explain the fact that microaggressions are often committed unintentionally once we 
recognize that microaggressions are often the result of implicit biases or otherwise non-conscious 
cognitive processes. That is, people can commit microaggressions without explicitly endorsing the 
oppressive (e.g., racist, misogynistic, homophobic, transphobic) views that undergird them, and 
indeed, while explicitly rejecting them and/or being committed to justice broadly speaking. For 
example, a white person who is a committed anti-racist might not explicitly endorse racist beliefs, 
but nevertheless might microaggress a Black friend or colleague. The microaggression likely 
results from implicit biases, or internalized negative social stereotypes about Blackness, that 
operate on us at a subconscious level.60 Or, for another example, we might misgender our trans 
friend, despite our best intentions, as a result of deeply entrenched cis-normativity and a 
widespread social commitment to the sex/gender binary. These social norms, beliefs, and attitudes 
can act on us in ways that we do not fully realize, at times manifesting in microaggressions.   
The final two features of microaggressions concern harm: the harms of microaggression are likely 
to fly under the radar or be difficult to recognize,61 and this is, at least in part, because the harms 
of microaggressions are cumulative in nature and compound over time.62 Microaggressions can 
cause harm, even in instances where neither the perpetrator nor the target perceive that a harm has 
been done, and these harms accumulate over time, slowly and often unrecognizably, until the 
 
“normal” as to be invisible to everyone, potentially even to the oppressed themselves (Frye 1983; Young 1990; Bartky 
1979).  
60 See Fricker (2007) for a discussion of negative-prejudicial identity-based stereotypes that are contained within the 
collective social imagination which can drive oppressive practices (on her account, epistemic injustices, and for our 
purposes, microaggressions). On implicit bias, see Holroyd (2015) and Holroyd et al. (2017).  
61 Note that this is a different point than the previous one (that is, that microaggresive actions are attributionally 
ambiguous). While the former point about attributional ambiguity refers to the lack of clarity about how to attribute 
intentions to the agent committing the act, or how to appropriately understand the act, the point here is about the 
recognizability of the harms that result (e.g., whether the harms are detectable, to those committing microaggressions 
or to those being harmed). Again, the ability for harm to be obscured is reflective of the mystification of oppression 
(Bartky 1979). And, as I argued in the Introduction to this thesis, I contend that harm can (and often does) occur 
without the awareness or recognition of the person being harmed.  





molehill has become a mountain. The consequences of the cumulative harms of microaggressions 
can be varied, but include, for example, the development of internalized oppression (cf. Bartky 
1990), experiences of otherness and lack of belonging, and loss of social trust (for a discussion of 
these long-term consequences of microaggressions, see chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis).  
I contend that these seven features, taken together, constitute a preliminary articulation of what 
makes microaggressions resemble one another enough to recognize them as diverse instances of 
the same phenomenon. Being recognized as an instance of microaggression does not require that 
each and every of these conditions be met in each discrete instance. For example, while some 
microaggressions are more ambiguous (e.g., “That’s ‘Dr.’ to You” example above of the junior 
woman professor being routinely addressed as “Ms.”), some are more overt and obvious (e.g., 
“Misgendering Professor” example above of the professor who intentionally misgenders a trans 
student to another colleague). As such, some microaggressions are more likely to pass by 
unnoticed, while others might stand out more readily. Or, there might be cases of microaggression 
which are intentional (e.g., “Misgendering Professor”), or for which the experience of attributional 
ambiguity is lacking for the person on the receiving end. In other cases, the person being 
microaggressed might assume that the act was unintended (e.g., “That’s So Gay!”). On the view I 
have outlined, instances of microaggression are related via overlapping resemblances of a variety 
of these common features, even where one or more of the named features is absent. The relations 
of the features to one another may shift – microaggressions can have various combinations of these 
features and still be recognizable as instances of microaggression. Importantly, we can talk 
meaningfully about the concept and the phenomenon of microaggression by understanding the 
microaggression concept in this way. There is precedent for this way of understanding concepts, 
which philosophers ought to engage with in order to offset worries about the definitional 
challenges facing the microaggression concept.  
 Who Knows It When They See it? Standpoint Matters for 
Microaggression Recognition  
Before concluding, I want to address one additional, related concern about the microaggression 
concept and the phenomenon it describes. This is the worry that microaggressions are so broad 




(Lilienfeld 2017a, 144). Furthermore, in some cases, microaggressions are only identified and 
named as such retroactively (ibid.). The general concern is that because the concept of 
microaggression and the phenomenon it describes is so elusive, knowing when we can identify 
some instance as falling under the extension of the concept is tricky. I grant this difficulty: 
microaggressions are indeed puzzling, and often difficult to identify and name in practice. 
However, I do not think this difficulty is equally realized for all who encounter microaggression. 
Rather, I think some people are better equipped, as result of their social and epistemic locations, 
to recognize and name instances of microaggression as such. Put another way, I think standpoint 
matters for recognizing and naming instances of microaggression in practice. Let me develop this 
idea further.  
Taking seriously a commitment to standpoint epistemology epistemology (Marx 1976; 1981; Marx 
& Engels 1975a; 1975b; 1975c), and particularly feminist standpoint epistemology (see Alcoff and 
Potter 1993; Hill Collins; 1990; 2004; hooks 1984; Harding 2004; 2008; Hartsock 1998; also see 
chapter 1 of this thesis), I contend that those people who, in virtue of their social location, are most 
likely to be on the receiving end of microaggressions are best suited to realize when a 
microaggression has occurred. Given the family resemblance analysis offered above, you might 
say that some people, as a result of being positioned so as to regularly encounter microaggressions, 
are better positioned to recognize the various connections and overlaps between the various 
features, and properly identify and name microaggressions when they encounter or experience 
them.  
Recent advocates of standpoint theory (see Rolin 2009; Toole 2019; Wylie 2004; 2012) argue that 
people in oppressed social positions are generally epistemically advantaged with respect to 
recognizing oppression, understanding the significance of oppression, and understanding the 
connections between individual acts of oppression and larger oppressive systems and structures. I 
contend that this is the case here, namely, that those who are on the frequent receiving end of 
microaggressions are generally better suited to recognize microaggressions when they occur, and 
also to understand their significance, including the harms they cause and how those harms connect 
to larger, interlocking systems of power and oppression (for a longer version of this argument, see 




As Wittgenstein called on us to look at how language-users actually use a particular concept in the 
real world, I think it is similarly relevant for our present purpose to look at how marginalized 
people talk about their own experiences with oppression, viz., to examine how marginalized people 
use the concept of ‘microaggression’ and what sorts of actions they describe as ‘microaggression.’ 
I contend that marginalized people are best able to recognize microaggressions (and understand 
their moral gravity and broader social significance), because it is marginalized people who are 
subjected to routine microaggressions and experience their harms first-hand. Microaggressions are 
likely far more difficult for people who have never been on the receiving end of them to recognize 
and grasp their significance.  
Most generally, the point is about perspective, and how one’s identity and experience shape their 
perspective. Our identities and experiences inform what we are likely to perceive (or to fail to 
perceive) in our social world; they also shape how we understand and relate to what we perceive. 
Consider an innocuous example. My partner is a well-trained mycologist. Her training and broad 
set of experiences with finding, identifying, and studying mushrooms has shaped her perception 
in significant ways. Consequently, when we go on a hike in the forest, she is far more likely than 
I am to notice mushrooms, to be able to name them, to understand why they are growing in the 
places they are, and how they interact with the broader ecological context. The way she and I 
experience the context of the forest is very different; she notices fungi hidden away that I would 
not have noticed and would have simply breezed past without her ability to call them to my 
attention. Though we are, in such cases, occupying the very same environment (the forest), and 
the objects in question are really there (the mushrooms), the likelihood that either of us will 
recognize them or understand them in context is markedly different on account of our past 
experiences and how those experiences have shaped our perspectives, attuning our eyes to readily 
notice (or in my case, fail to notice) certain things in our environments.  
My claim is that recognizing oppression and oppressive phenomena in our broader social context 
is like this, namely, our relative experiences with oppression shape our capacities to recognize and 
name oppression in practice. Those who live with the constant experience and awareness of 
oppression and oppressive structures are better able to recognize and identify instances of that 




shaped their perception to make them more aware of oppression and its various mechanisms. 
Oppression and oppressive phenomena are not features of their environment that they can simply 
ignore or not notice – oppression structures the way they move about and engage with their 
environments.  
Like fungi in the forest, microaggressions are often hidden in plain sight. For those whose 
experiences have not attuned their perception to notice subtle instances of oppression, they might 
go overlooked. At the same time, they might be readily apparent to those whose perspectives and 
perception are shaped by oppression. They are “really there,” even if they are more or less easy to 
see for differently situated people.  
To bring the focus back to microaggressions, and to make my claim regarding standpoint more 
concrete, let’s consider a real example. At a recent divisional meeting of the American 
Philosophical Association, a white male attendee approached another conference participant (a 
woman of colour) and asked where a particular conference room was located. She replied that she 
did not know, only to have the man respond: “Oh, sorry, you look like you work here.”63 I won’t 
speculate about this man’s intentions, and indeed, we can give him the benefit of the doubt that he 
did not intend anyone any harm by his questioning. However, it is likely the case that, in making 
this offhand remark to a young woman of colour philosopher, he was entirely oblivious of the 
impact that his words might (and ultimately did) have on her, or the broader context in which such 
a speech act is situated. That said, the racist and misogynist undertones were not lost on the young 
woman of colour. Moreover, a second attendee in the room (another woman of colour), witnessed 
the exchange and immediately recognized it as an all-too-familiar act of microaggression. 
Speaking to me after the fact, she noted that comments like this “make her feel like she doesn’t 
belong.” That’s a pretty crummy feeling before one is slated to give a conference talk. (Can you 
say, “stereotype threat?”).64 The main point here is the following: both women, in virtue of being 
 
63 True story – this actually happened.  
64 Stereotype threat refers to a psychological threat that is elicited by a negative stereotype and the resulting feeling 




women of color in a context that is structured by power imbalances and in which people like them 
are vastly underrepresented, they were able to recognize this comment as an instance of 
microaggression, and also contextualize it within a broader pattern of context-specific facts (e.g., 
that women of color are not expected to be professional philosophers, and are more readily 
understood as hotel staff). They are epistemically better positioned to perceive these features of 
the man’s comments than he is. They live with certain identities and experiences that make the 
significance of such comments more readily apparent. They have a clear sense of how they connect 
up with broader patterns and bits of racism that they experience in this context and others.  
I believe that this is generally true with microaggressions and other similarly subtle mechanisms 
of oppression, namely, that our identities and experience shape our relationship to them, making 
us more or less able to recognize them and understand their significance in real time.   
In making the claim that those with lived experience of oppression are more likely to perceive 
microaggressions, I want to be clear about two things that I am not suggesting. First, I am not 
suggesting that the perception of oppressed people is infallible. My claim is weaker than that. The 
claim is that our perspectives are shaped in important ways by our lived experiences, which 
influence what we can see and what we thereby come to know about the world. As Briana Toole 
(2019) characterizes the significance of standpoint, it is about how our identities inform and 
influence our knowledge acquisition. The claim is not that our identities make us perfect knowers, 
though, they may make us more reliable knowers in a particular context, e.g., regarding 
oppression. So, I am not suggesting that oppressed people will get it right one hundred percent of 
the time, or that they will have a perception that is perfectly attuned to all subtle instances of 
oppression and all microaggressions. The claim is that their experiences make them better able to 
see microaggressions, not that they will see or understand them all with perfect accuracy.  
To relate this back to the example offered earlier, you might think that while my mycologist partner 
is generally far better positioned than I am to recognize and identify mushrooms in the forest, her 
 
the person to perform worse than they otherwise would, were they not made acutely aware of the stereotype (see 




perception will not be perfect or infallible. Though it is rare, she might occasionally miss a batch 
of mushrooms that were right in her path. That she occasionally fails to perceive mushrooms that 
are in her environment does not detract from the fact that she is, in general, far better positioned 
than I (and, realistically, than most!) to perceive, name, and understand mushrooms when they are 
present in some environment. Her training and past experiences make this the case. She need not 
be a perfect or infallible mycologist (though she is pretty close) to still be better positioned, 
epistemically speaking, to know things about fungi and to identify them when she encounters them. 
Infallibility does not invalidate the claim of epistemic advantage.  
Secondly, intersectionality is relevant here. I do not want to claim, or even to suggest, that all 
oppressed people will be equally attuned to all microaggressions. As I have argued, our identities 
and experiences make us more apt to notice certain things, and, in light of experiences, to 
understand them and their significance in context. But of course, not all oppressed people 
experience oppression in the same ways (e.g., I take seriously Young’s 1990 pluralistic picture of 
the many ways oppression manifests, or what she calls the different “faces” of oppression). It is 
possible (and indeed, likely) that differently oppressed people will be more or less able to notice 
different microaggressions, or more or less able to understand the full moral and social significance 
of a particular microaggression. For example, a white queer woman might be well-positioned to 
recognize gender or sexual orientation based microaggressions in practice (and understand their 
connections to systems of misogyny and heteronormativity) but might not as readily perceive the 
myriad microaggressions that Black people experience, or the full scope of their significance (e.g., 
their historical significance or the extent of their connection to or roots in anti-Blackness), as a 
Black person might. Intersectional differences in experiences of oppression will have impacts on 
the ability of differently positioned individuals to recognize microaggressions and grasp their 
moral and social significance in practice. Again, our direct experiences with oppression make a 
difference, so differently oppressed people will be more and less able to perceive and understand 
different types of microaggressions.  
In sum, the point is that our experience acts as a guide when it comes to recognizing 
microaggressions in practice, and in understanding their connections to broader systems of 




and tricky to pin down in practice, those who occupy positions of marginalization and experience 
oppression directly are better equipped to recognize them – specifically, to pick up on the 
overlapping features of microaggression. First-hand experiences with oppression, including 
microaggressions, “train the eye” to better recognize instances of microaggression when they occur 
again… and again… and again. Oppressed people generally have an epistemic advantage in this 
domain (a point which is developed in chapter 1 of this thesis).  
 Objections and Replies  
Before concluding I would like to briefly consider some objections to the claims I have offered 
above.  
First, I have claimed that the microaggression concept is coherent even if it does not break down 
cleanly into necessary and sufficient conditions, and I have illustrated this by appealing to family 
resemblance theory as an example of one way in which we can make sense of the concept without 
appeal to necessary and sufficient conditions. One might object to this approach, arguing instead 
that there are better or more fitting ways of understanding the concept of microaggression. For 
example, one might argue that microaggression is best explained as an “essentially contested 
concept” (Gallie 2019) or is better explained by something like a prototype theory of concepts 
(Hampton 2006). To answer to this concern, it is worth reiterating what I have set out to do and 
what I haven’t. Specifically, my aim in this paper is to address concerns about the challenges 
involved in defining microaggression, and related concerns about the coherence and usefulness of 
the concept. To this end, I have used an appeal to family resemblance to demonstrate that there 
are, within philosophy, ways of making sense of concepts without appeal to necessary and 
sufficient conditions. In presenting the family resemblance approach, I have been careful in my 
framing: I am not taking a definitive stance on what is the best theory for the concept, but rather 
am presenting one possibility for making sense of the concept that gets us around certain concerns 
about the concept. I am here using family resemblance as an example of a way around such 





The other possible objections that I want to consider concern my appeal to standpoint 
epistemology, and my claim that members of structurally oppressed groups are generally better 
positioned to identify and name microaggressions in practice, as well as to have a better sense of 
their moral and social significance in context.65 One objection that might be raised against this line 
of thinking is the following: but what if oppressed people disagree about whether some instance is 
a microaggression.66 This objection could take two forms: first, what if members of the same 
marginalized group disagree about a microaggression purportedly targeting a member of that 
group (e.g., two white women disagreeing about a gender based microaggression), and second, 
what if two people from differently marginalized groups disagree about a microaggression (e.g., a 
white woman and a woman of color disagree about whether some instance is a microaggression).  
A few things are worth noting in response to these concerns. First, I have noted above that the 
standpoint claim that I am making is not a claim to infallibility or perfect knowledge, but rather is 
a claim about a tendency toward reliable perceptions and greater access to knowledge. In the case 
of disagreement, it is possible that someone is simply wrong about what they take to be the case. 
They could be failing to appreciate, for example, how some comment is rooted in or reinforcing 
some harmful group-based stereotype or bias. They might not have all of the relevant historical 
background or information about the specific context in which the comment or action is situated, 
both of which have bearing on the microaggressive force of a particular comment or action.  
For example, consider the “Real Mom” example described at the outset of this paper. Two people 
watching that interaction might react differently and come to different conclusions about whether 
the instance was a microaggression or not. But those differences could be rooted in differences in 
what one knows about preferences for biological parenthood and the marginalization of different 
 
65 Insofar as the forthcoming discussion raises objections and replies about my appeal to standpoint epistemology, 
they are also relevant to my appeal to standpoint epistemology in the previous chapter. What I say in defense of 
standpoint epistemology here can be taken as relevant to what I say about standpoint in chapter 1 as well.  
66 Lilienfeld (2017a) raises a version of this concern. He asks: “If Minority Group Member A interprets an ambiguous 
statement directed toward her—such as “I realize that you didn’t have the same educational opportunities as most 
Whites, so I can understand why the first year of college has been challenging for you”—as patronizing or indirectly 
hostile, whereas Minority Group Member B interprets it as supportive or helpful, should it be classified as a 




forms of parenting. They might not know, for example, how loaded the qualifier of “real” is when 
attached to the identity of “parent.” Though both witnesses to the interaction might be members 
of structurally oppressed groups, they might nevertheless lack some relevant knowledge or 
experience which informs the microaggressive impact of that particular comment. In that case, 
then, the person who fails to perceive this comment as a microaggression could simply be wrong 
about that, in light of missing relevant social information and context. Furthermore, this reinforces 
my previous claim that intersectionality is relevant to standpoint: even people who can all be said 
to be oppressed will have varied experiences of oppression and, as a result, might not all understand 
all types of oppression and marginalization equally. Intersectional differences shape the ability to 
accurately recognize different microaggressions in practice, and this is consistent with the 
standpoint claim that I have made above.  
Another related point is that harm, as I understand it can be objective (for a review of how I am 
thinking about harm, see the discussion of harm in the introduction to this thesis). In other words, 
some comment or action can be objectively harmful, just in case it reinforces one’s oppression. 
This harm occurs regardless of one’s subjective perception of that harm. Microaggressions 
reinforce structural and systemic oppression, and as such, constitute a harm (see introduction to 
this thesis as well as chapter 3 of this thesis). So, one can be harmed by microaggressions, even 
when they do not perceive them, or even when they misperceive them as not microaggressions. 
(And, because oppression is, as I have noted, often internalized and mystified (cf. Bartky 1979; 
1990), this can, at times, be the case). In a case where an oppressed person fails to perceive an 
instance of microaggression as such, or in which two people disagree about whether some instance 
is a microaggression, we can look at the comment or act in its context to help settle the dispute or 
clarify what has taken place. If the comment or action is one that reinforces stereotypes, biases, 
marginalization, or oppression, then it is likely a microaggression in that context, even if one is 
unable or unwilling (e.g., as a result of internalized oppression) to perceive it as such. Again – 
even those who are generally better positioned to recognize microaggressions are fallible. In such 
cases, looking to structural and systemic features of the social and political context can help us go 




 Conclusion  
Microaggressions are difficult to pin down, both conceptually and as they manifest in practice. 
Many diverse features of microaggressions (and ongoing debate about what counts as 
microaggression) make achieving a precise definition (e.g., in the form of necessary and sufficient 
conditions) fraught. Though this has led some to worry about the clarity and usefulness of the 
concept (cf. Lilienfeld 2017a), philosophers can help us get around these worries. Specifically, 
philosophers have tools for making sense of the meaning of concepts in ways that do not depend 
on isolating some essence of a concept or being able to define it with reference to necessary and 
sufficient conditions. I have illustrated this prospect by developing one possible route for 
conceptualizing microaggression, namely, via an appeal to a family resemblance understanding of 
the concept. I have suggested some common features of microaggression which might be thought 
to unify varied instances of microaggression into a coherent and recognizable concept. I have also 
argued that even though microaggressions can be ambiguous in practice, some people, in virtue of 
their social and epistemic positionality, are generally better positioned to recognize them and to 
speak to their broader significance as they occur in real time.  
This paper has as its motivation a desire to resist concerns about and challenges to the 
microaggression concept, and related calls to abandon it altogether. I have suggested that even in 
the absence of a fixed definition of microaggression, there is still good reason not to abandon our 
attempts to better understand the microaggression concept, in all of its multidimensionality, and 
the morally and socially significant phenomenon it tracks. We can, I believe, draw on the 
epistemically advantaged perspectives of those on the frequent receiving end of microaggressions 
to guide our exploration and theorizing of the concept. With such perspectives as our guide, we 
can continue to get a better picture of microaggression and continue to refine our conception and 
understanding of it. In the meantime, by appealing to conceptual approaches such as family 
resemblance theory, we can go some way toward grasping the unity and coherence of the 
microaggression concept. Moreover, we can continue to communicate sensibly about 
microaggressions, we can recognize them when they occur in practice, we can describe them and 
their consequences to others, and we can continue to theorize about them and advocate for their 
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Chapter 3  
3. Microaggressions in Clinical Medicine 
 
Abstract:  
This chapter proposes a recipient-centered, harm-based account of 
microaggressions within the context of clinical medicine. In so doing, it 
argues that microaggressions can undermine physician–patient 
relationships, preclude relationships of trust, and therefore compromise the 
kind and quality of care that patients deserve. Ultimately, by focusing on 
the experiences of those on the receiving end of microaggressions, the 
paper demonstrates how harmful microaggressions in clinical medical 
contexts can be, and thus provides strong reasons why healthcare providers 






Damon Tweedy is a psychiatrist, lawyer, and writer. He’s also Black. While in his first year as a 
medical student at Duke University, one of his professors saw him in the classroom and asked why 
the burned-out light bulb in the room hadn’t been changed, as requested. Tweedy realized that his 
professor assumed he was a maintenance worker. Tweedy never took up this incident with the 
professor, nor did the professor ever apologize. Tweedy recounts that his best “revenge” would be 
to excel in the class, which he ultimately did. At the end of the semester, upon learning that Tweedy 
received the second highest grade of over one hundred students, this professor invited him to work 
as a research assistant in his lab, still never apologizing for what he’d said earlier in the semester. 
Tweedy declined the professor’s invitation. Despite excelling in this class and in medical school, 
in Black Man in a White Coat (2015), Tweedy discusses how he internalized this incident and how, 
compiled with countless similar occurrences throughout his education and training, the experience 
stayed with him. He continually had to battle impostor syndrome68 and tried to overturn and 
disprove stereotypes. This caused him significant stress and anxiety (2015, 24ff.). 
Though Tweedy doesn’t analyze his experience using the language of microaggressions, this 
occurrence is a clear example of one. Microaggressions can be defined as verbal, nonverbal, and/or 
environmental slights, snubs, or indignities that are either intentional or (most often) unintentional; 
they convey hostile, derogatory, or otherwise negative messages to target persons based upon their 
membership in a structurally oppressed social group (Sue 2010). Over the last decade, and 
particularly in the last several years, microaggressions have received a great deal of attention, both 
 
67 This chapter is a revised version of a previously published paper, published in The Kennedy Institute of Ethics 
Journal, 28(4): 411–449, 2018. The paper was co-written with Lauren Freeman, and we made equal contributions to 
the research and writing of this paper. I have revised the paper on my own for inclusion in the thesis.   
We’re grateful to the following individuals for their comments on and discussions about drafts of this paper: Stephen 
Hanson, Avery Kolers, Andreas Elpidorou, Monnica Williams, and especially to two anonymous reviewers for their 
meticulous readings of two drafts of this paper. Additionally, we’re grateful to audiences at the Southern Society of 
Philosophy and Psychology (2016), the Kentucky Philosophical Association (2016), FEMMS 6 (2016), and the 
Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association (2017).  
68 “Impostor syndrome,” describes high-achieving individuals who are unable to internalize their accomplishments or 




popular and scholarly, from supporters and critics alike.69 The most substantial scholarly work on 
microaggressions analyzes the concept specifically within the context of clinical psychology. One 
area in which microaggressions haven’t been considered in any depth is within the context of 
clinical medicine.70 Our paper aims to rectify this oversight. 
Section 3.2 outlines how microaggressions have been understood within the psychology literature, 
namely, as microassaults, microinsults, and microinvalidations. This taxonomy distinguishes 
microaggressions according to the type of act committed by the aggressor. Contrary to this 
approach, we imagine and propose an alternative way of understanding microaggressions. Instead 
of taking as the point of departure the act committed by the aggressor, we consider what an account 
of microaggressions would look like that instead understands them on the basis of the harm(s) 
 
69 For instance, in the scholarly literature Sue (2010), Nadal et al. (2011), Nadal (2013), have introduced and developed 
the phenomenon. Lilienfeld (2017a) has questioned the science behind how microaggressions have been studied and, 
quite radically, has called for a moratorium on any workshops that attempt to help prevent the occurrences of 
microaggressions until the research program has been validated. In both scholarly and popular venues, Haidt (2016, 
2017) has questioned the seriousness of microaggressions and, following Campbell and Manning 2014, has argued 
that microaggressions promote a culture of victimhood (thereby dismissing the extent to which they in fact cause real 
harm). Ong et al. (2017) and Sue (2017) have defended microaggressions against charges leveled against them in 
Lilienfeld 2017a, including Haidt’s. Other defenders of microaggressions include Decuir-Gunby & Gunby (2016), 
Friedlaender (2018); Huynh (2012), Isom (2016), Joshi Wynn et al. (2015), Kaskan & Ho (2014), and Pitcher (2017). 
For accounts of microaggressions that are specifically focused on clinical counseling and other clinical psychology 
contexts, see Constantine (2007), DeLapp & Williams (2014), Hook et al. (2016), Nadal et al. (2012), Owen & Rodolfa 
(2010), Shelton & Delgado-Romero (2013), Sue et al. (2007), Sue et al. (2008). Also see Rini (2019) for a sustained 
discussion of microaggressions by a philosopher. 
Within popular media, a large part of the microaggression debate has focused on microaggressions on college 
campuses (see, for example, McWhorter 2014; Vega 2014; Friedersdorf 2015) with many suggesting that claims of 
microaggressions are vastly overblown (i.e., Lilienfeld 2017b; Lilienfeld 2017). Lukianoff and Haidt (2015) have 
suggested that talk of microaggressions corrodes public discourse and encourages accusations and counter-accusations 
rather than critical thinking. Many have responded to such attacks on microaggressions, including Joseph (2015), 
Riedel (2016), Rini (2015), Runyowa (2015), and Weiss (2016).  
70 Since there’s been very little substantive work on microaggressions within clinical medicine, we see this paper as 
making an important contribution. Some basic treatments of the topic can be found in Bleich (2015), Montenegro 
(2016), and May (2017). These articles focus on microaggressions within the profession of medicine, specifically, 
between higher and lower ranks of physicians, physicians and medical students, and between physicians and nurse 
practitioners. None of them discusses microaggressions that occur between physicians and their patients. Hall and 
Fields (2012) discuss racial microaggressions between nurses and patients, though they focus on counseling 
relationships. We’re adding to the literature by broadening discussions of microaggressions in medical settings to 
include microaggressions that focus on harms to patients. Walls et al. (2015) is an exception insofar as it considers 
microaggressions experienced by patients; however, it focuses on the narrow patient group of American Indians with 
type 2 diabetes. Another exception is Smith-Oka (2015), which examines the effects of microaggressions in another 




experienced by the recipients. We propose this alternative, recipient-centered, harm-based 
framework for understanding microaggressions in section 3.3. Our proposed account distinguishes 
between three different types of microaggressions on the basis of the kind of harm that results for 
the recipient: epistemic microaggressions result in epistemic harms, emotional microaggressions 
result in emotional harms, and self-identity microaggressions result in harms to one’s sense of self, 
or existential harms.71 In developing our account, we provide examples of each kind of harm that 
frequently occurs in medical encounters. While our focus in section 3.3 is on the harms to patients 
that can result directly from the microaggressive actions of health care workers, section 3.4 
considers how repeated, long-term experiences of clinical microaggressions can have further 
damaging consequences: they undermine physician-patient relationships, preclude relationships of 
trust, and therefore, compromise the kind and quality of care that’s received. On the basis of these 
consequences, we argue that microaggressions shouldn’t be ignored in clinical medicine. In order 
to further motivate and substantiate our proposal to rethink the taxonomy of microaggressions, 
section 3.5 briefly revisits Sue’s account of microaggressions. In light of two cases considered in 
section 3.3, we show how and why Sue’s account can’t derive the precise conclusions about the 
kinds of harms that result from microaggressions, conclusions that can be reached on our proposed 
recipient-centered, harm-based approach. On the basis of this conclusion, we suggest that the 
dominant microaggressions taxonomy ought to be re-conceptualized.  
 Microaggressions 
The term “microaggression” was first coined by Chester Pierce (1970) and then developed to refer 
to the phenomenon of “subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are ‘put 
downs’” (Pierce et al. 1978, p. 66). In the last decade, there’s been renewed and sustained attention 
to and development of this phenomenon, initially in the work of Derald Wing Sue (2008; 2010; 
Sue et al. 2007) and more recently by his former student, Kevin Nadal (2013; 2018; Nadal et al. 
 
71 We use “existential harms” to refer, broadly, to the various harms to self-identity and one’s sense of self that result 





2011) and others (see Lilienfeld 2017a for a special issue dedicated to the topic of 
microaggressions). It’s widely accepted that “microaggressions” refer to brief and commonplace 
verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities – either intentional or unintentional – that are 
rooted in (implicit or explicit) prejudice and/or racial, ethnic, gender, sexuality, religious, 
disability, or other stereotypes and that are directed at and subsequently harm members of 
marginalized groups (see, for example, Sue et al. 2007; Sue, 2010; Torres et al. 2010; Nadal et al. 
2011; McWhorter 2014).72  
One common example of a microaggression is the following: a person of color is asked “Where 
are you from?” They respond with, “Louisville, KY, just like you.” If, instead of stopping there, 
the questioner continues, “But where are you really from?,” this is a microaggression since it 
emphasizes that there’s an important difference between a white person and a person of color who 
are both from the United States. Even if unintentional, this line of questioning sends the message 
that the person of color isn’t a “true” American, or that they are (or are considered to be) 
perpetually a foreigner or “Other” in their own country. Similar messages are sent when people of 
color, people of lower socioeconomic standing (SES), or people with unfamiliar accents are told, 
“You speak well” or “You’re so articulate!” Though the speaker might think they’re 
complimenting their interlocutor, such comments suggest that members of these groups aren’t 
expected to be articulate and that their being articulate comes across as surprising and anomalous.73 
When members of these groups routinely hear such comments and questions, microaggressions 
can compound to create a sense that they don’t belong, even in their birth country. 
Sue divides microaggressions into three different kinds: microinsults, microassaults, and 
microinvalidations. His taxonomy is act-based: microaggressions are understood and delineated 
according to the kind of act perpetuated by the aggressor. Not only has this taxonomy largely been 
 
72 It is worth noting here that the prefix “micro” need not mean that the act itself is small, relative to some other act. 
As Rini (2019, 29-31) argued, the prefix “micro” can refer to a part of whole system (e.g., in the way 
“microeconomics” explains actors within the larger economic system, whereas macroeconomics refers to the study of 
the system itself. In this sense, the prefix micro means to refer to a part/whole relation and not to comparisons of scale. 
I note this in the introduction to the thesis as well.  




taken for granted in the growing literature on microaggressions, but it seems to have become 
sacrosanct. Though Sue has made an undeniably important contribution to the literature on 
microaggressions, in this paper we’d like to imagine a different point of departure for 
conceptualizing them. Instead of defining and understanding microaggressions based on the kind 
of act committed by the aggressor, we focus instead on the kind of harms experienced by the 
recipients. Specifically, we propose and begin to consider what such a recipient-centered, harm-
based approach to microaggressions might look like.74 Such an approach accomplishes at least 
three things that an act-based approach (like Sue’s) fails to. It: (1) takes seriously, validates, and 
puts at the forefront the experiences of those on the receiving end of microaggressions, rather than 
those who commit them; (2) ensures that the harms experienced by those on the receiving end of 
microaggressions (viz., members of marginalized groups) aren’t obscured; and (3) makes sure that 
the various different types of harm aren’t missed, erased, or collapsed into a single category.75 
In choosing to understand microaggressions based on the types of resulting harms, we intend for 
our proposed categorization both to reflect and to be guided by the experiences of the oppressed.76 
Insofar as we’re taking as our point of departure the experiences of those on the receiving end of 
microaggressions, one might immediately object that the prefix “micro” isn’t appropriate since it 
seems to undermine the seriousness of harms that result (a problem we address below), and to 
minimize the agency and responsibility of those committing these harmful acts. For example, from 
the perspective of the microaggressor, to misgender a transgender man or woman might seem like 
nothing, or, at the very most, like an “honest mistake,” something “micro”; however, when 
considered from the perspective of the recipient, such an act is anything but micro ‒ especially 
 
74 For a discussion of how harm is being understood here and throughout the thesis, see the introduction chapter to 
this thesis. There, I note that I am understanding harm in such a way that harms are not necessarily wrongs (and thus 
are not necessarily blameworthy, though one might still be responsible for them). As discussed in this chapter, harm 
should be understood in this way.  
75 Since the publication of this paper, we have developed a longer articulation of what we think is wrong with Sue’s 
approach, and how, precisely, his approach does each of these things. Our longer critique of Sue’s account is 
forthcoming in Perspectives on Psychological Science, in press, 2021.   
76 This move is motivated by a commitment to feminist standpoint epistemology, as detailed in chapter 1 (and 




when it’s an instance of a patterned experience of being repeatedly misgendered.77 The term 
“microaggression,” then, reflects the understanding of these incredibly harmful actions as small or 
insignificant, and thus does little to prompt those who commit them to take seriously the severity 
of harms that result, and also provides little motivation to stop committing them. This 
understanding also lends fuel to the fire of the microaggression skeptic (for a discussion of the 
skeptical position, see chapter 1 of this thesis).  
Given this problem, one might object further that it would be best to do away with the term 
altogether and instead to simply call these acts aggressions, since from the perspective of the 
person on the receiving end, there’s nothing ‘micro’ about them, especially when compiled over 
time. There are four reasons why we refrain from abandoning the term. First, as it’s presently used, 
the term captures the unique nature and dynamic harm that such aggressions cause: they’re at the 
same time both innocuous (from the perspective of the one committing them) and deeply harmful 
and enduring (from the position of the recipient). It’s worth holding onto a term that manages to 
convey, at the same time, both the apparent smallness of the act and the significance and severity 
of the harm. Second, it’s important to call attention to these kinds of acts precisely because they 
are, in many cases, unintended. This is a feature that the term “microaggression” seems to capture, 
yet which the terms ‘insult,’ ‘invalidation,’ and certainly ‘assault’ (without the ‘micro’ prefix) do 
not.78 Third, it’s important to separate these types of actions from those that are explicit, overt, 
deliberate, and intentionally racist, sexist, transphobic, etc. In so doing, we allow for the possibility 
that microaggressions can be enacted by those who have our best interest at heart and do not mean 
us harm (e.g., our family, friends, colleagues, neighbors, or physicians). In this way, 
microaggressions are meaningfully different than the sorts of acts that are committed with the 
 
77 See Kapusta (2016) and Freeman (2018) on the harms of misgendering.  
78 Lilienfeld (2017a) problematizes the conceptualization of microaggressions and the associated research program, 
arguing that the concept of microaggressions is incoherent, insofar as “aggression” implies intentionality (147). 
Though not written as a response to this article, Brennan (2016) provides a compelling argument to the contrary. 
Contra Lilienfeld, and in line with Brennan, we contend that microaggressions are problematic and harmful, 
irrespective of the intentions of the aggressor since targets can be harmed even if doing so was not the intention of the 





express intention to cause serious harm, usually by people who do not mean well. Our final reason 
for retaining the term is that we’d like our discussion to be considered within the growing literature 
on microaggressions and to potentially have an impact on the rapidly unfolding conversation 
happening there. Were we to use another term (or to simply call them ‘aggressions,’ etc.), this 
wouldn’t be possible.   
With a basic understanding of how microaggressions have been understood in psychology, as well 
as how we intend to rethink them, we ask readers to join us in considering what such a proposed 
alternative understanding of the phenomenon would look like, specifically within a medical 
context. Before doing so, an important methodological qualification is in order. In what follows, 
we discuss a number of different cases. In most of these cases, the authors themselves don’t use 
the term “microaggression.” (Many of the accounts we draw on were published before this concept 
gained much traction (after the publication of Sue’s 2010 book gained scholarly attention). 
Nevertheless, we include these cases since they are clear examples of microaggressions as we 
understand them, and importantly, they demonstrate how harmful microaggressions can be for 
those on the receiving end.  
 Microaggressions in Medicine and Their Resulting Harms  
In this section, we consider a possible alternative recipient-centered, harm-based taxonomy for 
understanding and conceptualizing microaggressions. In lieu of an action-centered classification 
of microaggressions, the three kinds of harm-based microaggressions that we propose are 
epistemic microaggressions, emotional microaggressions, and self-identity microaggressions, 
which result, respectively, in epistemic harms, emotional harms, and existential harms. Before 
discussing each one, three clarificatory points are in order. 
First, we are focusing on microaggressions within a clinical medical context. We acknowledge 
that illness itself tends to be accompanied by emotional and self-identity impairing consequences. 
The point that we’d like to emphasize, however, is that experiences of illness and its impairing 
consequences are often compounded by harms resulting from the microaggressions of healthcare 
providers and others. That is, whatever harms arise from illness are exacerbated by harms that arise 




patients’ non-physical harms. Thus, harms resulting from microaggressions are significant over 
and above the consequences brought on by illness.  
Second, the three harms (i.e., epistemic, emotional, and existential) resulting from the three 
different kinds of microaggressions that we propose aren’t necessarily clear-cut or analytically 
distinct. There are often messy overlaps between them; epistemic harms come with existential and 
emotional side effects and harms to self-identity certainly manifest themselves emotionally and 
existentially. Though for the purposes of analysis we separate the harms into three different kinds, 
for the one experiencing them, such tidy analytic distinctions are rarely possible. 
Third, while microaggressions are typically understood to target and affect members of 
marginalized groups (Sue 2010, 23, 39) – viz., groups that have been historically and 
systematically oppressed – we understand “marginalization” (i.e., seriously restricted power, or 
experiences of powerlessness) to have a slightly broader scope in this specific context. Following 
Kidd & Carel (2014; 2017a; 2017b), we contend that within clinical medical contexts, many 
patients occupy a marginalized position qua patients, relative to physicians, as a result of 
(temporary or permanent) vulnerabilities with respect to their injuries or illnesses; their general 
reliance upon physicians’ recommendations or demands; their overall lack of (institutional) power 
and (epistemic) authority; or their (assumed or actual) lack of education and medical expertise 
relative to physicians within the space of the clinic.79 The extent to which this is the case varies on 
the basis of the condition for which one is being seen in a medical clinic. For example, an otherwise 
socially privileged person experiencing terminal illness, or a mental health crisis, can experience 
a robust sense of powerlessness with respect to their health condition and reliance upon their health 
care provider (that they might not feel if their condition were not terminal or severe). Other things 
will come into play as well, including educational attainment, fluency in understanding and 
communicating with medical terminology, and relative comfort in a clinical space. It is in these 
respects that even people who are socially dominant in [most] other contexts can still be 
marginalized—lack power, authority, or status—within the domain of clinical medicine, albeit to 
 
79 Our account differs from Carel and Kidd’s insofar as our account takes an intersectional approach to distinguish 




varying degrees. It follows from this that many patients can, at least theoretically, experience 
microaggressions in this specific context.80 For example, on our account, within a medical context, 
even an upper-middle class, white, cis-gender, heterosexual man could be subjected to 
microaggressions based on his status as a patient (e.g., with reduced epistemic power, with relative 
vulnerability). For example, a man with all of those dominant social markers (upper-class, white, 
cis-gender, heterosexual) might feel powerless in the space of the clinic upon receiving a cancer 
diagnosis. And, moreover, in this context, he might in fact lack power, privilege, or epistemic 
authority, relative to his physician, and might experience the clinic through that lens. It must be 
underscored, however, that the microaggressions he might experience in a medical context would 
have less serious overall consequences than those experienced by members of structurally 
marginalized groups (that is, groups which are marginalized in broader society) because part of 
the harm of microaggressions rests on their repeat nature in a variety of different contexts that 
accumulate over time. Someone who is structurally oppressed is likely to experience 
microaggressions in various domains beyond the medical, making the cumulative impact more 
severe.  
3.3.1. Epistemic Microaggressions and Epistemic Harm 
Epistemic microaggressions in clinical encounters are defined as intentional or 
unintentional/unconscious slights conveyed in speech or gesture by health care providers that 
dismiss, ignore, ridicule, or otherwise fail to give uptake to claims made by patients. Epistemic 
microaggressions result in epistemic harms to patients, which can result in epistemic injustices, 
specifically, testimonial injustices. Testimonial injustices are injustices suffered in one’s capacity 
as a knower, which occur when a speaker’s claims aren’t given uptake by the listener, due to 
prejudicial stereotypes held by the listener (either consciously or unconsciously) about some facet 
 





of the speaker’s identity. Epistemic microaggressions are related to ‒ but are not co-extensive with 
‒ this phenomenon.81, 82   
In medical contexts, epistemic microaggressions involve the tendency of physicians and other 
health care providers to view themselves as experts over patients’ bodies in problematic ways. It 
is true that physicians have a kind of (non-problematic) medical authority over patients; indeed, 
they’re medically trained and technical experts and the reason we visit them in the first place is 
because they can provide such expertise. This generally isn’t a problem. Rather, the problem is 
when their expertise prevents them from recognizing, taking seriously, or giving uptake to their 
patients’ claims and to the first personal perspective that their patients have over their bodies. 
Though a patient’s perspective isn’t expert in the sense that most patients aren’t trained medical 
practitioners, their first-person perspectives on their bodies and symptoms that are unavailable to 
physicians are often crucial in order to help physicians make proper diagnoses.83  
Thus, it’s problematic for physicians to automatically privilege their own third-personal, objective 
knowledge of what a patient experiences to the exclusion of the patients’ first-personal, subjective, 
embodied knowledge and resulting testimony. This is not to say that patients are infallible; patients 
can be, and sometimes are, mistaken, for example, about their diagnosis or what they need 
medically as a result. However, to assume automatically and outright that the physician knows 
better is epistemically limiting – it precludes the possibility that patients have some relevant 
knowledge (e.g., phenomenological knowledge about their symptoms or their pain). This tendency 
for health care providers to assume an automatic and totalizing epistemic privilege over their 
patients’ bodies, experiences, and testimonies can result in microaggressions toward patients, such 
 
81 Fricker (2007) provides a general account of epistemic injustices and resulting harms. She articulates two types of 
epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Since the publication of her book, there’s been 
a growing philosophical literature on the topic. Dotson (2011; 2012) and Medina (2013) challenge and expand 
Fricker’s account within the context of race. Carel and Kidd (2014) discuss epistemic injustices within medical 
contexts. Carel and Györffy (2014) consider how children are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustices in 
healthcare settings. Freeman (2014) discusses epistemic injustice in pregnancy. Sanati & Michalis Kyratsous (2015) 
discuss epistemic injustices in psychiatry. Also see Kidd, Medina, Pohlhaus Jr. (eds. 2017).  
82 Freeman and Stewart (2019) discuss the relationship between epistemic microaggressions and testimonial injustices. 




as implicit or explicit deflation of their patient’s credibility or failure to give uptake to their 
patients’ claims. Such microaggressions tend to occur without health care providers being aware 
that they’re committing them. We see an important example of what we are calling epistemic 
microaggressions in Arthur Kleinman’s work, though he doesn’t use the term “epistemic 
microaggressions.” Kleinman describes microaggressions in his account of healthcare 
practitioners discrediting patients’ first-personal accounts of their embodied experiences, 
specifically of patients with chronic pain.  
If there is a single experience shared by virtually all chronic pain patients 
it is that at some point those around them – chiefly practitioners, but also 
at times family members – come to question the authenticity of the patient's 
experience of pain. This response contributes powerfully to patients' 
dissatisfaction with the professional treatment system and to their search 
for alternatives (Kleinman 1988, 57).  
Such failures to give uptake to, to empathize with, or to respect patients as knowers in their own 
right – often motivated by stereotypes about race, gender, class, sexuality, gender identity, age, or 
ability – are examples of epistemic microaggressions. Testimonial injustices that result from such 
microaggressions are harmful to patients in a variety of ways.  
As Miranda Fricker (2007) notes, one of the most serious consequences of testimonial injustices 
is the moral harm committed against speakers (here, patients). The primary moral harm is that 
speakers are harmed in their capacity as knowers. Being regarded as a knower is a central 
component of human dignity and value; thus, to be harmed in this capacity results in a violation 
of the speaker’s humanity (Fricker 2007, 43-4). According to Fricker, this primary moral harm 
leads to a variety of secondary harms, which are either practical or epistemic.  
Practical secondary harms that result from patients being harmed in their capacity as knowers 
include misdiagnoses that could have been avoided had the patients’ testimonies been taken 
seriously in the first place. Epistemic secondary harms occur when listeners’ doubting of the 
speaker’s testimony (and the microaggressions that occur as a result) are internalized by the 




case of patients who experience repeated epistemic microaggressions, they might begin to doubt 
their own testimonies and experiences, which can exacerbate emotional and existential harms of 
the sort we describe below.84 
One example of epistemic microaggressions can be seen in the case of the sociologist, Tressie 
McMillan Cottom, as she elaborates in her book, Thick (2018, ch. 3).85 Even though Cottom is 
highly educated – she won a MacArthur “genius” grant – and has high socioeconomic standing, 
as a fat, Black woman, she knew that in any medical context she would face an array of 
discriminations. For this reason, she chose her physicians carefully. Or so she thought. 
When she was four months pregnant, bleeding and in terrible pain, Cottom knew that something 
was wrong. When she arrived at her doctor’s office, instead of being seen immediately for her 
urgent and likely dangerous situation, she was told to wait patiently in the waiting area. After 
insisting that she get some privacy since she was bleeding all over the chair, she was brought to an 
examination room. When her doctor arrived, he looked at her and said that she was probably “just 
too fat” and that for women “like her,” spotting was normal. She was sent home and told not to 
worry.  
That night, her pain escalated. When she called a nurse and described her situation, she was told 
that because the pain was in her bowel, not in her lower back, it was probably constipation and 
that she should just try to use the bathroom. She did this for the next 36 hours, with no luck. After 
three days of pain and almost no sleep, she went to the hospital. There, her health care providers 
implied that she’d probably just eaten something that was “bad” for her. Finally, and begrudgingly, 
they agreed to do an ultrasound, which showed not one, but three entities growing in her uterus. 
In addition to the fetus, there were two large tumors. Upon learning this, the nurse scolded Cottom: 
“You should have said something.” Ultimately, Cottom went into early labor and gave birth to her 
 
84 Veronica Ivy’s discussion of epistemic gaslighting (2017) is another example of such secondary epistemic harm.  
85 This discussion of Cottom’s experience is a revised version of a discussion offered in a forthcoming chapter 
contributed by myself and Lauren Freeman to the Routledge Handbook on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 




daughter, who died shortly after birth. After making plans for how to handle her daughter’s 
remains, another nurse said, “Just so you know, there was nothing we could have done since you 
never told us that you were in labor.” 
There are so many things wrong with the way that Cottom was mistreated, but here we will focus 
on the epistemic microaggressions. Before doing so, we must emphasize that the ultimate, tragic 
result of the death of her premature daughter was not micro. At every stage, Cottom knew that 
there was something wrong, tried to convey this knowledge to her health care providers, and was 
systematically marked as not being credible with respect to her knowledge of and claims about her 
body. As a result of widespread and enduring biases and stereotypes about Black women (see 
Collins 1986 for a discussion of stereotypical and biased “controlling images” of Black women, 
and Dotson 2011 on how these “controlling images” contribute to epistemic silencing of Black 
women) she experienced epistemic microaggressions. As a pregnant woman who was bleeding 
and in pain, her bleeding was attributed to her fatness. Later, her pain in her bowel was dismissed 
as being on account of something “bad” that she’d eaten (where “bad” has racial undertones about 
what Black people eat (see Hobbes 2018)). Finally, after the death of her daughter, she was blamed 
for not having spoken up sooner, where the implication was that the death was in part her fault and 
could have been prevented had she said something.  
In each instance, Cottom was relatively powerless vis-à-vis her health care providers. Not only 
was she blamed for her condition, but her knowledge of her body was ignored. Over and again, 
her health care providers assumed they knew better. Cottom thus suffered the epistemic harm of 
not being recognized as a credible knower, the practical harms of severe physical pain (much of 
which could have been avoided had she been taken seriously at the outset) and ultimately, the 
death of her daughter. Cottom lost her daughter and likely could have lost her own life. These 
consequences are macro and tragic. But we are concerned with the epistemic microaggressions 
that led up to them; her credibility as a knower being denied due to her race, gender, and body size, 
and as a result, her claims being ignored or dismissed. Reflecting on her experience, Cottom 
describes the following:  
“In the US, a typical pregnancy for a Black woman is more potentially 




women… And I thought I was an exception, if you want to know the truth.  
And one of the things I learned is that I couldn’t be an exception. It didn’t 
matter how educated I was, it didn’t matter that I tried to make all of the 
right choices. At the moment when the health care system needed me to be 
whatever they assumed a typical Black woman should be, in my position, 
they treated me that way until I was as incompetent as they assumed I was.  
And that looked like not believing me when I said that I was having labor 
pains… But that’s fairly typical, and that’s the devastating part of it.” 
(Cottom Interview for NPR’s “On Point” (2019)) 
The epistemic microaggressions that Cottom experienced are reflections of imbalances in 
epistemic and other sorts of social power that are themselves reflections of broader patterns at 
work both in health care and in society. Health care providers are members of an elite professional 
class and are assumed to have epistemic authority within that context and also more broadly. They 
often exert a sort of epistemic power over their patients – they block their patients from making 
meaningful epistemic contributions to the clinical exchange. This epistemic situation both reflects 
and reifies assumptions about power in the epistemic domain (e.g., who creates, controls, and 
deploys knowledge and who doesn’t; who is “rational” or “objective” and who isn’t (cf. Code 
1991)). Such microaggressions result in epistemic harms to patients: crucially, they are denied the 
full status of knower, which  is central to human dignity and value (Fricker 2007; also see Pohlhaus 
Jr. 2017; Dotson 2011). Because the epistemic contributions of patients who are members of 
marginalized groups are routinely blocked, over time this can result in patients coming to doubt 
their own epistemic capacities, especially as microaggressions add up and their harms accumulate 
(see Evans and Mallon 2020). Microaggressions can also, as we saw in the case of Cottom, lead 
to harmful health and other consequences. 
Another example of practical secondary harm resulting from epistemic microaggressions is evident 
in case of a 19-year-old female patient, Bronte Doyne, who died in part as a result of her 
physicians’ failures to give uptake to her testimony. After expressing concerns to her medical team 
at Nottingham University Hospitals Trust that her rare form of liver cancer had returned, Bronte’s 




recurrence of her cancer in a timely enough manner to have enabled her to receive adequate pain 
management and cancer care (Cara 2015; Srivastava 2015). Doyne ultimately died as a result of 
her undiagnosed cancer recurrence, 16 months after having her concerns dismissed and being told 
she’d survive.  
Though on first glace it might appear as though this case is simply one of gross medical 
malpractice, or even of lack of epistemic credibility of the patient, we argue that it’s a case of 
epistemic failure on the part of the physicians resulting specifically from the microaggressions 
they committed. The health care providers committed an epistemic microaggression by failing to 
give uptake to Doyne’s claims about her body and symptoms, and in particular her concern that 
her cancer had returned. In order for us to claim, convincingly, that Doyne suffered a 
microaggression, we must first show that she’s a member of a marginalized group. Doyne meets 
this criterion in two ways. First, she’s a patient. As mentioned above, following Carel and Kidd 
(2014; 2017a; 2017b), within a clinical medical context, patients can be considered marginalized 
relative to physicians, insofar as they lack power in the physician-patient relationship.  Doyne is 
also marginalized in a second way, namely, insofar as she’s a female patient. It’s a known 
phenomenon that due to pernicious gender-based stereotypes, within clinical medical contexts, 
women’s claims – in particular, claims of pain – are generally not taken seriously, are considered 
to be over-reactions, and are systematically ignored and/or dismissed.86 As a result, women have 
diminished status as credible givers of knowledge regarding their bodies (see, for example, Kukla 
2005; Foreman 2014a; Code 1991; Dusenbery 2018). 
On account of these two different (yet related) ways in which Doyne occupies a marginalized 
position, it becomes clear that what she experienced were microaggressions. Based on her 
marginalized status as patient in general and as a female patient in particular, her case isn’t just 
one of medical malpractice or of a failure of attributing epistemic credibility. Rather, the ways that 
Doyne was treated constitutes microaggressions given the nature of the interactions, namely the 
seemingly small off-hand remarks and slights, such as questioning whether she’d been “Googling 
 
86 It is worth noting that Black patients, and especially Black women patients, experience similar dismissals in 




her symptoms again,” when really, she’d been experiencing physical changes and pain and was 
trying to make sense of them both to herself, and in a way that would receive uptake by her medical 
team. These sorts of seemingly small comments are examples of microaggressions, and we’re 
suggesting that they’re directly tied to Doyne’s marginalized status qua female and female patient.  
The epistemic microaggressions experienced by Doyne contributed both to serious physical harm 
(and ultimately, to her death), as well as to significant epistemic harm (and related emotional 
trauma) for Doyne and her family. The latter can be viewed as a result of her and her mother not 
being listened to, and to their claims pertaining to her medical condition not having received 
uptake. All of these could have been avoided had Doyne’s physicians taken her and her family’s 
claims seriously at the outset. 
In this section, we’ve demonstrated how in addition to the significant physical harms that resulted 
(at least in part) from these two cases of epistemic microaggressions, both show how epistemic 
microaggressions can lead to other significant non-physical harms, which are inherently 
problematic morally and epistemically, and also instrumentally problematic insofar as they lead to 
further physical harms. Thus, on account of these consequences, epistemic microaggressions that 
result in epistemic harms are a serious moral and medical concern. They ought to be on the radar 
of health care providers, who should work to avoid committing them.  
3.3.2. Emotional Microaggressions and Emotional harm 
Illness is often accompanied by a wide range of emotions, many of which arise both before and 
during clinical encounters and continue to develop in complicated, fluctuating, multi-layered ways 
with the progression of illness. For instance, patients might react to their diagnosis with disbelief, 
numbness, sadness, anger, rage, denial, or fear. Emotional microaggressions occur when 
physicians and other health care providers fail to take patients’ emotional reactions to and 
emotional experiences of their diagnoses and illnesses seriously. Emotional microaggressions 
consist of indignities directed at patients, frequently motivated by assumptions about what 
constitutes appropriate emotional responses to medical symptoms and diagnoses and often 




gender. Emotional microaggressions, like all microaggressions, can impose additional and serious 
harms on patients that we discuss in what follows.87  
In a 2015 article in The Atlantic, Joe Fassler describes his wife Rachel’s emergency room 
experience, during which both her claims of intense pain as well as her emotional response to that 
pain were ignored and discredited by health care providers. This led to Rachel being misdiagnosed 
with kidney stones when in fact she had ovarian torsion, which can lead to ovarian loss, sepsis, 
and even to death. The failures to hear her, to consider her emotional responses to her pain, and 
the resulting misdiagnosis, lead to enduring emotional problems for Rachel, which followed from 
what she aptly called “the trauma of not being seen” (Fassler 2015).  
Despite Joe and Rachel repeatedly describing the severity of Rachel’s pain to the attending 
physicians and nurses (she rated it an 11 out of 10), each time they were told, “she was fine.” Two 
kinds of microaggressions are occurring in this case. The first is an epistemic microaggression, 
where the speaker’s claims to knowledge about their body aren’t given uptake, resulting in an 
epistemic injustice (not our immediate focus here88). The second is an example of an emotional 
microaggression, where the speaker’s emotional response to their pain isn’t taken seriously, 
resulting in emotional harm.  
For the healthcare team to have discredited Rachel’s emotional response to her pain is an example 
of an emotional microaggression. Fassler reports that in response to Rachel’s writhing in pain so 
severe she couldn’t speak, nurses barked: “Sit still, or we’ll have to start [the exam] over.” They 
also corrected her that what she was really experiencing was “just a little pain.” These responses 
are examples of failures to give uptake to Rachel’s (claims to pain and additionally to her) 
 
87 See Carel (2014), chapter 1 for an account of how the microaggression of the physician who diagnosed her illness 
had lasting and harmful emotional effects on her. Though Carel doesn’t use the language of microaggressions, we take 
her experience as described to be a clear example of them. 
88 Though our focus here is emotional harms of microaggressions, we’d be remiss were we not to say something about 
the epistemic dimension of the harm. For physicians to consistently have discredited, undermined, and ignored 
Rachel’s claims to and experiences of pain (based on gender stereotypes; see below) is an example of an epistemic 
microaggression since they failed to give uptake to her claims about her body. Instead, they relied on their own 




emotional response to her pain. They are based on stereotypes about women not only being more 
emotional than men (Code 1991), but also being overly emotional. This tendency to misjudge the 
seriousness of women’s claims about their physical symptoms, especially their pain, is well-
documented (see Ellin 2015; Dusenbery 2018; Foreman 2014a; Foreman 2014b; Hoffman and 
Tarzian 2001; Kukla 2005; National Pain Report 2014; Walters 2016; Watt 2006). It’s rooted in 
histories and stereotypes that women are hysterical, weaker than men, and unable to deal with 
pain; that they’re making it up; that they’re seeking attention; or that they’re just trying to get their 
hands on drugs. Women’s pain is also disproportionality assumed to be psychiatric in origin 
(Foreman 2014a, 68).  
Tara Culp-Ressler details the long history of women’s physical symptoms being ascribed to mental 
pathology, based in stereotypes of women as dramatic, irrational, and crazy (2015a; 2015b). These 
stereotypes can lead to women being told that their physical symptoms are “all in their head,” 
which can (and often does) lead physicians to miss potentially life-threatening physical conditions, 
in addition to compounding the emotional distress they are already experiencing. Considered from 
the perspective of physicians, one cardiologist confessed that “[i]n training, we were taught to be 
on the lookout for hysterical females who come to the emergency room” (reported in Dador 2011). 
This is precisely what happened in Rachel’s case. As we show, not only does this tendency to 
reduce women to “hysterical females” and subsequently to dismiss their claims to pain or other 
physical symptoms have the potential to do substantial physical harm (especially when it 
contributes to misdiagnoses), it can also cause lasting emotional harm.  
Returning to Rachel’s case, it’s worth noting that not only did her healthcare team take their own 
assumptions about her condition to be true (and superior to Rachel’s account), thereby failing to 
consider that Rachel might actually know better than they do about the severity of her symptoms 
(e.g., epistemic microaggression); but they also undermined the severity of her emotional 
responses to her pain. This made Rachel subsequently question whether she was responding 
“properly” to her pain (as if there is such a thing) and whether she was perhaps being overly 
dramatic, also contributing to existential harm of diminished self-trust (a consequence we explore 
below). Presently, we want to show that emotional microaggressions can result in serious and 




emotional harms that Rachel experienced, which far outlasted the physical harms of her illness. 
He writes: 
Rachel’s physical scars are healing, and she can go on the long runs she 
loves, but she’s still grappling with the psychic toll ‒ what she calls ‘the 
trauma of not being seen.’ She has nightmares, some nights. I wake her up 
when her limbs start twitching (2015).  
The “trauma of not being seen” is what Rachel believes to be the consequence of repeated 
dismissals of the emotional turmoil brought on by her illness and her emotional responses to her 
pain. While we want to highlight this emotional harm, we must also be clear that the 
microaggressions directed at Rachel also resulted in a permanent, practical secondary harm. The 
medical team’s failure to take her claims seriously at the outset (epistemic microaggression) 
resulted in delayed treatment (more than 14 hours after they arrived at the ER). Though her life 
was ultimately saved, her ovaries were not. Thus, in addition to the epistemic and emotional harms 
we’ve outlined, Rachel also suffered the (practical secondary) bodily harm of losing her ovaries.  
These combined consequences of emotional and epistemic microaggressions are examples of 
epistemic secondary harms, which result when the cumulative effect and internalization of 
epistemic injustices over time function to harm one’s view of one’s self as a competent knower. 
The reality of many members of marginalized groups is determined by understanding and 
conceptualizing events through the prism of repeated experiences with racism, sexism, 
homophobia, etc. (Sue 2010, p. 73). When such experiences are compiled over time, the results 
accumulate to be more serious and disadvantageous than one might initially assume, what Ron 
Mallon has called an “accumulation mechanism” (2017; 2021). Mallon develops this concept in 
order to explain how the seemingly small harms experienced in the past can accumulate over time, 
amplifying the resulting disadvantage suffered by marginalized individuals or groups (ibid.). Thus, 
we see that emotional microaggressions that manifest as disregard for patients’ complex subjective 
experiences of pain and illness can be harmful and enduring in a variety of ways. As with epistemic 
microaggressions, the harmful consequences of emotional microaggressions are serious and 




As we’ve acknowledged, the distinctions between the types of microaggressions we’re considering 
and their resulting harms are messy. Emotional microaggressions lead to both emotional and 
existential harms. Robin Stern, author of The Gaslight Effect, describes the phenomenon of 
“gaslighting,” wherein women aren’t only shamed for their emotional responses, but their feelings 
are routinely invalidated through attaching stigmatizing labels such as “crazy” (2007).89 Stern 
describes the invalidating experience of being “gaslit” as “soul destroying” and argues that women 
whose feelings are frequently invalidated in this way often start to second guess their ability to 
make decisions for themselves or conclude that their concerns aren’t worth articulating at all 
(ibid.). In this way, emotional microaggressions that invalidate women’s emotional responses to 
their illnesses and dismiss their physical symptoms as being the result of mental pathology can 
result in harms that are emotional, existential, and enduring.  
Before turning to the final type of microaggressions, it is worth reiterating a point raised above. 
Though we’re arguing that patients’ claims about their pain and their emotional responses to their 
physical conditions ought to be given uptake, we don’t mean to suggest that all patients should 
always be the final or absolute authorities about their own diagnoses, or that patients’ first-personal 
knowledge of their bodies, illnesses, or experiences of pain should always or automatically be 
taken as primary over the medical/technical expertise of health care providers. We want to retain 
important differences between these two distinct types of knowledge: that of patients and that of 
health care providers. Instead of giving priority to one over the other, we suggest the need to take 
both sources of knowledge seriously when dealing with patients. In her article “Confronting 
Diminished Epistemic Privilege and Epistemic Injustice in Pregnancy by Challenging a ‘Panoptics 
of the Womb,’ (2014)” Lauren Freeman argues that within the context of pregnancy, health care 
providers and pregnant people ought to have a relationship of epistemic peers. Epistemic agents 
are epistemic peers if “they can both make legitimate claims to knowledge about S, and if their 
respective claims are taken seriously by each of them” (5). Such a relationship is “based on mutual 
 






respect, open responsiveness, and strong communication between women and physicians.” 
Physicians who are able to successfully create epistemic peer relationships with their patients 
create supportive and open communicative environments in which they take time to listen carefully 
to patients’ accounts and concerns, and trust that they’re credible in their testimony (ibid.). 
Patients, in such contexts, can rely on this openness to their own perspective, and become more 
active participants in the dialogue. It’s this idea of epistemic peers that we have in mind when 
considering the kind of relationship that should exist between health care providers and patients.90 
An epistemic peer relationship lies in sharp contrast to what we see happening in the cases 
examined above, in which patients’ first-hand, embodied knowledges and emotional responses to 
their illnesses or symptoms are systematically dismissed in favor of health care providers’ 
technical knowledge ‒ often with detrimental consequences for the patients. 
Relatedly, one might be concerned that with the increased availability and use of online resources 
such as Web MD, patients might attempt to attach incorrect diagnostic labels to themselves, 
another reason why their perspectives should be treated with suspicion. We aren’t arguing in 
support of these sorts of self-diagnoses; we believe that the ability to diagnose and treat illnesses 
most often lies within the purview of physicians. The sort of knowledge that we think patients do 
have isn’t about specific medical diagnoses or treatments; rather, it pertains to the types and 
degrees of pain or other symptoms they’re experiencing first hand ‒ things that can’t be known, at 
least directly, by health care providers. In cases such as Rachel’s, she knew that something was 
very wrong, and she knew that both her claims to pain and her emotional responses to that pain 
weren’t given uptake. It’s not, as one might argue, simply a matter of epistemic luck that she just 
happened to be right about the severity of her pain and her physical symptoms. Rather, Rachel was 
better positioned to know something about her body than her health care team; she had better 
knowledge of the degree of pain that she was experiencing and that it was unlike other sorts of 
pain she’d experienced. This doesn’t mean that Rachel was in a position to self-diagnose her 
ovarian torsion, or to know what treatments were necessary to respond to her pain. The particular 
sort of expertise possessed by the health care providers is crucial to diagnosing and treating 
 




patients, and we don’t wish to undermine that. Rather, we’re suggesting that the ideal scenario 
would have been for Rachel’s health care team to have treated her as an epistemic peer. With 
Rachel’s knowledge, combined with their medical/technical expertise, the epistemic, emotional, 
and physical/embodied harms she experienced could have been avoided.  
3.3.3. Self-Identity Microaggressions and Existential Harms 
The final kind of microaggression we’re considering are self-identity microaggressions.91 News of 
illness, individual experiences of such news, and illness itself can change how people view and 
understand themselves and how they relate to others and to the world (Carel 2014). Within medical 
contexts, self-identity microaggressions occur when health care providers (or others, including 
family members) either intentionally or unintentionally undermine or don’t give uptake to the 
existential consequences that often accompany experiences of illness. Self-identity 
microaggressions result in enduring, non-physical, existential harms. For example, if physicians 
and health care providers focus only on the physical aspects of illnesses, they might fail to 
recognize the significance of how experiences of illness can impact the broader ways that patients 
experience themselves and the world around them, thereby failing to do justice to how important 
these experiences can be to patients as individuals. It’s important to note that while we’re 
highlighting this third category of microaggressions as a distinct source of harm, the other types 
of microaggressions we’ve identified in medical contexts can also result in enduring harms to a 
person’s self-identity and self-worth. 
An example of an existential harm caused by a self-identity microaggression is illustrated in 
Anatole Broyard’s book, Intoxicated By My Illness (1992). Broyard was a mixed-race man of 
 
91 Since the 2018 publication of this paper, Lauren Freeman and I have developed our account of self-identity 
microaggressions. Specifically, we parse them into two types. The first is medical self-identity microaggressions, 
which are limited to the medical context, and which capture the sort of experience Broyard (1992) describes – not 
having his illness experience recognized or given uptake, which he equated to an invalidation of his humanity. The 
second is marginalization-based self-identity microaggressions, which are those which result in a failure to give 
uptake to some important part of one’s marginalized identity or their embodiment (e.g., their trans identity, their queer 
identity, or their fat body). The latter is not limited to medical contexts, but rather track people with marginalized 
identities or embodiment through their lives and arise in various contexts. These two types are related in that they 
have to do with a failure to recognize a person as the person they are, leading to harms that are existential – pertaining 




Louisiana-Creole decent. His memoir documents how his identity was radically altered as a result 
of his cancer diagnosis and how he desired a doctor who could appreciate that central aspect of his 
illness experience. Reflecting upon his recently received diagnosis, Broyard writes: 
I had dawdled through life up to that point, and when the doctor told me I 
was ill it was like an immense electric shock. I felt galvanized. I was a new 
person. All of my old trivial selves fell away, and I was reduced to an 
essence. I began to look around me with new eyes, and the first thing I 
looked at was my doctor (37-8).  
With literary and philosophical elegance, Broyard illustrates how he felt deeply affected by his 
diagnosis. His physician was the first person to whom he looked for acknowledgement and 
understanding, but Broyard soon realized that his physician wasn’t equipped to deal with the 
existential impacts of his illness. Rather, his physician’s role was narrowly focused on the technical 
aspects of diagnosing and curing an illness, as opposed to seeing and treating a person, a sentiment 
echoed in numerous patient testimonies that we reviewed in researching this paper. Broyard 
reflects on not being seen as a human being by his physician, and how this left him feeling 
abandoned and alone to deal with his diagnosis.  
Other doctors give you a generic, unfocused gaze. They look at you 
panoramically. They don’t see you in focus. They look all around you, and 
you are a figure in the ground. You are like one of those lonely figures in 
early landscape painting, a figure in the distance only to give scale. If he 
could gaze directly at the patient, the doctor’s work would be more 
gratifying. Why bother with sick people, why try to save them, if they’re 
not worth acknowledging? When a doctor refuses to acknowledge a 
patient, he is, in effect, abandoning him to his illness (50). 
Though Broyard doesn’t describe the actions of his physicians and their resulting harms to his 
personhood using the language of microaggressions, we’re calling their actions self-identity 
microaggressions since they failed to see or engage with Broyard as a human being (rather, they 




acknowledge or respond to the nature of Broyard’s existential difficulties pertaining to his illness 
that resulted from his vulnerable position qua patient. Though this lack of attention to the more 
human side of illness might be considered micro from the perspective of the physician – after all, 
from their perspective, their job is to cure or treat injury, illness, or disease – from the perspective 
of patients, as we see with Broyard’s account, these oversights are anything but micro. The self-
identity microaggressions that Broyard faced had serious harmful existential consequences for his 
well-being and sense of self, as well as for his view of doctor-patient relationships more generally. 
Broyard recognizes the difference between how he perceives the existential crisis he’s facing as a 
result of his illness, and how his physicians understood it.  He writes: “To the typical physician, 
my illness is a routine incident in his rounds, while for me it’s the crisis of my life. I would feel 
better if I had a doctor who at least perceived this incongruity” (43).   
In her article, “Loss of Self: A Fundamental Form of Suffering in the Chronically Ill” (1983), 
Kathy Charmaz recounts that experiences like Broyard’s aren’t uncommon. Based on 57 
interviews conducted with people living with a variety of chronic illnesses, Charmaz suggests that 
many chronically ill patients go through significant existential crises as a result of their experiences 
of illness and the accompanying vulnerability that it brings, combined with failures of their 
physicians and families to acknowledge the complex existential and psychological consequences 
of their illness. Though Charmaz doesn’t use the language of microaggressions, we take her to be 
articulating the harmful existential consequences that arise from, among other things, self-identity 
microaggressions. Charmaz rejects a narrow view of suffering that restricts medical 
understandings of suffering exclusively to physical forms at the expense of considering how 
experiences of illness affect one’s very selfhood and way of being in the world.  
One of the women Charmaz interviews discusses several examples of how harmful self-identity 
microaggressions can be, especially when they come from someone with whom one has already 
developed an intimate relationship (like that between a physician and a patient). In describing an 
incident that happened to her, the interviewee notes the importance of a physician who’s more than 
simply a good technician. She expresses how necessary it is for the well-being of a patient to have 




Dr. Lang took care of me – he’s okay as a surgeon but as a doctor, he upset 
me more than words. You keep going in with the same problem and they 
stop listening. One time he sat there opening his mail while I was in the 
office. I said, “Go ahead and open your mail, I’ll wait.” He felt silly, then 
he listened (Chamaz 1983, 180).  
Later in the interview, the same woman expands upon the importance of a physician recognizing 
the personhood of a patient:  
What I like about Dr. Brenton and Dr. Kaye is that they treat you like a 
person…that is so important when you are ill, to be taken seriously as a 
person…The thing I found in Dr. Kaye and Dr. Brenton is a 
humanitarianism…In a person with chronic disease who has so many 
things to handle, not only the sickness, but just living problems – to be 
treated like a number is the last thing you need (Ibid.). 
The physician’s act of opening his mail as his patient expresses her concerns about her illness is a 
self-identity microaggression since this action fails to recognize the human being before him and 
it had consequences for her self-worth. Throughout her account, we see how harmful it can be to 
one’s sense of self to have their very being ignored by a physician.  
Another common example of a self-identity microaggression within a medical context (and more 
generally) is to deadname, mispronoun, and/or misgender a transgender or gender non-conforming 
patient.92 Deadnaming refers to using the birth or legal name of a transgender or gender non-
conforming person (that may still be on their legal identification due to legal, practical and 
financial difficulties in legally changing one’s name, but that they no longer use). Xeph Kalma, a 
transgender woman who lives with depression, calls deadnaming “that other dysphoria-spewing 
beast” (Kalma quoted in Sharman 2017; 204) and notes that each time it happens she feels like 
 
92 In the parsing out of self-identity microaggressions into two types, described in footnote 25 above, this sort of 
example would constitute a marginalized-based self-identity microaggression; it has to do with one’s marginalized 




she’s “being hit with a hammer” (ibid., 206). She describes her painful experiences of being 
deadnamed and misgendered in the ER: 
Deadnames can be a painful reminder of a terrible time in a person’s life. 
They are tenacious and require resources to fix legally, which many trans 
folx do not have. Because of this, mine still exists in the legal sense. In an 
attempt to counter this during the intake process, I tried to make it 
abundantly clear that even though my deadname might show up on some 
files, it is not in fact my name and is certainly not how I want to be 
addressed, especially in a suicidal state of mind. This tactic has worked in 
the past, but today, the message either isn’t passed along to the staff 
treating me or is simply ignored. I’m repeatedly deadnamed, leaving me 
worse than when I arrived at the hospital… Maybe some years of working 
in a hospital will have taught them that as a patient, I’m looking to be 
treated like a human being who is worthy of respect (Kalma quoted in 
Sharman 2017, 204-205). 
It’s clear from Kalma’s testimony that having her identity undermined was incredibly painful: 
worse, in fact, than the illness for which she’d originally sought treatment. From the perspective 
of health care providers, deadnaming might seem “micro”; in deadnaming patients, they might not 
intend to cause harm. However, as Kalma’s testimony attests, when considered from the 
perspective of the patient, deadnaming is not at all micro. Rather, it’s an act of disrespect, 
constitutes a failure to listen to or acknowledge patients, and is profoundly harmful, in particular 
when it occurs to a patient already in such a vulnerable state of illness. 
When physicians fail to give proper uptake to the existential consequences of illness, let alone act 
in ways that fail recognize the basic personhood of patients (as in deadnaming, mispronouning, 
and misgendering), they commit self-identity microaggressions; they fail to see and respond to the 
many significant ways that illness affects individual people, their senses of self, and the ways in 
which failing to recognize one’s selfhood in an already vulnerable state can be exponentially 
harmful. Insofar as it’s common in the face of illness for patients to experience significant 




further by not responding appropriately and humanely to these experiences.  As the testimonies of 
Broyard, the chronically ill woman interviewed by Charmaz, and Xeph Kalma show, this can have 
significant impacts for patients’ sense of self and also for how they relate to their physicians. Such 
a harm ought to be avoided by health care providers. 
 Long-Term Harms of Microaggressions in Clinical Medicine  
In this section we elaborate upon some of the long-term consequences that microaggressions in 
clinical medicine can have: they can undermine physician-patient relationships, preclude 
relationships of trust, and therefore compromise the kind and quality of care that is received.  
Recall the case of Bronte Doyne, a 19-year-old woman who died as a result of her undiagnosed 
liver cancer recurrence. She suffered more pain and received less care than she otherwise would 
have, as a result of her physicians’ failures to take seriously her testimony about her symptoms 
(epistemic microaggression). Consequently, her mother lost trust in health care providers. In 
reference to their repeated attempts to secure adequate cancer care for Bronte, Doyne’s mother 
stated: “I can’t begin to tell you how it feels to have to tell an oncologist they are wrong, [but] it’s 
a young person’s cancer. I had to. I’m fed up trusting them” (Cara 2015). When microaggressions 
are repeated, the long-term distrust that can result can have serious and dangerous physical and 
psychological consequences. Xeph Kalma explains: 
In this moment, in my already suicidal state, the doctor has made it a 
million times worse. I put my coat on and walked out…Instead of having 
those whom I trust take care of me, those whose job it is to take care of 
me, I am now at a brand new low – hopeless, hungry, and cold…The way 
I was treated in the ER – the misgendering, deadnaming, ignorance, and 
the lack of discretion I experienced – is incredibly dangerous. When I say 
it was ‘my last visit,’ I mean it. I will not voluntarily return to an ER the 
next time I’m feeling suicidal. Anything would be a better option than 
experiencing that level of embarrassment and shame again. 
Embarrassment and shame, from those who were meant to take care of 




The distrust that results from experiences of microaggressions, as evidenced by the testimonies 
we’ve discussed, contributes to patients’ doubts about the efficacy of health care, often resulting 
in delayed medical treatment, foregoing medical treatment altogether, and prolonged illness. These 
factors can deepen the physical, emotional, and existential harms that accompany illness. Although 
as we’ve argued above, all patients could be recipients of microaggressions in clinical contexts, 
members of marginalized, structurally oppressed groups are more likely to experience this injustice 
and to greater consequence.93 One serious and pervasive example of this phenomenon is that many 
women tend to delay seeking medical treatment when exhibiting symptoms of heart attacks, often 
because they’ve an internalized a fear of seeming “too emotional,” of being dismissed as a 
“hypochondriac,” or as seeming “crazy.” A recent Yale study reported that such fears of not being 
taken seriously led to women having “limited and sporadic connections” with primary care 
practitioners for routine check-ups and preventative heart care (Lichtman et al. 2015).  
Microaggressions are indeed a large part of this structural problem insofar as there’s a long history 
of the sorts of gendered epistemic and emotional dismissals we considered above. But this isn’t 
only an issue for cis-gender women. As we saw with Xeph Kalma, a phenomenon that’s common 
for many trans and gender non-conforming folks, fear of being deadnamed and misgendered, is 
enough to preclude them from even setting foot in a hospital or clinic.94 All of these reactions are 
related to the problem of microaggressions. Though actions performed may be micro from the 
perspective of the health care providers, the harms suffered are not micro at all and can lead to 
people avoiding health care settings to the detriment of their health.  
In one of the two studies of which we’re aware that specifically focuses on microaggressions 
toward patients within medical contexts (Walls et al. 2015), the investigators conducted in-person 
interviews with 218 adult American Indians diagnosed with type 2 diabetes. They found that 
greater than one third self-reported having experienced microaggressions in interactions with 
 
93 See Williams et al. (2009); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2013). 





health care providers, which correlated with self-reported history of heart attack, worse depressive 
symptoms, and prior-year hospitalization. Moreover, the researchers claim that microaggressions, 
in addition to other kinds of discrimination faced by members of marginalized groups within 
medical contexts, can ultimately contribute to worse behavior; poorer physical, and mental health; 
decreased service utilization; and reduced treatment compliance (ibid. 233, 237). Decreased 
service use and treatment compliance can in turn result in further disease complications and 
comorbidities. 
Our point is this: when one’s health, well-being, and in many cases, one’s very life is at stake, it’s 
imperative to trust and to have a positive relationship with those in charge of your treatment and 
care. Experiencing microaggressions within medical contexts, however, can undermine this trust 
in health care professionals, leading to a variety of roadblocks for successful treatment, as well as 
serious psychological and existential pain for the recipients, as evidenced by the testimonies 
detailed above. We must bring attention to the kinds of microaggressions that arise in medical 
contexts in order to try to eliminate them (or, perhaps more realistically, to diminish them as much 
as possible). Working to decrease microaggressions in medicine is especially important in light of 
the resurgent popularity of the concept of patient centered care.95 If we truly believe that medicine 
should be centered around and guided by quality care of patients, then this is all the more reason 
to promote understanding of health and illness “through the eyes of patients” (Saha et al. 2008). 
Doing so would involve a commitment to understanding what microagressions are; recognizing 
that they occur; understanding the severity of the harms that result from them; and finally, taking 
steps to be mindful so as not to commit them. As we’ve shown, non-physical harms within the 
context of illness can be just as serious as (and sometimes, as in the case of Rachel, even more 
enduring than) physical harms. As such, medical practitioners need to take heed and work to reduce 
microaggressions. 
 
95 Patient-centered care is a model built upon the active collaboration and shared decision-making between patients, 
families, and providers. In patient-centered care, one’s specific health needs and desired health outcomes are the 
driving force behind all health care decisions. Patients are partners with their health care providers, and providers treat 





 Microaggressions Revisited  
In the preceding sections, we’ve proposed and begun to develop a recipient-centered, harm-based 
alternative to Sue’s action-based account of microaggressions. We now return to several cases 
discussed above to show how and why, when compared to Sue’s act-based account, our account 
yields a better understanding of the specific harms of microaggressions. In so doing, we hope to 
demonstrate the theoretical and practical value of a recipient-centered, harm-based account of 
microaggressions and to motivate further discussion on this topic. 
Though Sue’s account of microaggressions is useful for delineating actions committed by those 
with relative power compared to members of marginalized groups, it’s less helpful in determining 
the precise nature of the harm experienced as a result of those actions. A recipient-centered, harm-
based account is better suited to this task. In order to demonstrate this point, we return to the cases 
of Tressie McMillan Cottom (epistemic microaggression) and Xeph Kalma (self-identity 
microaggression).  
Recall that Cottom’s claims about her body and her pain were repeatedly ignored by her health 
care providers, which led to a series of harmful consequences, including, ultimately, the loss of 
her child and her being blamed for that loss. Again, these outcomes are macro and tragic, but it is 
significant to zero in on the subtle, microaggresive interactions that occurred in the lead up to those 
tragic events. In being told that what she was experiencing was normal for women “like her,” and 
repeatedly, subtly dismissed when she tried to assert the seriousness of her pain, Cottom 
experienced subtle (though significant) epistemic microaggressions. When we try to categorize 
these microaggressions on Sue’s view, the specific nature of the interaction becomes harder to 
pinpoint. On Sue’s account, Cottom would likely have experienced a racial microinvalidation, 
defined by Sue et al. as “communications that exclude, negate, or nullify the psychological 
thoughts, feelings, or experiential reality of a person of color” (2010, 274). Cottom’s claims were 
ignored (due to gendered and racial stereotypes held by health care providers, as well as 
assumptions about normative body size), thereby invalidating her as a person (and specifically, as 
a fat Black woman). Though calling this harm a microinvalidation captures very generally the 
basic harm suffered by Cottom – nobody likes to be ignored – labeling it a microinvalidation fails 




both of the case itself and of the enduring epistemic consequences of such microaggressions. If we 
take seriously the sorts of harms that Miranda Fricker (2007) and others have convincingly argued 
can arise from testimonial injustices and other epistemic oppressions (Dotson 2011), it becomes 
clear how harmful it was for Cottom as a knower to have her claims about her body repeatedly 
brushed off, dismissed, and ignored – to tragic ends. One can be invalidated in many senses, but 
calling what happened an epistemic microaggression, pinpoints the distinctly epistemic dimension 
of the interaction, and underscores the specificity of the epistemic harms that resulted. Cottom’s 
very capacity and position as a knower was undermined. Being a knower is crucial to one’s agency 
and personhood (cf. Fricker 2007). It’s in this sense that microaggressions caused serious epistemic 
(among other types of) harm, rather than just invalidating her more generally, as Sue’s account 
holds. We aren’t questioning whether it’s harmful to have one’s thoughts, feelings, and 
experiential reality negated. Rather, our point is that our proposed account is better able than Sue’s 
to highlight the precise epistemic dimension of the harm. Identifying and naming the specific 
nature of the harm is important for understanding it in a full, robust moral sense.  
A second case that helps to show how our account is better able than Sue’s to provide a precise 
analysis of the kind of harm experienced as a result of microaggressions is Xeph Kalma’s. Recall, 
she was deadnamed in the ER. Her birth name (that still appeared on her identification) was no 
longer a part of her identity, as she expressed numerous times to her medical team. Being 
repeatedly called by that name and simultaneously misgendered during her visit threatened her 
sense of self. As with Cottom’s case, if we stick to Sue’s taxonomy of microaggressions, it’s 
difficult to pinpoint the precise nature of the harm suffered by Kalma. On Sue’s account, 
deadnaming could either count as a microinvalidation insofar as the recipient’s personhood is 
invalidated by failing to recognize who she is, or possibly as a microassault, defined as an explicit 
“derogation characterized primarily by a verbal or nonverbal attack meant to hurt the intended 
victim through name-calling, avoidant behavior, or purposeful discriminatory actions” (Sue et al. 
2010, 274). To be deadnamed and misgendered was extremely harmful to Kalma’s general well-
being, as conveyed in her testimony above. However, neither of Sue’s categories of 
microaggressions manages to capture the precise and enduring harm to Kalma that a self-identity 
microaggression and the resulting existential harm does; both of them seem to collapse all types 




terrible times in a person’s life. The fact that her health care team continued to deadname her even 
though she explicitly told them the name that she uses, is harmful to the core of her being and 
violates her sense of self. What Kalma described wanting (and what she felt her health care team 
failed to do) was to treat her “like a human being who is worthy of respect” (Kalma quoted in 
Sharman 2017, 204). Using the language of self-identity microaggression and the resulting 
existential harm highlights that what occurred to Kalma had implications for her identity and sense 
of self in an enduring way. We’re suggesting that an account that labels microaggressions on the 
basis of their harms is better able to capture what’s morally wrong in the case ‒ a conclusion that 
isn’t as easily or readily reached when her experience is described using Sue’s more general 
language of microassault or microinvalidation, which lumps all harms into a single category.  
The language we use to describe microaggressions has consequences for the way we think about 
them: how severe they are, how much harm they inflict upon those on the receiving end, the precise 
nature of this harm, and thus, how important they are for us to confront. For this reason, it’s 
preferable to describe microaggressions in ways that are most accurately able to capture what is 
morally salient: the particular, severe, and enduring harms that result from microaggressive acts. 
While Sue’s taxonomy conveys the idea that harms are caused to targets of microaggressions, it 
doesn’t specify the specific kinds of harm. However, when we start from the position of the harms 
experienced by those on the receiving end of microaggressions, as opposed to the actions of the 
microaggressors, we can better understand the significance of microaggressions and why they’re 
therefore important for health care providers and others to avoid.  
Presently, we aren’t launching a full argument in favor of our taxonomy of microaggressions, nor 
are we completely rejecting Sue’s account. Rather, as a preliminary foray into this issue, we hope 
that by showing how our account is better suited to capture the precise kinds of harm that result 
from various types of microaggressions, we might motivate readers to think anew about the starting 
point that’s traditionally been taken, and continues to be taken, to discuss and understand the 
phenomenon, and to consider how microaggressions might be re-conceptualized if we take on a 
different standpoint, namely, that of those on the receiving end of microaggressions and the 
enduring harms they experience. Doing so (in addition to doing more service to the perspective of 




about microaggressions, insofar as it illuminates how genuinely harmful they are for those on the 
receiving end – a question which still receives plenty of debate and skepticism.96 Intervening in 
microaggressions through awareness, education, and training, might be more likely and less 
contentious once we make such a shift in the cultural mindset towards a recognition of the ways 
in which they really do impact people’s lives in enduring, harmful ways.  
Before concluding, we’d like to acknowledge a possible objection to our proposal. One might 
argue that Sue’s account of microaggressions is sufficiently recipient-centered, insofar as his 
primary aim in theorizing microaggressions is to bring to light a phenomenon that affects 
structurally oppressed people. However, we see Sue’s account as treating the harms experienced 
as secondary, insofar as his account doesn’t center on those experiences, but rather focuses on and 
is guided by what the actor/microaggressor is doing to that oppressed person. That is, his account 
takes as its point of departure the agency of the microaggressor, as opposed to theorizing from the 
position of those harmed. In so doing, Sue’s account is unable to make much headway on 
differentiating the unique harms that may result from the types of acts he identities, something 
that’s required of any account of microaggressions. He spends significant time making the case 
for the different categories of microaggressive acts but gives little attention to the diversity of 
harms that might follow from them.  
This is evident in much of the literature that utilizes Sue’s taxonomy to research the negative 
impact of microaggressions. This empirical research uses Sue’s three categories to examine at how 
microaggressions generally cause harm, mostly without distinguishing between distinct harms that 
result from the different types of microaggressions. The conclusions are thus of the form: 
microaggressions contribute to x, y, and z harms, without attention to whether or not the distinct 
types of microaggressions cause harm differently or cause different harms altogether. For example, 
Hunn et al. (2015), Berk (2017), and Munro (2017) rely upon Sue’s tripartite distinction of 
microaggressions, but when they move to discussions of harms, all harms caused by 
 
96 See note 2. Also see chapter 1 of this thesis for a response to this skeptical position and the Introduction of this 





microaggressions are lumped together into a single category. We believe that an account that calls 
for a more nuanced distinction between different types of harms caused by different types of 
microaggressions is superior insofar as it better describes the phenomena under consideration. In 
other words, significant nuance is lost when we fail to consider the unique harms of particular 
types of microaggressions. Thus, as research and discussion on microaggressions continues, it’s 
beneficial to consider adopting an account which can illuminate some of this nuance.  
 Conclusion  
In this chapter we’ve discussed the dangerous consequences of microaggressions within the 
context of clinical medicine. We’ve proposed a possible, even if only tentative, alternative 
classification of microaggressions within this context that takes the harms experienced by patients 
as its point of departure. In doing so, we’ve articulated three types of microaggressions ‒ epistemic, 
emotional, and self-identity microaggressions ‒ which result in harms that are epistemic, 
emotional, and existential respectively. We’ve illustrated each within a medical context by 
providing examples drawn from patients’ firsthand experiences. By centering the experiences of 
those on the receiving end of microaggressions themselves, we hope to have shown how harmful 
microaggressions in medical contexts can be, and thus to have provided compelling reasons why 
health care providers ought to know about them and actively work to avoid committing them. Our 
hope is that future extensions of this work can (1) develop the new classification of 
microaggressions that we’ve offered here, thus shifting the terms of the debate to focus on the 
perspectives of those who experience microaggressions as opposed to the types of actions 
committed by microaggressing agents (2) use this revised classification and the related harms to 
begin developing practical tools which can be used to aid health care providers in recognizing and 
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Chapter 4  
4. Hearing Queer Voices in the Clinic:  On the Prevention of Clinical 
Microaggressions for Better Communication and Care 
 
Abstract:  
‘Microaggressions,’ are brief and commonplace verbal, gestural, or 
environmental indignities that, whether intentionally or not, convey 
hostility or derogation toward members of marginalized groups (Sue 
2010). Given the power differentials inherent in the doctor/patient 
relationship, clinical encounters are often rife with microaggressions, 
which can be a detriment to effectively communicating patients’ 
symptoms and needs, and can thus stand in the way of patients receiving 
quality care (see Freeman and Stewart 2018). This is the case regardless of 
physicians’ intentions. The difficult reality of microaggressions is that they 
often occur – and cause harm – without the perpetrator even realizing what 
they have done or said, or why it is problematic. In this chapter, I discuss 
the harmful implications of microaggressions in clinical contexts, 
particularly those leveled against members of the LGTBQ+ community. I 
argue that routine experiences of microaggressions committed by health 
care providers can, over time, degrade queer peoples’ trust in health care 
professionals, produce anxiety about ‘coming out’ to providers, cause 
queer people to withhold information that is pertinent to their health, or, in 
the worst-case scenario, avoid health care contexts all together. When 
queer people are unable to effectively and openly communicate with their 
health care providers – or, avoid them altogether – the many health 
disparities that LGBTQ+ communities already face can worsen. As such, 
I argue that as a matter of health justice, health care providers need to 




LGBTQ+ people, and work to stop committing them. Furthermore, I offer 
positive proposals for how health care providers can better collaborate with 
their queer patients and become more effective hearers of their queer 
patients’ testimonies. Drawing on the work of Lauren Freeman (2015) and 
others, I argue for an “epistemic peers” model of communication with 
queer patients in the clinic, which should help to reduce the frequency of 
microaggressive comments and to ultimately improve the quality of 
communication and knowledge exchange between queer patients and those 






So, I went to see a provider, hoping to find some 
good provider for gender stuff. And this place, it was 
a trans clinic, but they didn't really know what to do 
with me, because... well they don't really have words 
for non-binary people. So, they didn't have that on 
the sign-up form. When it asked gender, I couldn't 
click anything. I saw trans, but I knew that the intake 
form wasn't gonna have what I wanted on there, like, 
a gender box for me. But I was hoping. I ended up 
just leaving. (23-year-old gender-fluid patient 
quoted in Lykens et al. 2018).  
The rapidly growing interdisciplinary field of medical humanities has shown us time and again 
how integral personal expression and effective communication are to medical communication.97 
Communicating effectively in medical contexts is, of course, invaluable for achieving accurate 
diagnoses and successful treatment. In what follows, I consider one phenomenon that can cause 
clinical communication to go array, thereby preventing the sorts of expression and productive 
interactions that are so vital for quality care. Specifically, I focus on the phenomenon of what has 
been called “microaggressions,” and I examine how the frequency of such microaggressions 
leveled at LGBTQ+ people in clinical spaces serves as a barrier for effective communication, and 
thus quality care.  
The chapter will proceed as follows: in section 4.2, I will provide an overview of what 
microaggressions are and the sorts of harms they cause for their targets; in section 4.3, I will 
develop an account of how microaggressions in medical contexts can degrade trust, and ultimately 
effective communication, thereby negatively impacting the kind and quality of care that is 
 
97 A version of this chapter was presented at the Ninth Annual Western Michigan University Medical Humanities 




received; in section 4.4, I will apply the conceptual understanding of microaggressions and their 
short and long term harms specifically to LGBTQ+ patients, arguing that for this group, there is a 
particular need to minimize microaggressions in clinical settings; in section 4.5, I provide a brief 
overview of some ways health care providers can minimize microaggressions and begin to 
neutralize their harmful effects. Specifically, I focus on effective listening and communication that 
helps to counteract the harmful influence of microaggressions in clinical interactions.  
 Microaggressions and their Harmful Effects  
The term ‘microaggression’ was first introduced by a Black psychiatrist by the name of Chester 
Pierce in the 1970s, with a specific focus on racial microaggressions (or, those microaggressions 
which target a person on the basis of their marginalized racial identity). Pierce understood 
microaggressions to be a subtler mechanism for enforcing racial hierarchy and racial oppression, 
which, much like other types of racial animus and aggression, is meant to “brutalize, degrade, 
abuse, and humiliate” others on the basis of their marginalized racial identity (Pierce 1970). The 
concept was then further developed to refer to the phenomenon of “subtle, stunning, often 
automatic… exchanges which are ‘put downs’” (Pierce et al. 1978). More recently, and especially 
within the past decade, the phenomenon has experienced a resurgence of interest, primarily 
following the publication of the book Microaggressions in Everyday Life by psychologist Derald 
Wing Sue (2010) and a series of articles by him and his colleagues (Sue et al. 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 
Nadal 2013; 2018; Nadal et al. 2011; Nadal et al. 2014).  
A classic and often-cited example of a microaggression is the following. A person of colour is 
asked by a white interlocutor “Where are you from?” The person of colour replies, “I am from 
here – a Kentuckian, just like you!” If instead of accepting the answer and ceasing questions, the 
interlocutor continues – “No, but where are you really from? – the interlocutor has committed an 
instance of microaggression. Specifically, the interlocutor has microaggressed the person of colour 
in a way that sends multiple messages, including that the person of colour does not belong, that 
they appear foreign even in their home state and country, and that there is some meaningful 
difference between a white person and a person of colour uttering the locution that they are from 
Kentucky. What makes this sort of act characteristic of ‘microaggression’ is that it is subtle, 




racism and xenophobia. It is important to note that microaggressions do not turn on the 
microaggressor’s intention – microaggressions can harm their targets irrespective of their 
interlocutor’s intention to do so or not. In this example, the microaggressor might not have meant 
anything malicious by his follow-up question, and yet, for the person of colour, it was likely one 
more instance of never-ending reminders that they are seen as different, as “Other,” in the place 
they call home.  
The dominant conception of microaggressions is that which largely follows in the tradition of Sue 
and his colleagues, who developed microaggression theory in such a way as to focus primarily on 
the type of act committed by the microaggressing agent. This yields the well-known tripartite 
taxonomy of microaggressions, which divides microaggressions into the following: microinsults, 
microassaults, and microinvalidations (see, for example, Sue 2010). This taxonomy has been 
largely taken for granted in both the growing empirical psychological literature on 
microaggressions (see, for example, Balsam et al. 2011; Cruz et al. 2019; Resnick & Galupo 2019) 
and also the nascent philosophical literature on microaggressions (see for example, Friedlaender 
2018; O’Dowd 2018; Rini 2020).  
However, despite its popularity, in a 2018 paper, I argue with Lauren Freeman that such a 
conceptualization of microaggressions is fundamentally misguided (see chapter 3 of this thesis). 
Microaggression theory – insofar as it aims to understand how the phenomenon of 
microaggressions affects marginalized people (i.e., the targets of microaggressions) and ideally to 
rectify the harms microaggressions cause to them – ought to start from the perspectives of those 
who are most likely to be on the receiving end, that is, those who fall within structurally 
marginalized social identity groups. As such, Freeman and Stewart (2018) introduces a new 
taxonomy for microaggressions, which categorizes them on the basis of three distinct types of 
harm that targets are likely to experience as a result of microaggressions, yielding the following 
taxonomy: epistemic microaggressions are those which result in epistemic harm; emotional 
microaggressions are those which result in emotional harms; self-identity microaggressions are 
those which result in existential harms to one’s sense of self or identity. This new way of thinking 
about microaggressions from the perspective of those on the receiving end helps to keep the focus 




people, or those with less social, political, or institutional power vis-à-vis some other agent). Doing 
so helps to underscore not only that microaggressions can indeed be harmful, but it also helps to 
isolate and highlight the precise nature of the harms that result (on our view, fundamentally 
epistemic, emotional, or existential harms). Though I will not overview the full argument given in 
Freeman and Stewart (2018) here, our primary contention is worth recapping: we argue that insofar 
as they are deeply harmful for members of already marginalized groups, microaggressions warrant 
our moral attention and our best attempts at intervention.  
 Microaggressions in Medical Settings and the Degradation of 
Trust, Communication, Access, and Care  
Part of the harmful nature of microaggressions rests on their repeat nature. 98  Insofar as 
microaggressions are routine, brief, and commonplace interactions, they tend to occur readily, in 
virtually all dimensions of marginalized people’s lives. In other words, those who experience 
microaggressions tend to experience them frequently, in a wide range of social settings: at work, 
at school, at the grocery store, and, importantly for our purposes, within the space of the medical 
clinic.  
The medical clinic is an important site for considering the harmful nature of microaggressions for 
at least three reasons. First, illness experiences can already lend themselves to feelings of 
confusion, alienation, and a variety of other emotional and self-identity impairing consequences 
(see Freeman & Stewart 2018; Broyard 1992; Carel & Kidd 2014; Frank 2002). The many 
emotionally and existentially (not to mention, physically) taxing dimensions of illness are 
compounded by other things that can go wrong within the space of the clinic – including 
microaggressions (our focus here). Second, the medical clinic is infused with inherent power 
differentials – those between doctors and nurses, nurses and patients, and so on. For our purposes, 
we are interested in the inherent power differential between health care providers (particularly 
 
98 For an articulation of the ways in which small actions can accumulate to amount to large disparities (or, large 
discrimination or other inequalities), see Mallon (2021). Mallon also discusses his view of “accumulation 




physicians99) and patients. Patients tend to occupy marginalized positions (of status or power) with 
respect to health care providers, as a result of vulnerabilities associated with (acute or chronic) 
illness or injury, the tendency to take orders from health care providers and comply with their 
demands, and their different (and often understood to be lesser) epistemic position (resulting from 
their actual or assumed lack of formal medical training).100,101 Third, in order for health care to 
function properly, effective communication is essential. The proper practice of health care 
(involving, primarily, diagnosing, treating, and preventing illness) requires the successful 
transmission of information between patients and health care providers, and vice versa. Effective 
communication, in turn, relies on there being adequate trust. Specifically, patients need to trust 
that their physicians have their best interests in mind, that their physicians will listen to them and 
take them seriously when they describe their symptoms or otherwise, and will diagnose and 
prescribe appropriate treatment, to the best of their ability. These are the preconditions upon which 
patients decide to disclose often sensitive and deeply personal information, experiences, and 
worries to their providers. When trust is damaged, patients have a significant interest set back, 
which constitutes a serious harm (McLeod 2020, 65).  
On account of these three salient features of the medical clinic (namely, the complexities of illness, 
the inherent power dynamics, and the importance of effective communication to the salient trust-
relationships), the medical clinic becomes a space not only where microaggressions can be 
pervasive (e.g., because of the inherent vulnerabilities and imbalances in power), but, perhaps 
more importantly, where routine microaggressions can do serious damage (e.g., to trust 
relationships). The power differentials inherent between patients and health care providers, 
particularly between patients from structurally marginalized groups and their providers, makes 
 
99  As such, while I will use the more inclusive phrase of “health care providers” throughout, I primarily have 
physicians in mind, insofar as they generally wield the most power in medical contexts.  
100 See Carel (2014), Carel & Kidd (2014).  
101 See McLeod (2020) for a discussion of this power dynamic. McLeod sees the physician-patient relationship as a 
fiduciary relationship, which is inherently infused with power (power to exercise one’s judgement in a particular 
domain; power in the form of possessing a certain sort of authority; power to make determinations regarding another’s 




microaggressions not only possible, but likely. And, as I will describe below, frequent experiences 
of microaggressions degrade the trust that is the foundation of open and effective communication, 
and that is in turn essential for quality care. This makes microaggressions important to pay 
attention to in medical contexts, insofar as they can be one roadblock that stands in the way of 
patients receiving the care that they need – and particularly, patients who already occupy 
structurally marginalized social positions. This need to better attend to microaggressions is made 
difficult, however, by the nature of microaggressions as subtle acts (see chapter 2 of this 
dissertation), which can make them easier to ignore, dismiss, or simply not to notice, for both the 
microaggressor, and the microaggressed.102  
So, what do microaggressions look like in medical settings? As noted above, microaggressions can 
represent different sorts of actions, events, or circumstances. For example, microaggressions can 
be verbal, that is, they can result from something that is said by a health care provider to a patient. 
Consider an example involving a young, female patient comes into medical clinic. Having 
previously had a confirmed ovarian cyst rupture, she reports to the health care provider that she 
thinks she has had another ovarian cyst rupture. Note, that the patient is making a claim that is the 
result of both her embodied awareness of her current level of pain, but also an understanding of 
her past experiences and how they compare to her current symptoms. Upon the patient’s 
suggestion, the health care provider replies, rather rudely, that the patient should “stay off of Web 
MD.”103 This constitutes a microaggression104 because, while appearing to be a small, benign 
comment, and despite the health care provider’s [good] intentions, this remark sends the message 
that the female patient does not (or cannot) know her own body, and is not in a position to make 
 
102 For a discussion of why this is the case, see discussion of oppression being “mystified” in the introduction to this 
thesis.  
103 This is a modified, fictional example based on the true story of Bronte Doyne, who, upon telling her health care 
providers that she thought her rare form of cancer had returned, was told to “Stop Googling symptoms.” It turned out, 
her rare cancer had in fact come back (see Cara 2015). See chapter 3, this thesis, for a further elaboration of this case.  
104 Specifically, on the account given in Freeman & Stewart (2018), it would be an epistemic microaggression, that is, 
an “intentional or unintentional/unconscious slights conveyed in speech or gesture by health care providers that 
dismiss, ignore, ridicule, or otherwise fail to give uptake to claims made by patients.” See also Freeman and Stewart 




claims about her own physical state. It amounts to a dismissal of her claims to knowledge about 
her own embodied experience.  
Microaggressions are not always verbal comments or remarks, however; they can also be gestural 
or environmental. Consider the following gestural microaggression. A young, female patient is 
reporting a difficult experience she had with a sexual encounter. It was hard for her to work up the 
courage to speak about this with her health care provider, and she is experiencing feelings of 
confusion and shame. In the middle of her story, the health care provider’s phone (which is not on 
silent) rings, and he pulls the phone out of his white coat pocket and answers, beginning a 
conversation about what his wife should prepare for dinner. He then concludes his call, hangs up, 
and returns to the patient: “So, what were we talking about again?” 105  This action (again, 
irrespective of the intentions of the health care provider) sends the message that what the patient 
has to say is not important – or, is at least less important than the physician’s dinner plans. It 
amounts to a failure to acknowledge that the patient is disclosing something personal, significant, 
and difficult. It amounts to a failure of respect for the patient in the room.  
Finally, consider an example of a microaggression that is not committed by an individual agent (in 
the way that a verbal comment or gestural move is), but rather has to do with the physical space 
of the clinic itself, as well as its aesthetics. Consider the following. A fat patient is in an 
examination room having their vitals measured. The registered nurse goes to take the patient’s 
blood pressure, only to discover that the cuff will not fit around the patient’s arm. There is no 
larger cuff available. The registered nurse then asks the patient to step on the scale, however, the 
scale is not capable of measuring weights high enough. This continues, with the fat patient unable 
to be properly treated, insofar as the clinic lacks the equipment necessary to accommodate the 
larger body size.106 This is an example of an environmental microaggression. It is not the result of 
 
105 This, too, is a modified fictional example of a real case, in which a patient describes her physician beginning to 
open his mail while she was in the examination room, seeking help for chronic pain (see Charmaz 1983, 180). 
106 This happens all the time in practice. A 2017 article from CBC News reported that when a 470-pound patient was 
in a hospital in Edmonton, Alberta (Canada), the patient was told they could not use the washroom, because they 
might “break the toilet.” They ultimately brought a commode into his (shared) hospital room and put fabric walls 
around it and told him he must use that, instead. The patient describes it as “the most degrading experience of his life.” 




something any single agent is doing or saying, but rather, the environment itself; the material 
conditions of it function to send the message to the fat patient that they do not belong and are not 
valued in that space – that, ultimately, their health is less important than those patients with 
“average” sized bodies.   
While these are just a few examples of microaggressions that can occur in medical contexts, in 
these settings, microaggressions are diverse and pervasive. Again, this is because patients are in a 
position of vulnerability, vis-à-vis their health care providers, and often demonstrate deference to 
them and their judgment. As a result, health care providers have disproportionate authority, which 
creates and reinforces the sort of power differentials that lend themselves to microaggressive 
comments and actions. And again, the material conditions of the clinic, insofar as the clinic is 
designed for a certain sort of normative body, can also send messages of exclusivity and non-
belonging to patients with non-normative bodies. All of this can result without anyone intending 
to cause harm. 
Freeman and Stewart (2018) have argued that it is crucial for health care providers to become 
aware of, pay attention to, and try to avoid microaggressions in medical settings because 
widespread microaggressions in these settings can lead to an array of negative outcomes for 
patients, in both the short- and long-terms. The short-term harms are varied and depend on the 
nature of the microaggression in question. For example, a microaggression of the sort above, in 
which a patient notifies her health care provider that she thinks she has a cyst and is subsequently 
told to “stay off of Web MD,” might cause short term epistemic harm; that is, the patient may feel 
as if she wasn’t taken seriously as an epistemic agent, who knows her body and her symptoms. 
This can register as a sort of epistemic put down, or as being put in one’s epistemic place, or 
otherwise being shut down as a knower. Relatedly, when a physician answers his phone while a 
patient is disclosing a painful or confusing experiencing, the patient might feel ignored, rebuffed, 
or even as if her humanity and vulnerability are not being recognized or responded to appropriately. 
This can register as a sort of disrespect, for the seriousness of the patient’s experiences, or for the 
 
system isn’t responding fast enough; health care providers are not properly trained and lack adequate equipment to 




patient herself, as a person. Finally, when a fat patient is unable to be properly treated because the 
standard equipment in the clinic cannot accommodate their body, they might feel a combination 
of shame, embarrassment, or unworthiness. They might feel as if they are not welcome, or do not 
belong in the space – like they won’t be, or can’t be, appropriately cared for in a way that meets 
their needs. All of these short-term consequences, whether epistemic, emotional, or related to the 
patients’ self-identity, can be seriously uncomfortable, and moreover, seriously damaging, to 
patients. As such, they are worth attending to in their own right. However, what we know about 
the microaggressions that marginalized people face is that they are not one-offs, but rather, they 
occur systematically. A person who experiences microaggression once is likely to experience 
microaggressions again, and again, and again. When this repetition of slights causes the harms of 
microaggression to compound, more seriously grave long-term consequences can occur.  
The long-term consequences of microaggressions (within the context of medical practice) include 
at least the following: repeated microaggressions can i) damage or preclude the possibility of trust 
between patients and health care providers, ii) damage the possibility for effective communication 
and knowledge transmission, and thus iii) undermine physician-patient relationships which are 
essential for quality care.107 In order to trust their health care providers and communicate their 
needs to them, patients need to feel as if they will be listened to and taken seriously when they 
give testimony to their health care providers. Microaggressions, however, can undermine both. 
Recall a case described in chapter 3 in which a young, female patient and her mother were 
repeatedly met with microaggressions when trying to convey information about the young 
woman’s symptoms, the mother recalls losing trust in her daughter’s providers as a result. She 
states: “I can’t begin to tell you how it feels to have to tell an oncologist they are wrong, [but] it’s 
a young person’s cancer. I had to. I’m fed up trusting them” (Cara 2015.) This case demonstrates 
that part of what is at stake in trusting someone is developing a normative expectation that the 
trustee (i.e., the one being trusted) will do whatever it is we are trusting them to do – in this case, 
 
107 For a longer discussion of the long-term consequences of microaggressions in medical contexts, see Freeman & 




to be responsive to their patient and recognize that their cancer has returned.108 Trust, then involves 
some degree of vulnerability (because the trustee can fail to do the thing we have entrusted them 
to do, cf. Baier 1986). When the trustee (in this case, the physician) fails to live up to our normative 
expectations, trust is damaged.  
Relatedly, trust can involve the expectation of competence and goodwill on the part of the trustee 
(see McLeod 2020, 68-78; also see Baier 1986). Microaggressions can degrade these dimensions 
of trust as well, by reflecting incompetence and/or a lack of effort to demonstrate goodwill or 
concern. Consider the words of a patient who reported experiencing routine microaggressions from 
the very people she entrusted with her care at a vulnerable time. In the testimony below, the patient 
reports that, as a result of this trust being broken down, she will not return to seek medical attention 
or care next time she finds herself in a similar [suicidal] state. She says,  
“When I say it was ‘my last visit,’ I mean it. I will not voluntarily return 
to an ER the next time I’m feeling suicidal. Anything would be a better 
option than experiencing that level of embarrassment and shame again. 
Embarrassment and shame, from those who were meant to take care of 
me” (Patient quoted in Sharman 2017, 206; emphasis added).  
These patient testimonies – and so many others like them – make it clear that when patients are 
doubted, dismissed, mocked, ridiculed, or otherwise slighted by those responsible for their care, 
they lose trust in the providers and the larger system (e.g., trust in providers to be competent or 
able to meet their needs). As a consequence, they may (and often do) opt to delay care, or even 
forego care altogether. 109  This, of course, has detrimental impacts on mental and physical 
 
108 See discussion in the third chapter, “Damages to Trust” of Margaret Urban Walker’s 2012 book, Moral Repair. 
109 This isn’t mere conjecture. In one of the only empirical studies that examines the effects of microaggressions 
specifically in medical settings, the researchers (Walls et al. 2015) found that of the 218 patients interviewed (all self-
identified as Indigenous Americans), over one-third reported having experienced microaggressions from providers, 
and that this correlated with self-reported history of heart attack, worse depressive symptoms, and prior-year 
hospitalization. Moreover, the researchers claim that microaggressions, in addition to other kinds of discrimination 
faced by members of marginalized groups within medical contexts, can ultimately contribute to worse behavior; poorer 




wellbeing, especially if people are hesitant to seek medical care when in crisis states, such as the 
patient quoted above. We thus have reason to worry about the impact microaggressions will have 
on those patient populations who already experience significant health disparities. One such 
patient group, namely, those who are members of the LGBTQ+ community, will be our focus for 
the remainder of this paper.110  
 Microaggressions and Queer Folks in Medicine  
Now that we have a sense of what microaggressions in medical contexts can look like in a general 
sense, and how they can be problematic in both the short and long terms, we can now apply that 
understanding directly to our primary focus, namely, the wellbeing of LGBTQ+ patients.  
Before getting ahead of ourselves, some basic familiarity with relevant terminology is in order. 
“LGBTQ+” is an acronym which refers to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Queer.” The addition of 
the “+” is an effort to be maximally inclusive – to represent all other non-normative sexualities, 
orientations, and identities that fall under the “rainbow umbrella.”111 LGBTQ+ people all, in some 
way or another, fall outside of dominant constructions of normative gender identity, experience, 
or presentation, and/or sexual orientation or preference. Queer people and their experiences are 
incredibly diverse; it is important to keep in mind that gender identity and sexual orientation are 
separate dimensions of one’s identity and experience. One can be, for example, a cis-gender 
lesbian; in this sense, one might conform to cis-normative gender, while deviating from 
 
Decreased service use and treatment compliance can in turn result in further disease complications and comorbidities. 
This research is discussed in Freeman & Stewart 2018 (included as chapter 3, this thesis).  
110 There are several documented health disparities facing the LGBTQ+ community, including but not limited to a 
higher risk for substance use, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), cancers, cardiovascular diseases, obesity, bullying, 
isolation, rejection, anxiety, depression, and suicide as compared to the general population (see Gounder 2016; Hafeez 
et al. 2017; Krehely 2009; Praderio 2019). An intersectional lens also suggests that we should pay attention to how 
disparities worsen for LGBTQ+ groups that are also structurally marginalized on the basis of some other structurally 
oppressed identity, such as race. For example, an estimated 50 percent of black transgender women are suffering 
greatly from HIV – a statistic that requires attentiveness to both trans health disparities and racial health disparities 
(see Powell 2018).  





heteronormative romantic and sexual expectations. Or, someone might be trans and identify as 
heterosexual. Or, someone might be queer in all dimensions! There are infinitely many ways to be 
queer – all are unique, beautiful, and valid. However, LGBTQ+ are often on the margins of 
mainstream [read: dominant] society and experience a variety of discriminations and mistreatment 
as a result.  
As noted above, microaggressions target members of systemically marginalized social groups, that 
is, those who are oppressed on the basis of their race, ethnicity, sex, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, body size, dis/ability status, and so on. Because LGBTQ+ people remain oppressed 
structurally, they are likely to be targets of microaggressions that draw on a number of social 
biases, myths, or stereotypes about LGBTQ+ people and communities, and which reflect deep 
social homophobia, biphobia, transphobia, or other sources of resentment against queer people.112 
While microaggressions tend to track socially marginalized people in all dimensions of their social 
lives, as I have argued above, it is particularly important to pay attention to them in medical 
settings, given the adverse consequences they can have for medical treatment delivery, and thus, 
for the overall health and wellbeing of queer people.   
Despite the large number of people who identify as members of the LGBTQ+ community,113 
health care providers and health care clinics are still generally ill equipped to accommodate their 
needs properly. Part of the problem involves medical training, which not only fails to correct for 
negative identity-based stereotypes (i.e., racial or gender stereotypes), but which can actually 
 
112 It is worth noting that while I am now focusing on microaggressions that queer people are likely to face qua 
members of the LGBTQ+ community, I do not intend to erase or ignore intersectional identities that queer people 
have, and how those might affect their experiences of microaggressions and other manifestations of structural 
oppression (see, for example, footnote 10). For example, queer people of colour are likely to experience 
microaggressions on the basis of race and their sexual orientation or gender identifications and experience the 
intersection of both racism and homophobia or transphobia. Queer women might experience microaggressions that 
simultaneously target their being women and their being queer, which are rooted in misogyny and homophobia 
respectively.  
113 A 2011 study from the UCLA School of Law reported that, as of that time, there were approximately 9 million 
LGBT Americans, a figure roughly equivalent to the population of New Jersey (Gates 2011). In the United States, we 




reinforce them.114 Relatedly, there is a general lack of attention to LGBTQ+ specific dimensions 
of health and health care in medical training. In a report for NPR, a third-year student at New York 
Medical College described the extent of her LGBTQ+ focused medical training as having 
“watched a BuzzFeed video” about what it is like to be transgender or intersex. She recalls 
recognizing that this was insufficient, noting that: “It was a good video, but it felt inadequate for 
the education of a class of medical students, soon to be doctors” (Cohen 2019). The video, paired 
with a 30-minute lecture on sexual orientation, was the only queer-focused training she received 
across her medical education. I point to this anecdote, but the problem is widespread – medical 
curriculum does not yet include, in any robust way, meaningful training in queer and trans health 
and health care.  
As a result of this lack of focus on queer health content in medical training, practicing health care 
professionals often feel incompetent to deal with LGBTQ+ identified patients (see Beagan et al. 
2015; Fallin-Bennett 2015). In a 2018 study of 658 New England area medical students, around 
80% of the respondents reported feeling “not competent” or only “somewhat competent” to treat 
gender and sexual minority patients (Zelin et al. 2018). This is problematic, especially since this 
competence can be increased by providing the content in the curriculum: studies show, for 
example, that when medical students learn about transgender health issues, they feel better 
equipped to treat transgender patients. For instance, when Boston University School of Medicine 
added transgender health content to a second-year endocrinology course, students reported a 
nearly 70 percent decrease in discomfort with providing transgender care (Safer and Pearce 2013).  
I don’t mean to suggest that an appropriate medical education and training that centers queer and 
trans lives, experiences, and health needs will wholly solve the problems (discriminations, biases) 
 
114 Two clear examples of the failure of medical training to reduce biases or misconceptions about marginalized patient 
groups involve biases about body size faced by fat patients, and myths about pain tolerance and Blackness. Regarding 
the first, recent studies have documented that over one-third of medical students have anti-fat biases, and medical 
school curricula are doing little to correct for it (see Geller & Watkins 2018; Miller et al. 2014). Medical students also 
have documented false beliefs about supposed biological difference between white people and Black people (i.e., 
including false beliefs about Black people have biologically higher pain thresholds and tolerances, that Black skin is 
thicker than white skin, and that Black blood coagulates more quickly) that often remain consistent through medical 




that queer and trans patients face in the clinic. Health care providers are still humans who, outside 
of their training, are socialized and exist within a deeply homophobic and transphobic society. 
They will, then, still be impacted by the influence of widespread stereotypes and biases. But, 
without any baseline knowledge and awareness of queer lives and needs, these stereotypes and 
biases are even more difficult to recognize, challenge, and try to combat.  
Not only does a lack of education about or understanding of LGBTQ+ identities and experiences 
make social stereotypes and biases more difficult to detect and challenge, it can lead to health care 
providers reproducing these biases, and relying on stereotypes, myths, and misinformation, within 
the space of the clinic. If they are not trained in accurate information about queer and trans people, 
there will be a default to reliance on the prejudiced assumptions they are already hold – those 
which are socialized into us all as a result of living in a cis-heteronormative society which 
privileges cis-gender people and heterosexuality. In acting on one’s unchallenged biases and 
assumptions, social stigmas can be reinforced and manifest in deeply problematic ways.  
Moreover, this is precisely what happens, and queer patients know it. A 2017 study for the Center 
for American Progress measured the extent to which LGBTQ+ patients perceived experiencing 
discriminatory treatment when seeking medical care. The results were astounding: of the 1,864 
patients surveyed, of which 857 identified as LGBTQ+, 8 percent of LGBQ identified patients 
reported that a doctor or other health care provider refused to see them because of their actual or 
perceived sexual orientation; 6 percent said that a doctor or other health care provider refused to 
give them health care related to their actual or perceived sexual orientation; 7 percent said that a 
doctor or other health care provider refused to recognize their family, including a child or a same-
sex spouse or partner; 9 percent said that a doctor or other health care provider used harsh or 
abusive language when treating them; and 7 percent said that they experienced unwanted physical 
contact from a doctor or other health care provider (such as fondling, sexual assault, or rape). 
Among the transgender respondents to the survey, the results were even more alarming: 29 percent 
said a doctor or other health care provider refused to see them because of their actual or perceived 
gender identity; 12 percent said a doctor or other health care provider refused to give them health 
care related to gender transition; 23 percent said a doctor or other health care provider intentionally 




used harsh or abusive language when treating them; and 29 percent said that they experienced 
unwanted physical contact from a doctor or other health care provider (such as fondling, sexual 
assault, or rape) (Mirza 2018). These results are astounding. Upon looking at them, there’s no 
wonder that queer and trans patients experience such burdens in trying to receive appropriate health 
care and maintain good physical and mental health.  
We need to understand these discriminations, and the ways they are experienced for those on the 
receiving end. And this is where the focus on microaggressions comes into play. While not all 
instances of discriminatory treatment are properly understood as instances of microaggression – 
some exceed that threshold and are clearly ‘macro’ instances of discrimination, assault, or 
otherwise overt maltreatment – many of them do.115 Many instances of what queer patients face in 
clinical settings amount to small, routine, seemingly subtle remarks and comments, often 
motivated by a lack of awareness, insight, or understanding, often at the hands of well-intended 
people (e.g., those tasked with delivering care). This is the core of what microaggressions are, and, 
when they are frequently occurring, they can lead to detrimental, or even disastrous, outcomes for 
queer patients.  
Let’s consider what microaggressions look like for LGBTQ+ patients in medical settings. Within 
medical contexts, queer patients encounter a variety of microaggressions, which reflect a failure 
to understand, respect, or appreciate some (or many) dimension(s) of their identities as queer.  
While it would be impossible to canvass all of the possibilities here, let’s consider a few examples 
of the sorts of microaggressions LGBTQ+ people might experience when seeking medical care. 
As noted above, microaggressions can be verbal, gestural, or environmental. Let’s consider each 
in turn.  
 
115 In calling attention to subtle mechanisms of discriminatory treatment (e.g., microaggressions), I do not mean to 
undermine the seriousness of the many overt forms of discrimination that LGBTQ+ people still face when trying to 
access healthcare, including outright denials of care. One extreme example of this is a recently passed (2021) state bill 
in Arkansas, which bans doctors from providing some types of trans healthcare to trans youth (see Reuters 2021). For 
a discussion of how such policy impacts trans youth (see Levin 2021). Such instances of overt discrimination and 
denial of care is unconscionable, and something we need to challenge, resist, and overturn, for the sake of queer and 




A verbal microaggression occurs in a medical context when a health care provider makes a 
comment or remark that functions to invalidate the knowledge claims, emotional experiences, or 
very identity of their patients. One commonly reported verbal microaggression experienced by 
trans and nonbinary patients is being referred to by the wrong gender pronoun or gender marker, 
or by a name they no longer use (a phenomenon referred to as ‘deadnaming’).116 While health care 
providers, in many cases, do not intend to cause harm to patients by misgendering them or using 
a name they no longer identify with, these practices can in fact be incredibly damaging for trans 
patients. Consider the testimony of one trans patient, who in a state of vulnerability sought medical 
care, only to be repeatedly microaggressed by the health care providers tasked with her care: She 
explains: 
In this moment, in my already suicidal state, the doctor has made it a 
million times worse. I put my coat on and walked out…Instead of having 
those whom I trust take care of me, those whose job it is to take care of 
me, I am now at a brand new low – hopeless, hungry, and cold…The way 
I was treated in the ER – the misgendering, deadnaming, ignorance, and 
the lack of discretion I experienced – is incredibly dangerous (Trans 
patient quoted in Sharman 2017, 206).  
Or, consider another example, this one reported by a 30-year-old, American Indian, genderqueer, 
two-spirit femme: 
I told her about my identity when she asked me. And I remember she asked 
me if I was a transgender woman. I felt a little taken aback at that but it 
was understandable, most people like me may be perceived as transgender 
women. But the problem was after I told her that, it didn't convince her. 
 
116 For an excellent article on the harms inflicted on trans people when they are ‘misgendered’ (and the moral 
contestability of those harms) see Kapusta 2016. Robin Dembroff & Daniel Wodak (2018) also discuss the harms of 
mispronouning trans and nonbinary folks, arguing that doing so reinforces ideologies that disrespect transgender and 
genderqueer individuals, and deprives them of opportunities for equal respect. Also see Freeman 2018 for a discussion 




She asked me if I had ever thought about transitioning, and I told her I 
couldn't, because I was already male and female. She kept asking me if I 
had ever considered breasts, or how did I feel about my penis. She was 
very adamant about it (patient quoted in Lykens et al. 2018). 
While this example borders on “macro-aggressive,” in light of the intense and unilateral focus on 
genitals and physical transition, even after the patient was clear that this was not something they 
desired, we can assume that the health care provider had good intentions (that is, she was trying to 
help in the only way her limited understanding allowed her to). And yet, when she had a person in 
front of her trying to help her understand, she could not hear them, and continued on with her 
singular focus on genitalia – a focus driven by cis-normative and binaristic notions of gendered 
embodiment (for a discussion of the obsession with trans people’s genitalia in reductive and 
violating ways, see Bettcher 2007).  
Not unlike trans and nonbinary folks, bisexual patients are also frequently subjected to 
microaggressions in medical settings, many of which are rooted in heteronormative assumptions 
about sex and sexuality (see Stewart 2019). Consider the following example, 117  which as 
constructed is hypothetical, but in reality, is all too common: 
Physician to cis-gender, bisexual woman patient: Have you had any new 
sexual partners? 
 
117 This example is slightly modified from Stewart (2019). For a similar first-person account of this, see Hastings 
(2018), who describes going to the doctor as a feminine-presenting queer woman, and having her doctor assume she 
has a boyfriend and question her about her contraception use (which she uses to improve her complexion) upon finding 
out she doesn’t have a male partner. She describes the onset of microaggressive questioning: “Puzzled questions 
inevitably follow: why are you taking a contraceptive if you can’t get pregnant? Are you absolutely sure you’re not 
pregnant? Do you have any other partners?” She also describes the impact they have: “More often than not, the 
inattentive and disapproving body language from healthcare professionals is enough to make me feel unwelcome. 
Whether it’s a raised eyebrow or a terse remark, these microaggressions chip away at my willingness to return.” A 
similar story is given by Ariana, a femme-presenting queer, and Kassie, a lesbian (see Praderio 2019). This scenario 
is all too common, as health care providers generally assume patients are heterosexual, and automatically interact with 




Patient: Yes, I have. Only one, and we have been monogamous for six 
months. 
Physician: What are you doing to prevent pregnancy? 
Patient: I cannot possibly get pregnant. 
Physician: Well young lady, no method is 100%… Are you using any 
contraception? Condoms? Birth control pills?… You need to be using 
some method, unless you want to wind up pregnant.  
While there is a lot going on in this brief example, I want to highlight a few things. First, it is clear 
that the physician has not listened to the patient or asked the right questions of her (see footnote 
21 below), but instead, has allowed his own assumptions about heteronormativity, about his own 
epistemic authority, and about his assumed knowledge of what is best for her, to carry the day. 
This subtle failure to listen appropriately and give uptake to what she has said constitutes a 
microaggression. Secondly, the physician belittles the patient on gendered lines by calling her 
“young lady,” a way of, again, diminishing her agency (epistemic and otherwise) in that moment, 
and reasserting his (epistemic and other) authority. These microaggressions, and the harms they 
generate, occur regardless of the physician’s intent. While all of these microaggressive dimensions 
of the exchange are important, and certainly worth attending to, I want to highlight the 
microaggression at play that specifically targets the patient’s identity as a bisexual, and her first-
hand knowledge about her own sexuality.  
In this case, if the patient was not (yet) out as bisexual to her physician, he has closed off that 
possibility by assuming that when a cis-woman reports they are sexually active, it is safe to 
automatically assume that she is referring to heterosexual sex in general, and vaginal intercourse 
in particular. There are many, many heteronormative and pro-natalist assumptions packed into that 
assumption, as well as a general lack of awareness of the existence and possibility of bisexuality, 
or the vast array of sex acts that are non-procreative, or generally are not vaginally-penetrative. On 




the physician’s remarks make it clear that he hadn’t listened to her when she came out to him, or 
that he didn’t believe her or take her seriously, or that he assumed that even if she identified as 
“bi,” she was likely still engaging in heterosexual relations of the sort that could result in pregnancy 
(e.g., heterosexual vaginal penetrative intercourse). He certainly did not leave open the possibility 
that her interactions could be with another woman, or otherwise of the sort that renders pregnancy 
impossible, as she had already expressed. The physician’s remarks constitute a failure to ask the 
right questions and to appropriately listen, and also amounts to a sort of epistemic arrogance.118 In 
either case, whether the physician had previously been made aware of the patient’s bisexual 
identity or not, the physician has committed a microaggression, and specifically, one that calls into 
question the patient’s very identity as bi. And just to reiterate, this is the case whether or not the 
physician meant to question his patient’s identity, and subsequently to cause her any harm. 
Microaggressions are sneaky that way: they can (and do) occur regardless of our intentions, or 
even our awareness (see discussions in the introduction and chapter 2 of this thesis).  
Not all microaggressions come in the form of words spoken, however. Some microaggressions are 
the product of gestures or bodily signals (i.e., facial expressions, body language) that can also send 
harmful messages to targets. Consider the following possible instance of a microaggression that 
occurs via body language. An HIV-positive gay man is in the clinic for a routine check-up. When 
taking his vitals, the nurse maintains a visible distance, and clearly tries not to make physical 
contact. When she does, she noticeably jumps back, as if to touch his body was disgusting or 
repulsive. Again, while the nurse likely means no harm – she might not even be consciously aware 
that she is acting this way – her body language sends the message that he is untouchable, unclean, 
monstrous even.119  
 
118 On the vice of “epistemic arrogance,” see Medina (2012). Also see Frye (1983) on the related problem of viewing 
others with an “arrogant perception.”   
119 Physician and poet, Rafael Campo, writes about the centrality of physical touch to the art of healing in his 1998 
book, The Desire to Heal: A Doctor’s Education in Empathy, Identity, and Poetry. To withhold contact can be 




In addition to verbal or behavioral, as noted above, microaggressions can also be environmental. 
Environmental microaggressions are unlike those which are expressed with words or physical 
actions and gestures, because they are not necessarily brought on by a particular agent. Rather, 
there can be features of the environment, that is, the physical space, which function to send 
messages to target groups that they are regarded as being of low worth or importance in that space, 
or that they otherwise do not belong there. Consider the following possible (and, indeed all too 
common) environmental microaggression. A polyamorous, lesbian teenager is browsing through 
the information pamphlets about sex and sexuality while she awaits the physician to enter the 
examining room. She quickly realizes that all of the information available presupposes both 
heterosexuality and monogamy.120 In other words, the pamphlets (in both the language used and 
the images depicted throughout) make references and provide information that systematically 
exclude people with sexual identities like hers. Immediately, she begins to second guess coming 
to the doctor, or, at least this doctor, again. She wonders if the doctor assumes heterosexuality and 
monogamy to be normatively best, or, indeed, the only reasonable possibility for sexual or 
romantic interaction. She wonders if he is aware of – and competent to speak to her about – the 
sexual identities she holds and the sexual experiences she is currently having.121 In a moment of 
self-doubt, bridging on utter panic, the young patient grabs her jacket and runs out of the clinic. 
She does not return. In this example, the patient experienced a microaggression that isn’t clearly 
traceable to any one particular agent’s comments or actions, and yet, it still had the effect of making 
her question whether this space was for her: whether there were people in the space that could 
understand her and support her, or whether she was simply too different, too “Other,” to exist 
 
120 On problematic assumptions of monogamy and the erasure of polyamory, see the interview with Carrie Jenkins in 
Illing (2018). 
121 A parallel example involves trans and nonbinary people arriving at medical clinics and being asked to fill out intake 
forms which only provide two sex/gender options, which correspond to the gender binary. For an argument against 
binaristic sex categorization in medical contexts, see Freeman & Ayala (2018). For an excellent analysis of the 





there. Insofar as this isn’t the first time she has been fundamentally misunderstood, the buildup of 
doubt pushes her toward the latter. 
Microaggressions such as those described above – and so many others – can have lasting 
implications for those queer people who experience them. Within the context of medicine, this can 
include the more general long-term consequences of medical microaggressions described above in 
section 4.2: an undermining of trust, damaged channels of communication, and thus the 
undermining of physician-patient relationships (including, in the worst case, the avoidance of 
medical care altogether).  
Discrimination of all sorts, including microaggressions, endangers LGBTQ+ people’s lives and 
wellbeing through delays or denials of medically necessary care. The Center for American 
Progress study cited above (Mirza 2018) notes that discrimination ‒ and indeed, even the potential 
for discrimination ‒ can deter LGBTQ+ people from seeking care in the first place. In the year 
prior to the survey cited above, 8 percent of all LGBTQ+ people ‒ and 14 percent of those who 
had experienced discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity in the 
past year ‒ avoided or postponed needed medical care because of disrespect or discrimination from 
health care staff. Among transgender people, 22 percent reported such avoidance. With regard to 
preventative screenings, 7 percent of LGBTQ+ respondents reported avoiding or postponing care 
in the year prior to the survey, while 17 percent of LGBTQ+ respondents who had experienced 
discrimination that year and 19 percent of transgender people reporting avoidance during that 
period.122 Of LGBTQ+ people who reported having experienced discrimination in the past year; 
18.4 percent reported avoiding doctor’s offices to avoid discrimination, nearly seven times the rate 
of LGBTQ+ people who had not experienced discrimination in the past year, at 2.7 percent (Mirza 
 
122 A 2011 study, the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, found that 27% of binary (mtf or ftm) trans people 
and 36% of nonbinary trans people reported postponing medical care due to fears of insensitive or incompetent 




2018). 123  This data makes it clear that experiencing discrimination – in whatever form that 
discrimination takes, usually multiple forms – makes LGBTQ+ people more resistant to seek care 
at all.  
In the following testimony, borrowed from Lykens et al. (2018), a two-spirit patient describes 
ceasing medical care after their health care provider routinely assumed that they desired genital 
surgery and refused to acknowledge or accept their identity as two-spirit, despite routinely trying 
to explain it. They recall:  
I remember that she [the provider] thought I hated my penis. This was so 
bizarre to me, you know, because I used it, I was fine with it. But she was 
seriously like convinced by all this shit that [because] I said I was non-
binary that I hated my penis. She told me on—well, she told me like three 
separate times […] to consider removing it, to consider bottom surgery. 
Like to transition, whatever that means. She didn't even really believe that 
I liked using it for sex. I left after the third time, I couldn't take it anymore. 
This example represents clear epistemic arrogance on the part of the health care provider, who, 
despite not having the same first-person experience of being two-spirit, and also likely lacking 
theoretical knowledge about non-binary identity and experience, still assumes she knows what the 
patient wants and needs better than they do. When the patient makes claims about their own 
experience (i.e., enjoying using their penis for sexual encounters), the provider still privileges her 
own understanding and refuses to believe them. Her failure to take their knowledge claims 
seriously, paired with her microaggressive erasure of their identity as two-spirit, leads the patient 
to leave, with no plans to return. As a result of her repeated microaggressive remarks, this provider 
has lost this patient, perhaps for good.  
 
123 As Mirza (2018) notes, this data from the Center for American Progress is consistent with other research. The 2015 
U.S. Transgender Survey, for example, found that nearly 1 in 4 transgender people (23 percent) had avoided seeking 




While there are many first-person reports of queer patients giving up on health care providers as a 
result of frequent experiences of microaggression and other discriminatory slights, many queer 
patients still (at times reluctantly) seek care. When LGBTQ+ people do seek care, past experiences 
of microaggressions can make them less likely to open up to their providers (i.e., about their 
sexuality or gender identity) than they otherwise would be. The Human Rights Campaign 2019 
reports that 10% of lesbians, 13% of gay men, 33% of bisexual women, and 39% of bisexual men 
report not disclosing their sexual orientation to their health care provider. Of course, this is often 
relevant information for health care providers to know (assuming they know how to provide 
LGBTQ+ informed care in the first place) in order to give them tailored medical advice and 
treatment.124   
In addition to the problem of not disclosing one’s sexual or gender identity at all, there is also the 
problem of providing false information in an effort to receive the care one needs. More precisely, 
LGBTQ+ people might alter their own story to conform to more dominant narratives, ones they 
anticipate providers being more likely to understand. For example, a nonbinary or genderqueer 
person might use the language of mtf or ftm transgender, if they anticipate that they’re actual 
identity won’t be understood or responded to appropriately. A genderqueer patient describes this 
very experience:  
But you know, you gotta lie when you go into a clinic, you gotta say you're 
trans and you gotta say you want hormones and surgery. They're not gonna 
understand genderqueer, but they're gonna understand trans. […] So I said 
I was trans a lot, when I wasn't. But I wanted my hormones more than 
anything else… So for a long time I was just telling doctors that I was 
 
124 Studies have shown that “coming out” is better for the health of LGBTQ+ people. For example, a study by the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention shows that gay and bi men who had disclosed their sexual orientation and 
behavior to their physician are more than twice as likely to receive the leading health institute's recommended testing 
and vaccines (Reynolds 2018). For a study on the importance of visibility for queer, lesbian, and bisexual women, see 





trans, but that was really tiring because I had to make sure I was saying the 
right things. And all I really wanted was to explain to someone that I was 
non-binary, that I wanted to be seen that way. So, for a long time I had to 
put myself on the back burner, because doctors probably wouldn't 
acknowledge my existence (patient quoted in Lykens et al. 2018).  
Notably, the patient describes having to describe themself as something they are not and use 
language to describe themself that does not fit with their lived experiences. They note that this was 
difficult and exhausting to maintain, as it involves a sort of self-deception and an act that needs to 
be kept up and maintained. And while keeping up a guise is difficult in itself, and perhaps even 
results in feelings of confusion and shame, the patient determines that, in this case, it is worth it in 
order to try to get the care that they need in a system that is difficult to navigate, and which 
generally fails to understand identities and experiences like theirs.125   
The possibility of these grave consequences – delaying or avoiding care, feeling unable to open up 
to health care providers, having to alter their own narratives in an effort to be understood, and so 
on – are crucial to pay attention to. As noted above, LGBTQ+ people already have worse outcomes 
on a variety of mental and physical health indicators. Avoiding or delaying medical treatment can 
only make those disparities worse. Insofar as health care providers are committed to bridging those 
gaps, diminishing unjust health disparities, and providing quality care to all patients, they need to 
be aware of the effect routine microaggressions can have in medical settings, and work to become 
more aware of them when they occur. In what follows, I will suggest some ways to combat the 
harmful effects of medical microaggressions faced by queer people, in hopes of improving clinical 
experiences for LGBTQ+ communities.  
 
125 For more on this problem, see Ivy (2013). Ivy highlights the problem of the “gatekeeper model” of health care 
delivery, and the impact it has on trans patients seeking medical resources to aid in their transitions. As Ivy describes, 
it is often the case that in order to access the means to medically transition, trans patients have to convince health care 
providers that they are “really trans” or that they are “trans enough.” As such, trans people often conform their 
narrative to fit the expectations of their providers, at least long enough to “convince them” that they are “trans enough” 





 Improving Communication and Care for Queer Patients  
So far, I have argued that as a matter of health justice, providers need to become aware of 
microaggressions and work to avoid them. Failure to do so has the potential to worsen (or, at least 
maintain) the health disparities faced by LGBTQ+ people, as they continue to avoid or delay care, 
or feel unable to communicate openly with their providers. I want to suggest some ways for health 
care providers to improve with respect to communication and care for LGBTQ+ patients, 
particularly with respect to avoiding microaggressions, or trying to neutralize their harmful 
impacts when they do occur.  
First, it is imperative to recognize that while health care providers often assume that they are the 
authority within clinical encounters, both parties (queer patients and health care providers) have 
relevant types of knowledge or expertise to bring to bear on the encounter (cf. Kukla 2007; also 
see chapter 3 of this thesis). While health care providers have an important sort of technical, 
medical expertise, which is essential for diagnosing and treating illness, what they lack in many 
cases is a first-person awareness of the phenomenological experience of being queer – the “what 
it’s like” to be LGBTQ+, and how that shapes queer patients experiences of themselves, their 
illnesses, and/or their health needs.126  
Moreover, Talia Bettcher has argued that trans people (and I have argued, other queer people as 
well)127 have “first-person authority” over their [gender or sexual] identities. Respecting this 
authority, Bettcher argues (and I agree) is morally and epistemically important. This is because 
when one makes an avowal of their gender they are, on Bettcher’s account, making what amounts 
to a confession, insofar as they are sharing information which is generally kept private or 
concealed. In publicly avowing one’s gender identity (or, I would add, their sexual orientation), 
 
126 This lack of access to the phenomenological “what it is like” of being queer is in addition to the widespread lack 
of knowledge about queerness in general. As I have indicated, medical training tends to be deficient in this domain. 
This is all the more reason for providers to recognize the limitations of their knowledge and, where necessary defer to 
their patients’ knowledge and collaborate with them to come up with the best possible course of action.  
127 I develop this argument in a not yet published paper, which was presented at the 2021 meeting of the Canadian 




they are staking a social claim – they are authorizing how they want to be seen and treated in the 
social domain (or in a particular context, such as a medical clinic). This, Bettcher contends, is 
closely related to their autonomy; to decide if, and when, and how, to disclose one’s gender identity 
or sexual orientation, is solely one’s own choice. For someone else to determine or disclose this 
for them would constitute a serious violation of their ability to self-define and control information 
about their identity.128  
Insofar as health care providers do not (and cannot) have direct access to the first-personal, 
subjective, phenomenological, embodied, and authoritative knowledge and experience that queer 
patients possess first-hand, it is necessary that health care providers begin to listen and respond to 
queer patients in a way that takes this first-personal knowledge and authority seriously, and 
integrates it into the process of understanding, diagnosing, and treating illness, or otherwise 
supporting health and wellness needs. To fail to do so is not only an ethical violation (insofar as it 
overrides one’s right to self-determination and self-definition), it can also hinder one’s ability to 
derive more complete knowledge of one’s situation and needs.  
Hence, there is a real need for the different types of knowledge that clinicians and their queer 
patients possess to come together in clinical discussion and deliberation. Lauren Freeman (2015) 
has provided one model that I think can help us here, namely, a model for what she calls “epistemic 
peers” (see discussion of this model in chapter 3 of this thesis). An epistemic peers relationship is 
one in which both parties are in a position to make legitimate claims to knowledge about some 
subject, S, and if their respective claims are taken seriously by either of them, the resulting 
knowledge will be more robust.129  Freeman describes how the disproportionate epistemic power 
 
128 See Kapusta (2016) on the importance of authority over one’s gender to one’s autonomy, and how the failure of 
others to recognize and respect this authority is morally contestable.   
129 While Freeman is focused on pregnant persons and their embodied knowledge, the model applies here. The main 
point is the call for collaboration across these different sorts of knowledge, and the unification of the 
embodied/subjective with the technical/“objective” to provide the best possible care. It is also worth noting that Serife 
Tekin is developing a similar argument within the context of psychiatry. She argues that psychiatric patients’ first-
hand experiences of mental illness and their subsequent testimonies are indispensable for objectivity in psychiatry 
(2020). Her general argument also applies here. Also see Davis-Floyd & Davis (1996) on the way assumptions of 
“authoritative knowledge” need to be brought into better balance with other forms of patient knowledge, such as 




(and sense of epistemic authority) health care providers have functions to undermine the epistemic 
privilege that patients have over their bodies, which can place them in a position of epistemic 
powerlessness (3). To counteract the problematic power/knowledge dynamics, she calls for the 
cultivation of epistemic peer relations, which are founded on mutual respect, open responsiveness, 
and strong communication. She writes:  
Physicians create a dialogic space in a supportive environment in which 
women feel comfortable talking about how their bodies feel to them and 
about what they are experiencing (physiologically, psychologically, 
emotionally), asking questions, and engaging in related discussion. 
Moreover, in this space, physicians take the time to listen carefully to 
women’s accounts and concerns and to respond, speak to, and treat them 
as credible in offering testimony based on their first-personal experiences 
of their bodies (5).  
I contend that the cultivation of such a relationship, one in which clinicians establish an epistemic 
peers relationship with their queer patients, is essential for creating the sorts of communicative 
contexts that are necessary to provide proper care for LGBTQ+ patients. Health care providers 
should recognize – and respect – the unique sorts of knowledge that queer patients have in virtue 
of their first-person experiences as queer and bring those into conversation with their own relevant 
knowledge and experiences.130  
As noted in the quote from Freeman (2015) above, for a health care provider to be a good epistemic 
peer to their queer patients requires listening and responding appropriately to the testimonies of 
those patients. In other work (Stewart 2017) I have begun to develop normative guidelines for 
 
130 It is important to note that while we take for granted that in most cases, health care providers do possess this sort 
of medical, technical expertise, in the case of treating LGBTQ+ patients, they often lack the queer-specific training 
and experiences that would give them epistemic authority in this domain. Testimonies from queer patients reflect that 
in many cases, they find themselves in a position of having to teach, explain, or educate their health care providers 
about queer identities and experiences, or having to interact with health care providers who are not queer competent 
(Praderio 2019). In such a case, an effective epistemic peers relationship would require even more deference to the 
knowledge and experience of the patient, which demands epistemic humility on the part of the health care providers, 




effective listening and ethical responses to testimony. Listening appropriately involves, first and 
foremost, bracketing one’s own assumptions and the limitations of their prior knowledge, and 
being open to having their perspectives and ideas challenged and changed by others who might be 
in a position to know better (Stewart 2017, 40; see also Frye 1983 on “loving attention” and 
Lugones 1987 on “playful world-travelling”). Insofar as there are some things that can only be 
fully and robustly understood with first-hand experience, those who lack that experience owe an 
openness to those who do have it, which requires a willingness to have one’s preconceived notions 
unsettled and genuinely challenged (cf. Lugones 1987). Where one truly cannot understand a 
certain experience (e.g., an experience of oppression), they owe what Laurence Thomas (1992) 
calls “moral deference” to the testimonies of those who have lived experiences of oppression. 
These are all tactics of listening better – trying to let go of one’s arrogance (cf. Frye 1983), 
observing deference to the testimonies of others when we have experiential gaps (cf. Thomas 
1992), and cultivating openness to having one’s perception of what things are like challenged and 
changed, when viewing the situation from another’s perspective (cf. Lugones 1987).  
Another dimension of effective listening involves demonstrating compassion, particularly for 
experiences of suffering. This compassion might require a recognition of and grappling with one’s 
relative power, safety, or institutional authority, and a willingness to feel and express concern for 
others who might lack it. Treating one’s patients compassionately, across difference, is essential 
to hearing, and treating, them well.131  
Once providers have cultivated the ability to listen and hear their patients well, they must also 
learn how to respond with empathy, and in a way that takes into account the patient’s stated needs 
or interests. This requires not automatically assuming that the provider is automatically in a better 
position to know what the patient really wants or needs (see, for example, the case of the two-spirit 
patient above), but instead tailoring their recommendations and guidance to the stated needs and 
interests of their patients and collaborating on a course of action that fits with the patients’ stated 
 
131 For a truly beautiful and insightful account of how health care providers can establish compassionate, empathy, 
and loving connection with their patients, see Campo (1998). Michael Cohen (1995) has also offered a defense of 
compassionate bioethics, and an argument for how we might make medical practice more robustly compassionate 




goals and values. Responding empathetically requires giving meaningful attention to those needs, 
desires, goals, and values.  
All of the above – becoming epistemic peers, cultivating better and more ethical listening practices, 
and engaging in empathetic response to patients’ needs – function together to help reduce the risk 
of microaggressing patients. It does so by establishing a more level epistemic playing field – one 
which does not assume that providers have the epistemic upper hand by default. In cultivating 
more ethical listening practices – ones that decenter one’s own perspective, remain open to having 
one’s mind changed, and reflect moral deference – one is less likely to diminish or demean, even 
in subtle ways, patients’ perspectives, identities, or values. All of these tactics are important for 
trying to balance out the power dynamics that occur in clinical encounter, and which drive the 
frequency of microaggressions. The more we close the presumed and actual gap in power, the 
more we can reign in microaggressions, and their detrimental impacts on patients.132 
Though the strategies I have just outlined have as their aim reducing the circumstances in which 
microaggressions are likely to occur (e.g., by balancing out epistemic power relationships, 
avoiding speaking over and for patients, and knowing when to defer to their lived experience), I 
want to briefly suggest some additional, tangible ways that microaggressions can be reduced in 
clinical settings. These suggestions, however, are less about what individual health care providers 
can do when interacting with their patients, and instead focus on structural changes that need to 
occur within the space of the clinical environment itself (e.g., the aesthetics of the physical space 
of the clinic).  
To get us started, let’s revisit the example given above, in which a patient is browsing the medical 
literature in the clinic, and realizes that there is none available which matches her sexual orientation 
and preferences. Such cases are all too familiar for LGBTQ+ patients and can send the message 
that they will not be understood or respected in that space, or that they are deviant or abnormal 
insofar as they are not reflected in the available literature. These sorts of environmental 
 
132 For a longer discussion of the way microaggressions reflect and reinforce unequal relations of power, see Stewart 




microaggressions are easily prevented, or counteracted, by the presence of “microcues,” that is, 
small markers of inclusivity and acceptance that imply an awareness of, and respect for, diverse 
sexual and gender identities (see Sue et al. 2020 on these and other microaggressions intervention 
strategies). Some easy to incorporate examples would be having literature and pamphlets that are 
representative of diverse sexual preferences and gender identifications, having posters that reflect 
various sorts of families or sexual partners, having gender neutral and accessible washrooms, and 
removing gendered language from sexual health resources (for e.g., baskets containing free 
condoms should not have heteronormative language on them!) Another important thing that 
providers can do is indicate their pronouns when introducing themselves to a patient (“Hi, I am 
Dr. Smith and I use he/him pronouns”). Pronouns could also be displayed on the name badges of 
providers and staff. This normalizes asking for and providing pronouns in all clinical exchanges, 
thereby reducing the risks or mispronouning or misgendering.  
Another change that is easy to implement, but which can seriously reduce the harmful 
consequences of environmental microaggressions (and other interpersonal microaggressions as 
well!), involves designing and utilizing inclusive intake forms. As noted above, intake forms are 
one of the first parts of a clinical encounter which suggest to a patient whether their experiences 
are recognizable and understood in that space. Having a range of gender identity and sexual 
orientation options can help make LGBTQ+ people feel welcome from the outset. It can also help 
open the door for more open conversations later. Though providers often are reluctant to ask 
patients questions about sexual preference for fear of embarrassing them, recent survey data 
indicates that an overwhelming majority (approximating 90 percent) of patients don’t share that 
fear (Powell 2018). A simple open question on registration forms ‒ “Do you have sex with men, 
women, or both?” ‒ can give a physician information and help establish communication that might 
prove important in understanding and treating health needs. It also takes the onus of asking this 
question for the first time off the provider in real time, and allows the patient to indicate it in 
writing, in a more discrete way.  
Queering the clinical space in these ways helps to reduce the sorts of environmental 
microaggressions that can make LGBTQ+ patients feel unsafe or unwelcome, and can help to 




paired with verbal signifiers and the use of appropriate and inclusive language,133 these seemingly 
small changes can make a world of difference for counteracting the harms of microaggressions 
that occur in medical settings. Going beyond this, and thinking about structural changes, there is 
also a need to put serious effort into diversifying medical school classes, as well as physicians and 
administrators at all levels. For a discussion of the importance of diversity at the level of medical 
education and institutional culture, in addition to individual level changes, see Dean et al. (2016).  
Though I have just spent a great deal of time pointing to things we should be concerned about with 
respect to medical practice, I would be remiss not to note that there is some reason for optimism 
about the future of this practice, and its interactions with LGBTQ+ patients. My optimism here, as 
both a theorist and a queer person myself, comes as a result of looking to the next generation of 
health care providers. There is, for example, reason to believe that the current generation is more 
LGBTQ+ inclusive and accepting than previous generations, and that this trend will only continue 
(Charlesworth and Banaji 2019; Gates 2017). Within the context of medical training, future health 
care providers are pushing for better and more-inclusive preparation and training, which will 
provide them with the tools needed to give quality care to all of their patients (see Cohen 2019).  
Here is one hopeful story. After having failed to receive what she thought would be sufficient 
training to effectively treat queer patients in her medical school’s curriculum, the New York 
Medical College Student referenced above (the one who reported her LGBTQ+ medical training 
coming in the form of a Buzzfeed video) rallied a group of her peers to approach the administration 
about the lack of LGBTQ+ competency in their medical training. The student reports that 
administrators were "amazingly receptive" to her presentation and that she quickly gained student 
and faculty allies. As a result, the school went from one and a half hours of LGBT-focused content 
in the curriculum to seven hours within a matter of two years (!).134 The student noted that she 
 
133 For a helpful overview of trans-inclusive language, see Lowik (2019).  
134 I do not want to imply that this victory – in getting 6 additional hours of LGBTQ+ focused training, is sufficient. 
LGBTQ+ health should be woven all throughout the entirety of medical education – not simply tacked on as an extra 
discrete unit. However, it is worth celebrating the efforts of one future provider and her peers to start taking steps in 




doesn't think the change would have happened had the students not pushed for it themselves 
(Cohen 2019).  
This story is not the only one like it. Medical students at Harvard Medical School, for example, 
are now similarly pushing for more LGBTQ+ focused medical training. Jessica Halem, Harvard 
Medical School’s LGBT program director, reports on the motivation for the recently developed 
Sexual and Gender Minorities Health Equity initiative at Harvard, stating that: "The main first 
driver truly was medical students organizing and saying 'Hey, I need the curriculum to reflect the 
kind of medicine that I came here to study!’” (Cohen 2019). Future medical providers desire to do 
right by their patients, including their LGBTQ+ patients, and they know that this starts with having 
a proper, queer-centered medical education, with consistent, accurate, and comprehensive 
content.135  
The hope is that better training will make health care providers feel more prepared, more 
comfortable, and more competent with their LGBTQ+ patients. Ideally, it will also help to 
overcome – or at least start diminishing – the implicit preferences that health care providers 
currently have for heterosexual patients, and the negative associations held against LGBTQ+ 
patients (see Sabin et al. 2015). All of these improvements will help to decrease the risk of 
alienating patients with microaggressive language and actions, can help foster better 
communication with them, and ultimately make LGBTQ+ patients feel more comfortable and safe 
speaking up in the clinic.136 
 
135 Another reason for optimism is that such curricula are being developed for eventual implementation on a wider 
scale. The University of Louisville Medical School in Kentucky served as the nation’s pilot site for training future 
physicians on the unique health care concerns and issues encountered by people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender (LGBT), gender non-conforming or born with differences of sex development (DSD) (UofL SOM 2015). 
For an argument that medical schools have a moral responsibility to train future health providers to respond 
professionally to queer patients, see Schuklenk & Smalling (2013).  
136 There is some empirical reason to believe that this will, in fact, be the case. One study has demonstrated that 
patients most prefer to receive sexual health information from their provider who initiates the conversation (45.1%) 
and least prefer information from the Internet (25.4%). Patients are most comfortable with providers who are 
"knowledgeable about sexual concerns" (74.5%) and "seem comfortable addressing sexual concerns" (68.3%) 
(Wittenberg & Gerber 2009). This suggests that queer patients do desire to have fruitful interactions about sexual 
health and gender identity with well-trained health care providers, and that they are more likely to do so if they perceive 




I am made hopeful (at least in a limited, qualified sense) when I see the concrete actions starting 
to emerge in this domain, which are aimed at better preparing health care providers to interact with 
LGBTQ+ patients, and to do so more respectfully and with greater care for their identities and 
experiences. In Canada, for example, an Assistant Professor at the University of Toronto Dalla 
Lana School of Public Health, Alex Abramovich, recently co-authored an article in the Canadian 
Medical Association Journal (Lam and Abramovich 2019) that provides comprehensive steps for 
physicians to follow to become more trans-inclusive and trans-competent in their care delivery. 
The article made several tangible recommendations, including asking patients privately at the 
beginning of the encounter which pronouns they go by and addressing patients with a gender-
affirming approach throughout the encounter (i.e., an approach which does not pathologize gender 
variance).137 These seemingly small changes in how health care providers interact with patients 
can go a long way to demonstrate their willingness to learn, and desire to respect the humanity of 
patients. As I have suggested above, making these changes is a matter of health justice, and a 
matter of ensuring LGBTQ+ have the opportunity to be mentally and physically well – something 
every human being deserves.  
 Conclusion  
This paper has considered a potential roadblock for queer patients attempting to receive quality 
medical care, namely, the influence of microaggressions in clinical encounters. In medical 
contexts, microaggressions can have a detrimental impact on core features of the clinical 
relationship, most importantly trust and effective communication. Effective communication is a 
necessary condition for knowledge transfer between patients and clinicians. Microaggressions 
stand in the way of such communication and contribute to the positioning of LGBTQ+ patients as 
epistemically inferior. I have argued that in order to overcome these failures of communication 
and trust (and ultimately to combat the detrimental impact of microaggressions), health care 
providers should aim to establish an epistemic peers relationship with their queer patients, whereby 
they respect their queer patients as epistemic equals and as experts in their own right. They should 
 




also cultivate practices of listening which aim to diminish their own “arrogant perception” (cf. 
Frye 1983), and in which they demonstrate deference when necessary (cf. Thomas 1992). Only 
then can health care providers truly hear their queer patients, in a way that makes administering 
the highest quality care possible. Finally, I have suggested some easy-to-implement changes to the 
physical space of the clinic, which provide “microcues” for LGBTQ+ people to help them perceive 
the space as one in which they will be understood and respected. I have also pointed to some 
reasons for optimism about the direction in which things are headed – one in which structural 
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Chapter 5  
5. Paving the Road to Truly Free Speech: Establishing a More Just Free 
Speech Infrastructure on Campus and Beyond138 
 
Abstract: 
Freedom of speech and a range of related issues have become the subject 
of thriving (albeit at times contentious, and even hostile) debate. Unlike 
many debates that philosophers and other academics engage in, issues 
surrounding freedom of speech – applications, boundaries, and limitations 
– have infiltrated popular consciousness as well, bringing the importance 
of the debate into even sharper focus. While these debates around the 
meaning and scope of free speech have applications in a variety of domains 
(civic life, the media, social media, and various other institutions), a 
substantial focus in recent years has been on the role of free speech and 
free expression on university and college campuses. As such, this paper 
considers debates around freedom of speech and expression as they 
manifest in those contexts.  
Using one highly contested speech phenomenon, namely, 
“microaggressions” as my lens, I aim to complicate the current debates 
around freedom of speech and expression on college campuses, and in 
particular, a recent articulation of the value and benefits of free speech on 
university campuses proffered by Philip Pettit (2018). Though Pettit’s 
framework for understanding freedom of speech, and specifically his 
 
138 This paper benefited from helpful comments from the audiences at the Southwestern Ontario Feminism and 
Philosophy Workshop, Western University’s Freedom of Expression Panel, and the 2019 Public Philosophy Network 
Conference. I am also grateful to Lauren Freeman, Carolyn McLeod, and Richard Vernon for helpful commentary on 





“infrastructure” analogy has a great deal of promise, I argue that it is, in 
some important ways, limited. Specifically, I argue that his account is not 
adequately attentive to the role of power and oppression on our speech 
practices. I then provide an expansion of his view which is more suitably 
attentive to the influence of power and oppression on speech. I contend 
that analyzing Pettit’s free speech framework through the lens of power 
and oppression offers a more promising route for thinking about the value 
and scope of free speech and expression in college and university settings. 
I consider how this adapted view – one which is sufficiently attentive to 
power and oppression – can help us understand that the reduction of 
microaggressions and attempts to neutralize the harms of 
microaggressions can be thought of as integral parts of a robust, fair, anti-






Freedom of speech and a range of related issues139 have become the subject of thriving (albeit at 
times hostile) debate. Unlike many debates that philosophers and other academics engage in, 
questions about freedom of speech – its applications, boundaries, and limitations – have infiltrated 
popular consciousness as well, bringing the importance of the debate into even sharper focus.140  
While debates around the meaning and scope of free speech have applications in a variety of 
domains (civic life, the media and journalism, social media, and various other institutions), a 
substantial focus in recent years has been on the role of free speech and free expression on 
university and college campuses. At least part of the reason for the growing interest in free speech 
and free expression on university campuses – at least within the United States and Canada – has 
to do with the recent political climate in both places. Specifically, in both places, politicians on the 
political right have adopted an increasingly popular view that “free speech is under attack,” (Gelber 
2018; Guelzo 2018; Powers 2015) and that the majority of this attack is being launched from within 
the academy, in particular by those deemed left-wing (Jesse 2018; Davies 2018; Mackinnon 2019). 
Anxieties about “cancel culture” and “cancellation,” especially of right-wing thinkers, abound 
(Paul 2020).  
In response to what those on the political right see as a crisis of free speech, right-leaning 
politicians and pundits have proceeded to demand more, and more demanding, speech protections 
to offset this alleged attack. In the United States context, for example, while still in office, the now-
former president of the United States, Donald Trump, threatened in an address to the Conservative 
 
139 The sorts of related issues that I have in mind include, for example: discussions around “safe spaces” (Freeman 
2014; Moody-Adams 2018), content warnings (Freeman 2017; Moody-Adams 2018; Stewart 2019d; Saul 2018), 
student protests of speakers (Estlund 2018), instances of civil disobedience (Nussbaum 2018), and no-platforming or 
de-platforming (Levy 2019; Simpson and Srinivasan 2018), among others.  
140 The popular awareness of the free speech debates is at least in part due to academics who have written popular 
works on this question, many of whom are participants in manufacturing the “free speech crisis.” Obvious examples 
include Jordan Peterson (see Maher 2017) and Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015; 2017; 
see discussion in chapter 1 of this dissertation). Helpful clarifications about the debate have been offered in the public 






Political Action Conference (CPAC) to issue an executive order to cut off federal funds to public 
colleges and universities that failed to adequately “support free speech” (see Shepardson and 
Johnson 2019; Wilke 2019).141 In the Canadian province of Ontario, where my current academic 
institution is located, sitting Premier Doug Ford issued a similar demand. However, unlike his 
American counterpart, his threats were not empty. In August of 2018, Ford notified universities 
within his jurisdiction that, should they fail to adopt policies that adequately uphold freedom of 
speech and expression, they, too, will be at risk for significant funding cuts (Giovannetti and Hauen 
2018).142 Ford proceeded to give Ontario universities until the first day of the new year (January 
1, 2019) to design, implement, and enforce wide-ranging free speech policies.143 The mandate 
required that the free speech policies ensure that “schools remain open to discussion and free 
inquiry, [do] not shield students from ideas or opinions they find offensive and [will] not allow 
students or teachers to obstruct others from expressing their views.” Schools that fail to enforce 
the policies up to a satisfactory extent, at determined by Ford’s administration, would face 
“reductions to their operating grant funding, proportional to the severity of non-compliance” 
(Giovannetti and Hauen 2019). 
Of course, an obvious worry in both cases (viz., the United States and Ontario) involves the 
question of who gets to design the policies to be implemented? Or in other words, who gets to 
decide what speech is permissible or not and by what standards? These are contentious questions. 
Whoever designs the free speech policies that govern a particular institutional or social context 
have a lot of power to shape the speech norms that will proliferate there. For reasons that will 
become obvious in this chapter, this exercise of power is something to be concerned about. 
 
141 Like most things haphazardly demanded by former President Trump, the details of what this would entail in practice 
were entirely vague, rendering the threat up to substantial interpretation, and, thereby utterly useless.  
142 I have presented these two cases non-chronologically. Ford actually issued his threat first (in August 2018). 
Trump’s CPAC speech was in March of 2019.  
143 It is worth noting how troubling this is, since Canadian public universities get most of their funding from the state, 





In light of this recently heightened attention to free speech and free expression on university and 
college campuses, the space of the academy will be my primary focus in what follows for thinking 
through the problem of free speech. Specifically, I will examine one recent defense of free speech 
and its application to college and university campuses (what I will call the “free speech 
infrastructure view” offered by Pettit 2018). After drawing out some limitations and assumptions 
of the view, I will expand upon it in order to make it more attentive to the ways in which power 
and oppression shape speech norms and speech practices on university campuses. Throughout, I 
will use one highly debated speech phenomenon, microaggressions, to anchor the discussion. I 
will argue that a sufficient “infrastructure” for free speech on campus – one which can 
meaningfully and equitably maximize free speech – must attend to the influence of power and 
oppression on speech, specifically for marginalized members of our campus communities. This 
includes, I will suggest, incorporating norms aimed at minimizing the frequency and/or 
neutralizing the impacts of microaggressions on campus. 
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 5.2, I will give a brief overview of the free speech 
debates, particularly as they unfold within the context of university campuses. I will focus 
specifically on microaggressions and their relation to campus speech.  In section 5.3, I will discuss 
Philip Pettit’s 2018 chapter “Two Concepts of Free Speech,” which defends a particular 
framework for understanding the value of free speech, using academic contexts as a case study. I 
call this the free speech infrastructure view. In section 5.4, I argue that Pettit’s account, as 
presented is limited. Specifically, it is limited by a lack of adequate attention to the role of power 
and oppression in shaping speech norms, speech communities, and the extent to which people are 
able to speak in such a way that is meaningfully free. Like Pettit, I think about speech protections 
with reference to the university context. In section 5.5, I will expand upon Pettit’s “free speech 
infrastructure” framework as described in section 5.3, aiming to provide nuance in the form of 
analyses of power and oppression and their impacts on speech. I contend that Pettit’s general 
account – when paired with an adequate analysis of power and oppression – offers a promising 
route for thinking about free speech in university settings. This is because, I contend, he gets the 
goal right (that is, protecting free speech to the maximal amount equally enjoyable by all) and has 
the right approach for getting there (a protective infrastructure of policies and social norms). But, 




specific norms must be cultivated to work against the corrosive effects of power and oppression in 
our speech contexts, specifically academic contexts. In section 5.6, I will consider and respond to 
possible objections to the view I have offered. I will then briefly conclude and gesture towards 
future directions for philosophical theorizing around this particular issue.  
Before moving ahead, a few qualifications are in order.  
First, the scope and intention of this paper is to interrogate a question about justification, not to 
offer a complete picture of the speech protective infrastructure needed on university campuses. In 
other words, my goal is to make a normative claim about what is morally and socially justifiable 
with respect to speech restrictions, and the policies and norms that enforce them. I will not offer 
guidance on how we might design specific speech policy or speech codes to govern academic 
institutions, as I believe these should always be designed with reference to specific campus 
contexts. I will offer a few suggestions about possible avenues for norm change, however, which 
I believe can be beneficial in most, if not all, campus contexts. I do not take the recommendations 
that I offer below to be exhaustive; rather, I offer them as examples of the sorts of norm changes 
that can help support a more just speech protective infrastructure within our campus contexts, for 
example, by helping to reduce microaggressions and their harmful effects on marginalized 
members of our campus communities.  
Second, though my focus is on academic speech (or, speech that occurs within campus contexts), 
the boundaries of “academic speech” are indistinct. When I refer to academic speech, my focus is 
on speech that occurs within the space of the academy itself (i.e., within classrooms, offices, 
libraries, etc.). I fully recognize, however, that such a boundary is blurry; social media, blogs, and 
other online platforms have radically increased the opportunities for academics and students alike 
to speak and be heard outside of the physical walls of the classroom or the larger campus space. 
While it is an open (and interesting!) question as to how much this extramural speech should fall 
under the umbrella of academic speech, and whether, for instance, professors can or should be held 
accountable for speech they make outside of their formal professional role (e.g., on their personal 




scope.144 Relatedly, I am not referring to speech which happens at informal gatherings which may, 
at least to some degree, be connected to the academy in some way. For example, if a group of 
graduate students from a philosophy department at university X organize a karaoke night at the 
local bar, the speech they engage in in that setting is beyond the scope of my current interest 
(though, I think this does raise interesting ethical challenges to be discussed another time). Of 
course, there are blurry lines here, too: what about informal gatherings paid for with university 
dollars? What about post-conference events, where in some sense, graduate students and faculty 
members are still representing their departments and larger universities? I fully acknowledge the 
messiness that arises in cases like these, and I think they raise interesting questions about how to 
define the boundaries of “academic speech” or speech that occurs in “academic contexts.” That 
said, my present purpose is not to locate these limits, and as such, I will be setting these issues 
aside.   
Third, as noted above, I am locating my present discussion within academic contexts. I am doing 
this for a number of reasons. As already noted, there are important debates at present about the 
scope and limits of academic freedom and free speech and expression on university campuses. 
These often appear, in interesting and polarizing ways, in the public domain. I think there is good 
reason to focus on the academic context, and what conclusions we can draw about free speech 
when thinking about this particular institutional context. I find the academic context interesting, 
because universities have so many important goals: interrogating the truth, producing knowledge, 
educating students and the public, but also supporting and enhancing goals of diversity, equity, 
 
144 The increase of social media usage raises interesting questions about the degree of freedom professors do or ought 
to have with respect to speaking online (see Pettit 2018, 62 on the unique challenges the rise of social media offers to 
our general understanding of free speech; also see Warburton 2009, 82-85)). For an important analysis of a case that 
makes this question salient, see Protevi’s (2018) discussion of a professor, Steven Salaita, who faced negative 
professional consequences as a result of speech made on his social media platform, particularly about the BDS 
movement and Israeli activity in Gaza. An ongoing example that makes the debate around extramural speech online 
particularly salient is the current so-called ‘gender wars,” between trans-inclusive feminists and “trans-exclusive 
radical feminists,” which is largely unfolding on Twitter, FaceBook, and personal blogs, often disconnected from the 
formal publication process as well as standard professional norms. For a great analysis of the current “gender wars” 
and their relation to the question of academic freedom and extramural speech, see Dea 2019a. I find these sorts of 





and inclusion. As Michael Behrent writes in a 2019 report for the American Association for 
University Professors writes: 
Many of the most difficult issues surrounding free speech at present are 
about balancing unobstructed dialogue with the need to make all 
constituencies on campus feel included… In our intensely polarized times, 
such balancing of competing demands has become increasingly difficult; 
the question of free speech has become, ironically, an issue about which 
many on campus are increasingly indisposed to listen to one another. 
I find the possible tensions generated by these different institutional goals – “unobstructed 
dialogue” on the one hand and the “need to make all constituencies on campus feel included” on 
the other – interesting when it comes to thinking about im/permissible speech, and speech 
regulations and norms within university contexts. In addition to these reasons, I focus my attention 
on the academic context because it is through the lens of the academic context that Pettit explores 
the ramifications of his own account. 
However, despite my focus on academia, I am not ruling out the possibility that the framework I 
go onto advocate for (namely, a revised version of Pettit 2018) can be extended beyond the 
academy to other institutions. On the contrary, I think the issues raised in this chapter, regarding 
how we ought to think about the nature and protection of free speech, have important implications 
for other institutions that share principal values (e.g., justice, fairness, equity, inclusion) with the 
academy, including but not limited to the institution of medicine.145 Nevertheless, I will set those 
possible extensions of the argument aside for now and focus our attention specifically on the 
academic realm.  
 
145 I highlight the institution of medicine in particular for a variety of reasons. For one, it is the institution upon which 
my research on microaggressions and other harmful speech phenomena primarily focuses (see Freeman and Stewart 
2018; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; Stewart 2019a; 2019c). Furthermore, I think there are relevant similarities with respect 
to the institutional values that have to be balanced with free speech in either context, academia or medicine (i.e., 
justice, fairness, equity, inclusion) and how speech functions in either context (i.e., across entrenched power 




Finally, it is worth saying something about what motivates my broader approach of trying to work 
within and extend a particular defense of free speech, while also pursuing more justice within the 
domain of speech. In debates about the scope and limits of free speech, one compelling avenue for 
proponents of greater restrictions on certain sorts of speech, including microaggressions, is to try 
to meet free speech defenders or advocates on their own terms. In other words, one strategy for 
showing the reasonableness of certain sorts of restrictions on speech is to show either that i) 
restricting them is consistent with, or in some cases enhances, the reasons we value free speech in 
the first place or, ii) that failing to restrict them runs counter to, or detracts from, the goals of 
supporting free speech or the values that undergird it.146 This is the sort of approach I take in what 
follows. Doing so is valuable, I contend, insofar as it helps to shrink the apparent ideological 
distance between those who are more inclined towards free speech absolutism (i.e., speech policies 
that are very liberal with respect to speech, and try to approximate absolute free speech as nearly 
as possible) and those who think there are certain sorts of speech (or particular speech acts) that 
we might have other interests in restricting or trying to prevent (e.g., those who believe that 
pervasive and unchecked microaggressions on university campuses can counteract important 
values that universities hold, including but not limited to diversity, equity, and inclusion). 
Arguments that ground speech restrictions in the “pro-free speech arguments” of the critics are 
both pragmatically valuable insofar as they might make the restrictions seem more reasonable to 
the critics, and socially valuable insofar as they show that the ideological divide is exaggerated; 
people on either side of the debate generally want and value the same things (namely, the maximal 
amount of free speech possible for all), even if they disagree about what exactly that entails and 
how to go about achieving it.  
This is the sort of approach I am taking in what follows. Specifically, I aim to make use of and 
extend one defense of free speech, that of Pettit (2018) and show how, when informed by an 
understanding of the impacts of power and oppression on speech, we can get closer to the stated 
goal of maximizing free speech for all. I ask the reader to keep the following point in mind while 
 
146 I have taken this approach, rooted in what I call the “paradox of free speech” elsewhere. For a radio broadcast of a 
talk where I argued for restricting microaggressions and slurring speech on university campuses, based on the very 




reading the remainder of this chapter: I have chosen to engage with Pettit’s account because I think 
there is value in it, even if it is (as I will go onto argue) currently limited. I offer my critical 
engagement with Pettit not as an attempt to dismiss his view outright, but rather as an attempt to 
develop it and make it more robust. 
With these qualifications in mind, let us begin.  
 Free Speech Debates and the Campus Context 
Freedom of speech, in general terms, refers to the notion that individuals and/or communities ought 
to be free to engage openly in the expression of thoughts or ideas, without fear of retaliation, 
censorship, or legal or social sanction. In other words, this principle is one that aims at protecting 
individuals from having their speech controlled or silenced by others. This freedom is not, 
however, a purely abstract notion or moral ideal; rather, it is a core value of democratic 
governments, enshrined into their constitutions, widely celebrated, and fervently protected.147 It is 
also a central value of academic institutions. 
We might ask why freedom of speech is viewed as important in the first place. Various answers to 
the value question (that is, the question regarding why we do, or ought to, value freedom of speech 
in the first place) have been offered. The answer that tends to get disproportionate uptake and 
attention in the contemporary dialogue is that of John Stuart Mill in On Liberty. In chapter 2 of On 
Liberty, Mill provides a defense of the free flow of ideas, as a means of arriving at the truth (which 
no one person alone can arrive at) and in order to minimize the risk of society slipping into 
unchallenged dogma. Mill argued that the free expression of, and fair competition between, 
differing ideas was the best way to sort truths from falsehoods.  
 
147  In the United States context, freedom of speech is protected by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which declares that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (see United States National Archives 2018). In 
Canada, this freedom is protected by Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which identifies 
“fundamental freedoms” including freedom of speech (see Government of Canada 2019). And, though weaker than 
the protection afforded by a national constitution, freedom of speech is recognized and protected at the international 
level by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR; see United Nations 2019) and the 




It is likely this line of thinking that has generated the metaphor of “the marketplace of ideas,” 
which draws on an economic marketplace analogy to support the notion that when there are more 
ideas in circulation, the better ideas will win out. Put another way, the idea is that the most likely 
route to the truth is by maximizing the number of ideas in circulation, allowing the truth to interact 
with – and ultimately to rise above – errors and half-truths (Warburton 2009, 22). On this 
conception, the protection of free speech is construed as instrumentally valuable, that is, valuable 
for some other end. In this case, free speech is valuable for its ability to maximize the likelihood 
that we will arrive at truth.  
 It is worth noting that Mill does not use the “marketplace of ideas” phrase himself, and that the 
first reference to a “marketplace of ideas” comes from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in the 
1919 case Abrams v. Abrams (1919) (Schultz 2009). Nevertheless, this market metaphor is often 
associated with Mill’s thinking, even though some have argued that the metaphor does not 
accurately describe the heart of Mill’s view (see Gordon 1997).  
The concept of the “marketplace of ideas,” and Mill’s broader defense of free speech and 
expression, are often appealed to in ongoing discussions about the role and value of free speech 
(see, e.g., Miller 2017; Stanley 2018; Lombardi 2019; Shih 2017).148 Specifically, the marketplace 
metaphor very often gets appealed to within debates about speech on campus: a stark example of 
this is the use by the Heterodox Academy (a free speech advocacy group, founded by Jonathan 
Haidt and Quinn Rosenkranz, aimed at increasing “viewpoint diversity” on college campuses) who 
created an illustrated version of chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty as part of their free speech advocacy 
materials and regularly publish defenses of speech that rely on Mill’s arguments (Heterdox 
Academy 2021).149   
Another rather influential view about the value of free speech comes from Alexander Meiklejohn 
(1948; also see Purvis 2009). Meiklejohn argued that the value of free speech could be found in 
 
148 To hear Pettit discuss the marketplace of ideas, see ABC Radio National (2018). 
149  Their illustrated version of Mill’s On Liberty chapter 2, titled “All Minus One” can be viewed here: 
https://heterodoxacademy.org/library/all-minus-one/. An example of a blog they have published drawing on Mill can 




its connection to a well-functioning democracy. He claimed that in order to effectively preserve 
democracy, citizens and voters must be able to freely engage in uninhibited discussion and debate. 
This ability allows citizens to be as well positioned as possible to make informed choices about 
their self-government. Other scholars and advocates have also demonstrated that free speech is 
essential to democratic functioning because it is the means by which citizens are able to critique 
their government, and/or voice their dissent (Dry 1994; ACLU 2019). Like Mill’s, this way of 
thinking about the value of free speech (i.e., as an essential tool for the preservation of a 
functioning democracy) is instrumental; the value of free speech rests on its connection to 
something else of value, namely, the preservation of democracy, or the ability for democracy to 
flourish.  
Both of the aforementioned answers to the value question are instrumental. In other words, they 
locate the value of free speech in its ability to support some other good or value or bring about 
some other desired end. Another possibility, however, is that the value of free speech is not 
instrumental, but rather is intrinsic. For example, some see the ability to speak freely as part of 
what makes us autonomous beings, or what allows us to be meaningfully self-determining. On 
such a view, then, the ability to speak freely is essential to our very dignity as persons (Scanlon 
1972; also see ACLU 2019). Thought of this way, free speech is good in itself, fundamentally 
entangled with our ability to act autonomously, our dignity as persons, and thus, perhaps, our very 
humanity.  
Regardless of which justification we might find most compelling for valuing free speech, it seems 
as if there is at least prima facie reason to protect it.150 For our purposes, we will accept this as our 
starting point. In other words, we will start from the position that there is value in protecting free 
speech and proceed from there. (Moreover, Pettit gives us several reasons for understanding free 
speech as protected speech, which I will discuss in section 5.3 below).   
 
150 Or, as Kent Greenawalt (1989) puts it, there is likely a “presumption in favour of speech.” In other words, we have 




The general debate over freedom of speech – at least among those who accept that it is indeed 
valuable – largely concerns its boundaries and limitations. Broadly speaking, the central question 
involves what conditions, if any, might justify imposing restrictions on freedom of speech. When 
such conditions (that is, conditions that justify some restriction) are met, further questions arise, 
such as how to go about restricting that speech in practice (e.g., whether legally, or through social 
persuasion and norm setting), and by how much (e.g., where to draw lines on free speech, or to 
what extent to restrict some type of speech). 
We know that, at least in practice, the principle of free speech is not absolute. We restrict the 
parameters of free speech to exclude certain speech acts that we have deemed sufficiently harmful 
or socially damaging, including (but not always limited to): libel, slander, perjury, “fighting 
words,” and in some jurisdictions, obscenity and/or hate speech. Generally, arguments in favour 
of restricting some particular sort of speech appeal to Mill’s famous “Harm Principle” (Mill 1859; 
see also Warburton 2009, 22-24).151 The harm principle states that individual agents ought to be 
free to do whatever they wish up to the point where they begin to cause harm to another person. 
Another way of stating the principle is that the only justification for interfering with someone’s 
freedom to live their life the way they choose is if that person poses a risk of harm to others 
(Warburton 2009, 23). Applied to speech, the harm principle would suggest that one’s free speech 
liberties ought to extend up to the point at which they begin to cause a serious risk of or actual 
harm to others.   
This seems straight forward – people should be free to act up to the point that their actions begin 
harming other people. However, applying this principle can be difficult. Doing so requires sorting 
out some difficult and contentious questions, such as how to understand harm (see introduction to 
 
151 While Mill’s “Harm Principle” tends to be the most frequently discussed justification for curtailing speech liberties, 
there are other possible justifications as well. For example, an amendment to the ICCPR (see footnote 8) states that 
“the exercise of these rights carries ‘special duties and responsibilities’ and may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions when necessary [f]or respect of the rights or reputation of others" or "[f]or the protection of national 
security or of public order (order public), or of public health or morals.” While one could argue that each of these 
reasons for restricting speech could amount to harm prevention, I think the ICCPR amendment is getting at something 
broader, namely, that there are reasons to restrict speech that are not simply reducible to harm, but might be a matter 
of upholding security, order, or even morality. Given space limitations, I focus more narrowly on harm, but I do not 





this thesis), and what sorts of harms are sufficiently serious to justify imposing restrictions on 
speech. Consequently, there is substantial disagreement regarding whether certain sorts of speech 
ought to be tolerated, despite their being offensive and/or ignorant, or at what point such speech 
crosses into the terrain of being outright harmful, and thus, plausibly open to restriction (Maitra 
and McGowan 2012, 1).  
Such questions about free speech – where to locate its value and the plausible grounds for its 
restriction – are the focus of ongoing debates about academic freedom and free speech on 
university or college campuses. While these debates are extensive, I will home in on one particular 
locus of ongoing debate – that surrounding microaggressions – and use this focus as a launching 
point for considering how we ought to think about academic freedom and free speech on campus 
more generally.152  
First, let me say something about what microaggressions are, before saying something about why 
they are relevant to the present discussion. Microaggressions are commonly understood to refer to 
brief and commonplace verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, either intentional or 
unintentional, that are rooted in (implicit or explicit) prejudices, stereotypes, or biases. They target 
people on the basis of their membership in a social group that is marginalized on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, sex, sexuality, gender identity, dis/ability status, or other marginalized identity (see, for 
example, Sue 2010; Sue et. al 2007; 2008a; 2008b; Nadal 2013). 153  Consider the following 
example: a white person asks a Latinx person where they are from, to which the Latinx person 
replies “Uh, Ontario – just like you!” Instead of stopping there, the questioner doubles down and 
 
152 Before moving forward, it is worth noting that not everyone thinks the leap from general discussions of free speech 
to specific discussions about academic freedom/academic speech is legitimate or clear cut (see for example Simpson 
and Srinivasan 2018, 195). While I concede that there is nuance here (i.e., regarding the institution-specific goals and 
values of the academy) for our purposes, I am treating the question of academic freedom as a fairly straightforward 
application of the larger free speech debates. It is also worth noting that I am treating questions of academic freedom 
and free speech on campus as tightly interwoven. While the latter is more general, the former is also relevant, because 
I see academic freedom (what one is free to teach, research, publish on, and how campus community members are 
permitted to speak) as a manifestation of the question about the scope and boundaries of speech. So, academic 
freedom/academic speech are clearly implicated in this question.  
153 For the origins of the concept, see Pierce (1970); Pierce et. al (1978). For a recent challenge to the current framing 
of microaggressions and a modified conceptualization of microaggression theory, see Freeman and Stewart (2018; 




probes further, asking “no, like, where are you really from?” This constitutes a classic instance of 
microaggression: regardless of the questioner’s intentions, the content of their speech has sent a 
string of messages about the Latinx person’s identity and belongingness in Ontario. These 
messages include that the Latinx person is viewed as “foreign” or “Other,” that they are not 
recognizable as a “true Canadian.” Packed into the comments are stereotypes and assumptions 
about racial identity (e.g., that non-white people in Canada must be from elsewhere), as well as 
coded messages about the Latinx person’s inferiority vis-à-vis the white questioner.  
There is vast empirical evidence (Nadal et. al 2011, 2014; Resnick et. al 2019; Solaranzo et. al 
2000; Swann et. al 2011; Williams 2017) and theoretical argument (Freeman and Stewart 2018; 
Friedlaender 2018; McGowan 2019; Schroer 2015; Stewart 2019a; 2019c; and Brennan 2016 on 
‘micro-inequities’) in favour of the view that microaggressions cause significant harm. Moreover, 
moral arguments have been offered which contend that the fact that microaggressions cause harm 
justifies attempts to minimize microaggressions and their negative consequences in a variety of 
settings (see for example chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis). As I have described in the introduction 
and chapter 1 of this thesis, microaggressions are a mechanism of, and are continuous with, 
structural and systemic oppression. Being oppressed, and having that oppression acted on or 
reinforced, is a harm. Microaggressions contribute to the degrading of all sorts of things in which 
one is likely to have a vested interest: their epistemic standing, their emotional integrity, their 
identity, their being made to feel welcome or included in a particular space, their ability to trust 
others, and so on. These setbacks to one’s many significant interests amount to harm, regardless 
of anyone’s intentions to cause said harm (again, see introduction to this thesis; see McLeod 2020 
for an articulation of this broad sense of harm).  
However, despite the vast theoretical research positing that microaggressions are harmful, and the 
empirical research which backs up these claims,154 there are still those who doubt their seriousness 
 
154 Though throughout this thesis I have pointed to the empirical psychology literature which aims to measure the 
negative consequences of microaggressions, it is worth noting the problematic nature of our tendency to only view 
such quantifiable evidence as “real” or “objective” evidence. Such empiricist tendencies can erase the significance of 
the testimonies of those who live and report being harmed by things like oppression, and more specifically, 




and who ardently contest any continued research and advocacy around microaggressions (e.g., 
Friedersdorf 2015; Lilienfeld 2017; Haidt 2017; Campbell and Manning 2015; 2018. For a 
discussion of their critiques, see chapter 1 of this thesis).  
A great deal of the debate around microaggressions – their impact and whether or not attempts to 
reduce them are legitimate – has taken place on university campuses. On the one side of the debate, 
critics of microaggressions claim that “liberal leaning” teachers and administrators are teaching 
students to see oppression and injustice where it “doesn’t really exist” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2017); 
and, as a result, are making students “overly sensitive” (Lukianoff and Haidt 2017), thereby 
creating a problematic sort of “victimhood culture” on campuses (Campbell and Manning 2018).155 
To the extent that words cannot cause any real harm 156 , they contend, attempts to reduce 
microaggressions are undue infringements on other students’ and professors’ fundamental rights 
to speak openly and freely. 
This worry about infringements on speech has played out in some very public ways. For example, 
philosopher Kathleen Stock has made claims of being “silenced” and “cancelled” after receiving 
backlash for her trans-exclusionary views and comments, which many transfeminists see as 
microaggressive or otherwise harmful (see “Open Letter Concerning Transphobia in Philosophy” 
2021; see Stock 2021 for her response). For another example, University of Toronto professor 
Jordan Peterson (in)famously refuses to use gender neutral pronouns, seeing himself as a “free 
speech warrior” fighting against “political correctness” (McBride 2017; Murphy 2016). As a 
result, Peterson routinely misgenders trans and non-binary students (speech acts which have been 
discussed throughout this thesis as instances of microaggression) and attends free speech rallies 
arguing in defense of his right to do so (Murphy 2016). His employer, the University of Toronto, 
has said they support his “right to academic freedom,” but do worry that he is in violation of the 
Ontario Human Rights Code, and his faculty responsibilities, when he misgenders trans and non-
 
155 For a response to this line of thinking, see chapter 1 of this thesis.  
156 This is an underlying assumption for most of the critics of microaggressions, though it is rarely made explicit. An 
exception is Haidt and Lukianoff’s (2017) essay for The Atlantic, titled “Why It’s a Bad Idea to Tell Students Words 





binary students in these ways (Murphy 2016). Peterson refers to the affirmed pronouns of his trans 
and non-binary students as “made up words,” a claim which, in and of itself, is microaggressive. 
He also refers to his transgender students as “transsexuals” (see Murphy 2016), which is also 
deeply problematic (perhaps a microaggression, perhaps something more). The cases of Stock and 
Peterson are but two recent and ongoing examples out of many, but they get at the broader point. 
Essentially, the worry from the likes of Stock and Peterson is that attempts to reduce 
microaggressions and the like – especially those which encourage people to speak, or refrain from 
speaking, in particular ways – constitute undue infringements on their freedom of speech, 
amounting to inappropriate and unjustified “cancellation.” (And, this argument is made regardless 
of the minimal amount of effort involved with changing one’s speech, e.g., effort as minimal as 
simply trying one’s best to use a trans student’s appropriate name and pronouns.) Unfortunately, 
these stories tend to get a ton of press and attention, and they paint the debate – and what is at stake 
in it – in a fairly superficial light.  
On the other side of the debate, proponents of microaggression awareness and reduction have 
argued that microaggressions need to be understood within their broader social and historical 
context, and that doing so helps to make it clear that microaggressions are importantly connected 
to ongoing systems of oppression (McTernan 2018; Friedlaender 2018; O’Dowd 2018; Freeman 
and Stewart 2020; McClure 2019; Rini 2021). Given their role in perpetuating systems of 
oppression and the varied harms microaggressions cause, the proponents argue that there is good 
reason to raise awareness of microaggressions and work to reduce their harmful effects (Freeman 
and Stewart 2018; Friedlaender 2018; Rini 2015; 2021). They generally contend that this is true 
over and above any apparent restrictions such attempts to reduce microaggressions (e.g., requiring 
professors to use trans and non-binary students’ preferred pronouns) might impose on one’s ability 
to speak absolutely freely (i.e., in a way that is perfectly, or near perfectly, unrestricted). Most 
simply, microaggressions theorists contend that there are important positive reasons (e.g., 
pertaining to equity and inclusion) to work to reduce the proliferation and impact of 
microaggressions on campus. In what follows, I will argue that there are additional reasons, rooted 




 I will return to microaggressions in detail in section 5.5 below, but for now, suffice it to say that 
microaggressions are one representative case of the unfolding debates about free speech and 
expression on college and university campuses. Before circling back to microaggressions and how 
microaggressions ought to factor into discussions of free speech on campus, let’s consider what I 
take to be a promising, though limited, way of thinking about the value and justification for 
protecting free speech on campus. This is the “free speech infrastructure” model offered by 
philosopher Philip Pettit.  
 Philip Pettit’s Infrastructure Analogy  
In a recent chapter titled “Two Concepts of Free Speech,” Philip Pettit sets out to examine the 
concept of ‘free speech’ in order to help us get clear(er) on two related questions: first, to what 
extent can our speech choices be said to be free? And second, in what sense can speech choices be 
thought of as free? Pettit notes that there are two possible answers to the latter question: i) that 
people are free to speak insofar as they are unhindered in exercising their speech choices, and ii) 
that people are free to speak insofar as they are protected in exercising their speech choices. He 
argues that it is conceptually important to distinguish between these two notions of freedom with 
respect to speech (Pettit 2018, 61). I will describe each in turn. 
Free speech qua unhindered speech is speech that you can conduct without facing (covert or overt) 
hindrance from other individuals or officials. Put succinctly, free speech qua unhindered speech is 
speech that is free from the removal, replacement, or misrepresentation of speech options by others 
(Pettit 2018, 62). Pettit notes that this is a negative freedom, or in other words a freedom in the 
sense of non-interference (see Berlin 1969). Pettit sees this sense of free speech, viz., free speech 
qua unhindered speech, as problematic. Pettit contends that one is not truly free just in case their 
speech is unhindered, because one could simply adapt their speech preferences to their 
circumstances. That is to say, in the face of certain speech options being hindered, one could 
simply adapt or alter their speech to avoid or circumvent that hindrance, and still be said to have 
spoken freely (see Pettit 2018, 63). Quoting Berlin, Pettit notes that on such a view, “the extent of 
a man’s negative freedom [would be] a function of what doors, and how many are open to him; 
upon what prospects they are open; and how open they are” (Berlin quoted in Pettit 2018, 63). But, 




[they] must learn to want only what [they] can get may contribute to [their] happiness or [their] 
security, but it will not increase [their] civil or political freedom” (ibid.).  
Take the following example: an adjunct instructor wishes to issue an explicit critique of their 
academic institutions, and to do so publicly. This is the speech they truly wish to make. However, 
it is a condition of their contract that they cannot make critical comments about the university or 
its leadership in the public domain. Consequently, the adjunct professor issues a more vague, less 
direct, and thereby less effective critique of the institution. They water down what they otherwise 
would have said. For Pettit, that the adjunct professor was able to issue some bit of speech, which 
they appear to have chosen, and were seemingly unhindered in doing so, is not sufficient to say 
that they were truly free. The speech options the adjunct professor really want to take were 
foreclosed; they simply adapted their preferences to what was allowable in the situation. Pettit 
contends that this is far too weak a sense of free speech. It is weak because we cannot readily 
assume, in such circumstances, that people are in fact saying what they would otherwise say if 
certain speech options were not foreclosed. In the case of the adjunct professor, we can clearly say 
that they were not saying what they would otherwise say. This is, on Pettit’s view, an inadequate 
sense of free speech.  
On the other hand, free speech qua protected speech is a stronger requirement for free speech; 
notably, protecting speech goes beyond non-interference and actually interferes with the very 
possibility of interference by placing obstacles in the way of others to prevent them from 
interfering with your speech (Pettit 2018, 64).157 Such protections can include speech protective 
laws (see footnote 10) or policies (e.g., campus speech codes), upheld by supportive social norms. 
Importantly, meaningfully protecting speech involves placing not only obstacles in the way of 
 
157 It is worth noting (and Pettit acknowledges this) that any system or apparatus that aims to protect speech (i.e., by 
placing protections in the form of obstacles to others who would interrupt one’s free speech) will be controlled by 
someone or some institution, so there will always be some question about who gets to be in control of such a protective 
apparatus (Pettit 2018, 65). Pettit contends that such a speech-protective apparatus will most likely come from the 
law, with the support of social norms. Notably, Pettit claims that such speech protective apparatuses will not come 
from the “whim” of an “elite body” or “autocrat.” He might be wrong about this in practice: e.g., the campus speech 
codes discussed in the introduction are such an apparatus, and they were explicitly ordered by those currently in power 




people from blocking the speech of others, but rather also enforcing penalties (legal, institutional, 
or social) for doing so (Pettit 2018, 65).   
Pettit argues that free speech ought to be understood in the second sense; namely, speech is 
properly understood to be free to the extent that it is protected. Understanding free speech as 
protected speech, Pettit argues, has important practical implications, socially and politically 
speaking. Specifically, he claims that while free speech qua unhindered speech is fairly 
undemanding (e.g., does not require law or policy to be put in place to formalize protections), the 
second notion of free speech – free speech qua protected speech – is both socially and political 
demanding (Pettit 2018, 66). It is only by “dint of law and regulation” accompanied by “supportive 
social norms,” Pettit argues, “that speech gets to be protected, and gets to count as free” (Pettit 
2018, 67). These protections (formal protections and supportive norms), Pettit argues, function to 
maximize free speech up to the point that it is “co-exercisable and co-enjoyable for all” (Pettit 
2012, 92-107).158 Taken together, these features (laws, policies, and norms) create and sustain the 
infrastructure which protects speech and keeps it truly free.  
On Pettit’s view, then, putting such laws, policies, and norms in place, then, is not an invasion or 
violation of free speech. Rather, laws, policies, and norms are part of what creates and sustains 
free speech in the first place. Laws, policies, and the social norms that support them (e.g., norms 
of people acting in ways that uphold these speech-protective laws and policies) create the 
“infrastructure necessary for people to share in the enjoyment of that ideal” (Pettit 2018, 68). 
Insofar as laws and policies are part of the very infrastructure of free speech (and of making speech 
maximally free to the highest extent realizable for all), those who claim to embrace free speech 
cannot reasonably default to the position of demanding that there be no regulations or restrictive 
policies or norms around speech. This is because it is from these laws, policies, and norms that 
such a freedom is derived; they are what grant us free speech in any meaningful sense in the first 
 
158 It is worth pointing out that while Pettit does not acknowledge the obvious connection to John Rawls, his principle 
of speech liberty as being the maximal amount that is co-exercisable and co-enjoyable for all sounds a lot like Rawls’ 
liberty principle (namely, that each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 





place. To the contrary, then, those who claim to support free speech must be committed to 
“identifying regulations that can provide the best infrastructure possible for free speech” (Pettit 
2018, 68), where this infrastructure is aimed at creating the conditions to maximize the possibility 
of free speech for all.  
Pettit contends that developing the right protective infrastructure for maximizing free speech has 
important benefits which are only realized when speech is suitably protected (in other words, these 
benefits do not arise when free speech is only unhindered, but not protected). Moreover, Pettit 
argues that protecting speech confers these benefits without incurring “heavy costs” (Pettit 2018, 
73). The benefits Pettit argues can only truly arise when speech is meaningfully protected by a 
sound free speech infrastructure include: i) speaker status (that is, speakers enjoy a certain sort of 
status in relation to others, where everyone is assumed to be equally free to speak); ii) the 
possibility of communicating meaningfully via one’s silence (i.e., where one’s silence can be 
understood to communicate something other than the fact that their speech was hindered in some 
way); and iii) the establishment of greater accountability for one’s speech (including their 
silences), insofar as what one says (or doesn’t say) within the context of adequately protected 
speech can be properly attributed to them; speakers are thereby required to assume responsibility 
for what they do and do not say. Pettit calls these i) the status benefit; ii) the enfranchising benefit, 
and iii) the responsibility benefit, respectively (Pettit 2018, 73-77). I will discuss each of these 
benefits in section 5.4 below. For now, the general idea for Pettit is that when speech is suitably 
protected, each of these benefits will realize. He does not specify exactly what such necessary 
protections would entail (and I will try to spell some of this out in section 5.5 below). However, it 
is worth flagging that Pettit assumes baseline speech conditions that are relatively just and fair 
(e.g., he repeats throughout that he is assuming a “context of virtue,” see Pettit 2018, 77). In what 
follows, I will consider Pettit’s view without such an assumption of virtue, replacing such an 
assumption with the non-ideal reality of power and oppression which structure our society and 
speech contexts.  
After articulating his view, Pettit turns to the academic context as a case study. Pettit asks us to 
consider the contemporary research institution, in which “a regime of academic freedom has been 




speech.” In the academic context, robustly protecting speech, Pettit argues, generates several 
benefits: it allows the truth to emerge (a “marketplace” type argument), it brings us collectively 
closer to the truth, and “professionalization guards against abuse” because professors and 
researchers want to avoid being subjected to “censure and shame” (Pettit 2018, 78). Pettit actively 
sets aside the concern that academics and researchers will abuse their academic freedom and 
generally protected speech, perhaps too quickly (as I will suggest below) (Pettit 2018, 78).  
In presenting his view, Pettit makes various comments which read as overly optimistic about the 
extent to which our background speech conditions are already just. One clear example of the extent 
to which Pettit seems overly optimistic about our current social and speech conditions comes when 
he describes the role of the “economy of esteem,” in disciplining speech (that is, in constraining 
the sorts of speech people are likely to engage in, given their interest in personal esteem). The idea 
is that speech – even problematic speech – should be protected and that, in most cases, individuals’ 
desires for respect and esteem will constrain what they actually say. On this, he writes:   
“This economy will not work… in the presence of widespread bias or 
bigotry, of course, or within an asocial ghetto like the community of 
thieves. But in more common, less noxious environments, and certainly in 
an environment where virtue applies, it can impose a useful discipline on 
how people exercise the opportunities given them by the protection of 
speech, guarding against the wayward abuse of those opportunities” (Pettit 
2018, 77).  
Despite his acknowledgement that widespread bigotry can corrupt the sort of free speech system 
he describes, Pettit does not seem to think our actual speech circumstances are like this; on page 
76, for example, he references the existence of a “bigoted few” and suggests that intolerance is 
rare. He seems to take for granted that we live in a society (and occupy institutions, including 
academic institutions) in which a politics of esteem will be effective; in other words, he assumes 
that there is not “widespread bias or bigotry” and that “virtue applies” (Pettit 2018, 77). On account 





Perhaps I exist in a different social and political landscape than Pettit (and, I most certainly do), 
but I find it challenging to imagine a world in which bias and bigotry are rare, and in which such 
a politics of esteem would have the sort of safeguarding effect Pettit describes. To the contrary, 
from my vantage point as an LGBTQ+ woman, dealing with invisible disability, who was raised 
in a low-income area, the world I see and interact with on a daily basis, is rife with bias and overrun 
with bigots; bias and bigotry are certainly not in short supply.159 I would assume that most people 
who occupy positions of social disadvantage or marginalization would agree. So, while Pettit 
seems to assume that we are already operating under conditions without excessive bias and bigotry 
(i.e., that conditions of extreme and corruptive bias and bigotry are exceptions, not the rule), I 
believe, to the contrary, that we need to create those conditions: to rebuild our speech infrastructure 
in such a way that reduces the influence of bias and the growth of bigotry that can so easily corrupt 
it. Bias and bigotry are already part of our speech landscape. They inform our speech norms and 
practices. Acknowledging this reality, and trying to push back against it, is essential if we are to 
build a speech infrastructure that protects, fairly and equally, the speech of all.  
 Cracks in the Infrastructure, Or the Influence of Power and 
Oppression  
Before describing the limitations I see in Pettit’s view as he has presented it, let me reiterate what 
I find valuable about the view, and why I find it worth engaging with in the first place. In general, 
I find the argument in favor of a “free speech infrastructure” comprised of laws, policies, and 
supportive social norms to be the best model for ensuring that speech is truly protected, and is so 
for everyone.  Such a view allows for the flexibility of drawing not only on law and policy to create 
desired speech conditions, but also implicates social and institutional norms. As I will go on to 
 
159 I want to be clear here that I am not suggesting that Pettit (or other people who occupy more socially dominant 
perspectives) are “perfectly privileged,” and thereby unable to understand oppression in any way. Rather, my point 
here is both intersectional and rooted in a commitment to standpoint epistemology. Pettit is, in many ways, 
comparatively privileged and occupies a relatively dominant position in society. Taking standpoint seriously, this 
impacts how he will see and understand structures of power and oppression. Of course, the lens of intersectionality 
offers us the important reminder that power and privilege are not all-encompassing. It is possible that Pettit has some 
experience with oppression (e.g., with invisible disability, with immigration status – with any number of things I 
cannot and do not know about him and his experiences). This is irrelevant to the core claim, however, which has to 
do with relative degrees of power and privilege, and how intersectionally-different life experiences shape our 




show, this inclusion of norms as part of the essential infrastructure for protecting speech is 
particularly helpful when it comes to thinking about speech phenomena such as microaggressions, 
which we might want to constrain or restrict, but not by way of law or policy. In such cases, 
forming and maintaining the right norms will be crucial (e.g., for minimizing things like 
microaggressions and their corrosive impact). In addition to finding the infrastructure model 
promising, I also find value in Pettit’s articulation of the benefits that would arise when speech is 
sufficiently protected (that is, the status benefit, the enfranchising benefit, and the responsibility 
benefit). I agree with Pettit that, with the right kind of speech protective infrastructure in place, all 
of these benefits would be realized, and that they are valuable benefits worth pursuing. The 
attainment of these benefits provides additional reasons to ensure that speech is suitably protected. 
For all of these reasons, I find Pettit’s model to be a helpful starting place for thinking about 
protecting speech, particularly on university campuses.  
However, despite the promise of Pettit’s model, in what follows I will argue that it is limited in its 
current form. Specifically, analyses of power and oppression, and their influences on speech, must 
be brought to bear on Pettit’s account in order for it to achieve the ends and bring about the benefits 
that he proposes. In the remainder of this section, I will highlight how a lack of engagement with 
power and oppression causes Pettit to assume too much. In the following section, section 5.5, I 
will aim to build upon his view by situating it more squarely within the unjust realities of our 
current social and political context, structured as it is by imbalances in power and oppression.    
Before I suggest some adaptations to Pettit’s view which help better account for the influence of 
power and oppression (which I develop in section 5.4 below), let me first clarify the problematic 
assumptions that underlie Pettit’s lack of engagement with power and oppression while setting out 
his articulation of the positive benefits of a free speech infrastructure. Making these shortcomings 
explicit is significant for figuring out how to account for them when revising the account, and 
ultimately for informing how we can start moving toward a more just, more robustly supportive 
infrastructure that doesn’t suffer from the same limitations and problematic assumptions.  
Consider the first benefit of the speech protective infrastructure Pettit describes, namely, the status 
benefit. In describing it, Pettit contends that when a sufficient free speech infrastructure is in place, 




others in the system. As Pettit describes things, when speech is protected, everyone’s voice is fully 
their own and, “absent undue timidity,” they can “look others in the eye without fear or deference” 
and know that they are no one’s “lackey or pawn” (Pettit 2018, 74).  In such cases, he contends, 
“silence is typically going to be significant of approval” (Pettit 1994, 49). Of course, our actual 
(read: non-ideal) speech situation is not at all like this.160 In our actual, non-ideal speech contexts, 
structured by power and oppression, people are speaking across deeply engrained power 
differentials (e.g., raced, gendered, or classed power differentials), and oppressive social norms 
which train some people to speak to others from a position of deference (e.g., women are often 
socialized and expected to demonstrate deference to men), while other people are empowered to 
speak on others’ behalf. (See Alcoff 1991 on speaking for others across differences in power.) 
Moreover, routine slights, such as microaggressions, further degrade the equal status of some 
speakers. Many factors, informed by power and oppression, position speakers differently and 
unequally.  
A robustly supportive free speech infrastructure, aimed at justice, would take these facts into 
account and work to neutralize the perverse impacts that speaking across unjust power differentials 
can have. It is not enough to assume that with speech protective laws and policies in place, and the 
broad social desire to uphold them, everyone will necessarily be respected as equals in the domain 
of speech. More work is needed to bring about more just speech norms – ones which can respond 
to our present speech context, which situates some speakers as always already credible, while 
positioning others as lacking credibility (cf. Fricker 2007) or otherwise as untrustworthy. Many 
broad scale social changes would have to be implemented in order for all speakers to be in a 
position to meaningfully claim and receive the “equal respect of others” that Pettit contends is part 
in parcel with this protected status.  
Now consider Pettit’s second benefit, what he calls the enfranchising benefit.  Pettit contends that 
adequate speech protection allows people to effectively communicate their values, even by their 
 
160 Here, I am drawing on the distinction between ideal theory and non-ideal theory, where non-ideal theory takes as 
its starting point the actual, material conditions [of injustice] in which we find ourselves. For an overview of non-ideal 





silence.161 Under Pettit’s conceived free speech infrastructure there is a “presumption that when 
you do not speak out on some relevant matter… that you are happy with the way things are; [that] 
you are happy with the situation...” (Pettit 2018, 75; also see Pettit 1994). For this to be true, 
however, we need to be able to differentiate between willful and unwilful (read: compelled) 
silences – a point that Pettit does not consider. In other words, we need to have a way of 
determining when silence is not freely chosen or exercised, i.e., when it is coerced by social 
forces162, which can happen even when free speech is formally protected in the ways Pettit has in 
mind.  
Consider the following scenario.163 A female graduate student experiences an instance of sexual 
misconduct at the hands of her male doctoral supervisor. She is, in many ways, vulnerable vis-à-
vis her supervisor; he has the power, effectively, to make or break the career she has worked so 
hard to obtain. While she desperately wants justice for his sexual wrongdoing – and to avoid this 
happening again, to herself or anyone else – she fears the likely consequences of speaking up: she 
knows that she is less likely than he is to be believed164 (he is an esteemed professor after all!), she 
is likely to be accused of trying to ruin his reputation,165 and she may very well be made out to be 
a pariah within her department, or her discipline writ large, all the while never getting the justice 
 
161 It is worth noting that Pettit’s discussion of the enfranchising benefit in this 2018 chapter is an extension of the 
view he develops in a 1994 chapter, “Enfranchising Silence: An Argument for Freedom of Speech.” There he develops 
the idea that one important reason for protecting free speech is that doing so “enfranchises silence.” It allows for 
“silence itself to become a form of speech” (45). Pettit’s view has been critiqued and challenged by Rae Langton 
(2007), who has argued that free speech itself does not enfranchise silence.  
162 See Dotson (2011), where she describes the phenomenon of “testimonial smothering.” Dotson describes testimonial 
smothering as “the truncating of one’s own testimony in order to ensure that the testimony contains only content for 
which one’s audience demonstrates testimonial competence” (Dotson 2011, 244). In other words, when a marginalized 
speaker recognizes that the content of their speech is particularly risky, or likely to be met with incompetence that 
poses further risks, that speaker might engage in a sort of “coerced self-silencing” as a means of self-preservation. 
Clearly, in such cases, one’s silence is not an obvious indication of their values, or their approval of the status quo, as 
Pettit contends.  
163 This is a slightly modified version of an example I develop in Stewart (2019e).  
164 See Fricker (2007) for a helpful analysis of [gendered] credibility deflations.  
165 Manne’s (2018) concept of “himpathy” is relevant here. Manne describes himpathy as our socialized tendency to 
give undue credence to concerns about men’s reputations and wellbeing, often at the expense of women (e.g., their 





she desired in the first place. In other words, by speaking up, she could actually make things worse 
for herself, in an already difficult time. Knowing this compels her to silence herself – to smother 
her own testimony (cf. Dotson 2011). This silence certainly does not indicate her acceptance of 
the status quo; rather, her silence reflects the difficulty involved in speaking up against power 
when one is vulnerable.  
This sort of example (likely to register as familiar with far too many women graduate students) 
renders Pettit’s account of “silence as acceptance” problematic at best, and outright dangerous at 
worst. Assuming that silence is necessarily interpretable as an endorsement of the status quo fails 
to demonstrate robust awareness of or engagement with the systems of power and oppression that 
dictate our speech norms and shape our propensities toward silence (or, when the circumstances 
might render silence rational, or even necessary). Again, in an ideal and perfectly just speech 
infrastructure, without the influences of power and oppression, Pettit would likely be right – we 
could, in such contexts, understand silence as intentional, and as communicating acceptance or 
lack of dissent. People just would speak up when something was wrong. But that is not the 
infrastructure we currently operate within, despite speech being formally protected, and Pettit’s 
analysis needs to take that into account.  
Finally, consider the third benefit Pettit describes, the responsibility benefit. The idea is that under 
a speech protective infrastructure (that is, a situation in which speech is formally and informally 
protected), people can be held responsible for what they do (or do not) say. This is because, Pettit 
contends, in situations of protected speech (and where many other idealized conditions hold), 
people’s utterances convey attitudes in such a manner that “speakers can be assumed to hold 
genuinely to them” (Pettit 2018, 76). Consequently, Pettit contends, when people speak 
disagreeable or even abhorrent views, we can blame them, especially when they conform their 
attitudes to “the contours of power and popularity” (ibid.) or otherwise fail to speak against the 
dominant tide. You have to “be your own man or woman,” Pettit charges, “You have to speak for 
yourself” (ibid.). The idea here is that when we are free to speak as we please, we are responsible 
for not just speaking in accordance with popular opinion – we have a right, and a responsibility, to 




As with the first two benefits, I think such a view is complicated by thinking about the influence 
of power (e.g., how power influences speech, and what people can get away with saying) and 
oppression (e.g., that which makes it hard to speak out against the status quo). One thing to note 
is that, even if we can, in a formal sense, be held accountable for our speech, the extent to which 
people experience accountability for their words (and the impact of their words) is itself shaped 
by power. For example, Donald Trump, it turns out, can get away with making misogynistic, racist, 
and xenophobic comments, with little to no accountability. He can even get away with (in some 
sense) inciting an insurrection against the US government (Fandos 2021).166 But, this reality (that 
Trump seems to be held less responsible for his words than the average citizen) likely runs counter 
to our expectations about how responsibility for speech should be doled out. Intuitively, we likely 
think that the greater one’s (social or political) power, the greater responsibility one ought to have 
for their words and the impact of those words. Their words can, of course, have greater impact, 
given their larger platform and more sizeable audience and influence.167  
Even if we were all held equally accountable for our speech and the effects of our speech, the idea 
that we would truly be, in a deep sense, individually responsible for all of the content of our speech 
still seems misguided. In a society like ours, stratified by power and oppression, and rife with 
prejudice, bias, and stereotypes, there is abundant evidence that we are influenced by such 
prejudices, biases, and stereotypes held at the level of the social imagination (Fricker 2007). For 
example, there is some evidence that we are influenced by implicit biases that are socially informed 
(see Brownstein and Saul 2016a, 2016b; Agarwal 2018; Payne et. al 2018). Such biases are 
conveyed via – and also exacerbate – microaggressions.  
The core idea is that, while we might think it is possible, and permissible, to hold people 
accountable for their speech (and, the prejudices and biases that speech might reflect), we can 
never assume people’s thoughts, and the spoken manifestations of those thoughts, are entirely their 
 
166 I say “in some sense” since, as we all know, Trump was impeached (for the second time) for this, though he was 
not held accountable in the form of conviction and removal by the Senate.  
167 See Mackinnon (1987) on the ability of the powerful to have their words count for more. It might follow from this, 
at least intuitively, that the degree of responsibility and accountability for the speech of those with significant power 




own. When Pettit says, “you have to be your own man” (Pettit 2018, 76) meaning that you alone 
are responsible for the content of your speech, he isn’t adequately attending to the influences of 
power, oppression and related social forces, such as prejudicial stereotypes and implicit biases, 
that influence our cognition and, ultimately, our speech. In our currently imperfect speech context, 
structured by power and oppression, we cannot readily assume that speakers “genuinely hold” to 
the content of their utterances (or, their actions more generally, for that matter). In many cases, 
this assumption may be expressly false. In order to increase the extent to which we can properly 
attribute people’s speech to ideas they genuinely hold, we have to work to decrease the biases, 
stereotypes, and prejudices that pervade our social imagination, and consequently corrupt the 
content of our speech.  
With respect to all three benefits of protected speech, Pettit overestimates the extent to which they 
are readily realizable in a society like ours, which is structured and influenced by power and 
oppression.  
Before switching gears to my positive account of how we might build upon Pettit’s view to better 
account for the influences of power and oppression, I want to raise a few more critical points. 
Specifically, I want to highlight one further assumption in Pettit’s account, which, like the above, 
fails to account for the influences power and oppression have in shaping our speech contexts.  
Pettit contends that when people’s speech is sufficiently protected, viz., when they are formally 
free to say virtually anything they desire and are formally protected in doing so, there are still 
informal mechanisms that will ensure that certain sorts of particularly harmful or damaging speech 
do not regularly occur. Specifically, Pettit states that people will generally want to “stand well in 
their opinion” and ultimately to “avoid condemnation and shame” (Pettit 2018, 77). They will, he 
argues, operate under a sense of discipline imposed by “the economy of esteem” (cf. Brennan and 
Pettit 2004). What seems to be missing from Pettit’s argument, however, is an acknowledgement 
that power can corrupt one’s sense of esteem and integrity; that is, the pursuit of power can make 
it such that holding and expressing abhorrent views becomes perfectly compatible with the pursuit 
of esteem, instead of something that would hinder it. Furthermore, to the extent that those in power 
make certain abhorrent (e.g., racist, nationalist, xenophobic, homophobic, transphobic, etc.) views 




diminished, and the expected social condemnation is either absent, or ineffective. For instance, in 
an American context where those who wield the most social, political, and/or economic power 
hold racist views about immigrants and refugees coming to America, holding these views becomes 
not only more acceptable, but, in some cases, esteemed (e.g., such that people are celebrated, at 
least by those in power, to the extent that they express similar views). And expressing those views 
becomes absolutely shameless; to the extent that they are called out or condemned, those with the 
greatest power merely double down, increasing the oppressive discourse and its influence. Pettit’s 
assumption that the “economy of esteem” will generally prevent a deluge of socially and politically 
harmful speech fails, it seems, to account for the corruptive impact of power, status, fame, and the 
normalizing of oppressive attitudes.  
Of note, however, is that Pettit does not ignore the role of status and fame outright – he just 
overestimates their positive impact. He argues that the “best safeguard against the danger of an 
inappropriate orthodoxy gaining hold is… the economy of esteem.” In the academic context, for 
example, Pettit contends that academics won’t regularly express bigoted or patently false views 
because they will want to avoid “mockery” or harms to their status or credibility. More 
importantly, if they respect the “economy of esteem,” they “stand to earn the long-term reward of 
high esteem and celebrity status” (Pettit 2018, 79). Setting aside how disheartening it is to think 
that the only reason academics might have to avoid bigoted speech is their own self-interested 
pursuit of self-esteem or fame, it also seems objectively false in practice; some academics appear 
to engage in bigoted rhetoric precisely because it gains them popularity or some form of celebrity 
status. 
As indicated above in setting out Pettit’s view, I think he overestimates the ability (and desire) 
people have to regulate their own speech (e.g., he puts too much stock in the force of the “economy 
of esteem”). He also vastly underestimates the destructive impact of various sorts of harmful 
speech (e.g., by thinking it is rare and instrumentally useful for helping us identify the “bigots 
among us”). On account of both, Pettit explicitly states that we should be cautious about “how far 
restrictions should run” because, as he sees it, there is an instrumental value in having people voice 
bigoted and/or intolerant views, namely, that if bigots don’t speak their views just because they 




are (Pettit 2018, 76). To be frank, this is a sacrifice I am willing to make. What Pettit fails to 
consider here is that when we impose zero restrictions (in the form of law, policy, or norms) on 
bigoted speech, such speech can (and does) proliferate, and often quickly.  
Take for instance the mainstreaming of hateful rhetoric upon the election of the former U.S 
President, Donald Trump, which correlated with an overall rise in hate speech (Arthur 2019), and 
ultimately, a significant increase in hate crime and other violence (Edwards and Rushin 2018; 
Hatzipanagos 2018; Feinberg et. al 2019; Sakuma 2019). This is what example of the sort of thing 
that can happen when we normalize hateful and bigoted speech, or fail to set or uphold norms 
against it. Or, for another and more recent example at the time of my revising this paper (April 
2021): the rise in Anti-Asian rhetoric amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to initial 
reporting that what had become the COVID-19 pandemic originated in Wuhan, China, former 
president Trump immediately began to use phrases such as “China-virus” and “Kung-Flu” (see 
Viala-Gaudefoy & Lindaman 2020; Bruce 2020).168 You might think using these terms was some 
sort of rhetorical strategy for Trump, aimed at making the virus seem “exotic” and “Other,” and 
perhaps to push blame (and thus responsibility) elsewhere. However, his rhetoric, left unchecked 
and unchallenged, proliferated. Then, many of his followers (those in the public eye and beyond) 
began using this inflammatory and xenophobic language, the effect of which is to personify the 
virus and attach it to actual communities of people. As such, the anger and frustration that people 
are feeling in response to the personal, social, and economic impacts of the pandemic get 
(mis)directed at actual Asian people in our communities. Contrary to Pettit’s contention, such 
language does more than make evident who the bigots among us are. Rather, the use of such 
language led to tangible hate and violence (see Yam 2021). Moreover, it contributed to the creation 
of a social and political climate in which such hate and violence came to be viewed as natural, 
normal, inevitable.169  
 
168 This is honestly so stupid that I regret typing it into this chapter.  
169 I say “led” here because there is some evidence of causality. A recent study has linked Trump’s inflammatory 




This is a high price to pay for “knowing who the bigots are,” and certainly a price the targets of 
such bigotry should not have to pay. As the calls to #MakeRacistsAfraidAgain and #EndAsianHate 
illuminate,170 we might be better off not allowing hateful views and speech reflecting them to 
become normal – to proliferate into the mainstream, exacerbating an already-prejudiced social 
imagination (Fricker 2007) and more deeply entrenching explicit and implicit biases, which 
ultimately lead to harm for socially marginalized people. We might be better, alternatively, to 
sanction this speech, whether formally or by way of social norms, in order to better insulate 
ourselves from its corrosive effects. We need to invest in strengthening more just foundations for 
free speech, ones built on equality and respect, and eliminate those things which threaten the entire 
structure – speech that reflects hate and bigotry, however subtle.  
Though I have identified virtues of Pettit’s account (for example, his understanding of free speech 
as protected speech), and I find his infrastructure analogy particularly compelling and helpful, I 
have argued that he assumes far too much. Specifically, Pettit paints an overly positive view of our 
current speech situation, failing to adequately account for the impacts that power and oppression 
have on that situation. As such, his view reads as an overestimation of the extent to which our 
speech infrastructure is already just, or functioning properly; to the contrary, I find much to critique 
in our current speech norms and praxis, and the background social and political conditions that 
undergird them. Furthermore, while Pettit contends that certain benefits are conferred on speakers 
just in case their speech is protected (e.g., that they can anticipate being recognized and regarded 
as on equal footing; that their silences could be interpreted as conveying a lack of objection or 
otherwise acceptance with the status quo; and that all speakers can be seen as wholly responsible 
for the words they speak), I think more work is needed to create conditions that are more conducive 
to seeing these benefits – and truly protected speech – extended equally to all speakers, across 
differences in power and oppression. To make Pettit’s speech protective infrastructure do what he 
intends for it to do – secure the maximum about of free speech enjoyable equally by all – we must 
attend to the realities of our imperfect social and political realities, and how they shape speech 
norms and praxis. We must consider the role that power and oppression play in impacting speech 
 




and communication, even if and when it is formally protected. And we must imagine how we can 
go about neutralizing the negative effects power and oppression can have on justice and fairness 
in the domain of speech.  
In what follows, I will build upon the strengths of Pettit’s account of free speech as protected 
speech and aim to give it the nuance necessary to achieve his desired aim, namely, modelling a 
system that is capable of conferring equal opportunities for speech, up to the maximal amount 
consistent with what is “co-exercisable and co-enjoyable for all.” In this way, the basic framework 
Pettit offers can be tailored to take account of, and be responsive to, the actual, imperfect 
conditions in which we find ourselves.  
 Road Work: Creating the Infrastructure We Need to Secure Free 
Speech for All  
I have suggested above that Pettit overestimates the extent to which our current speech situation is 
just, and to which it confers the benefits of protected speech equally to all speakers. In this section, 
I will argue that a suitably protective free speech infrastructure demands more work that Pettit 
assumes; we need to overhaul the broken roads of racism, misogyny, homophobia, and 
transphobia, correct for imbalances that benefit some people’s access and relative ease of moving 
about the current speech infrastructure, and ultimately re-vamp our protective speech infrastructure 
to ensure that all people indeed benefit from those protections equally. My question then is how 
do we create the protective infrastructure conditions that better account for the impacts of power 
and oppression, and which are better suited to ensure that the protections afforded by formal speech 
protections and the broader infrastructure can apply more equally for all, specifically all members 
of our campus contexts? Though Pettit is somewhat vague on this point (e.g., what specific norms 
are needed), I will suggest that we need both negative norms against certain sorts of speech, such 
as microaggressions, as well as positive norms, aimed at offsetting the harms of microaggressions 
or reducing them in practice, and generally creating spaces that can foster a meaningful sense of 
inclusion and belonging within our campus contexts. The need for such norms – and their relation 
to a robust speech protective infrastructure – only become obvious when we attend to power and 
oppression and their impacts on speech. This is precisely how I intend to build upon Pettit’s 




First, as noted in section 5.3 above, what Pettit’s account is most clearly lacking is an analysis of 
the role of power and systems of oppression on speech, and as a result, his view does not put any 
protective infrastructure in place to correct for the imbalances and injustices that power and 
oppression create in the domain of speech. Power – having to do with the relational dimensions of 
our social and political lives, which organize us in relation to one another, and dictate who is more 
effectively able to exert control over themselves and others171 – infuses our uses of language, 
determining not only who gets to speak, but also how, when, and with what force. Power 
(particularly social and political power) has a strong influence on credibility, that is, how likely 
someone is to be taken as authoritative when they speak, and to have their testimony afforded 
appropriate weight. 172  Power is also relevant to whether speech receives proper uptake. For 
example, Quill Kukla (2014) has argued that sometimes power can affect the way a speech act 
comes off. They describe how “in some circumstances, when a woman deploys standard discursive 
conventions in order to produce a speech act with a specific performative force, her utterance can 
turn out, in virtue of its uptake, to have a quite different force ‒ a less empowering force ‒ than it 
would have if performed by a man” (Kukla 2012, 440). We can extend Kukla’s idea here on 
intersectional grounds as well: for example, we might think a Black woman might be even less 
likely to receive appropriate uptake relative to a white woman. The idea is that one’s relative social 
power is directly connected to their likelihood of receiving proper uptake when they speak.  
Systems of structural and systemic oppression also have bearing on how individuals and groups 
are (more or less) able to move about the dominant speech infrastructure. Oppression is generally 
understood to refer to "the existence of unequal and unjust institutional constraints,” where these 
constraints involve harm to some social group and simultaneously benefit another social group 
(Cudd 2006, 25, 52; Frye 1983; also see introduction and chapter 1 of this thesis). Such 
institutionally structured constraints can include "legal rights, obligations and burdens, 
stereotypical expectations, wealth, income, social status, conventions, norms, and practices" (Cudd 
2006, 50). Iris Marion Young (1990) describes oppression as “structural phenomena that 
 
171 See, for example, Foucault (1979); Allen (1998).  
172 See Fricker (2007); also see Stewart (2019e) for a discussion of the role of gendered power in credibility economies, 




immobilize or diminish a group” (1990, 42). Oppressive phenomena are structural insofar as they 
are not the result of a few people’s choices or policies; rather, their causes are embedded in 
unquestioned norms, habits, symbols, and policies, and in unquestioned assumptions underlying 
institutional rules and of often ordinary, well-meaning people. 173  Oppressive phenomena are 
systemic insofar as an oppressed group need not have a correlate oppressing group. In other words, 
oppression need not always fit the paradigm of conscious and intentional oppression of one group 
by another, but rather can happen in far more nefarious, and at times less than obvious, ways.  
Speech and language are conventions that can fall prey to the forces of oppression, such that some 
people benefit disproportionately from our collective norms around speech and language use, 
while others lose out, or worse yet, experience harm as a result of them. Such relative benefits and 
burdens of our systems of speech and language can result from well-intentioned people, acting in 
good faith, but still reproducing already oppressive norms, (e.g., Fricker 2007’s articulation of 
testimonial injustice, or microaggressions, which will be discussed below).  
One would be right to question the extent to which free speech infrastructure, generally developed 
and built by those who already hold positions of power (e.g., in law, policy, university 
administration, and the like), might function to maintain the status quo – to not upset the current 
balance of power, which benefits those who already hold power. And people who tend to be on 
the losing end of the current systems of power and oppression have every right to question if there 
might be a better way of designing the infrastructure that they too must navigate. As Lynne Tirell 
(1998, 139) aptly puts it: “Once we realize that our linguistic categories reflect and are reflected 
by our social categories, and once we see that our discursive practices are normative, it is a short 
step to see language as an arena of political struggle.” These connections, namely, those between 
our social systems (infused with power and oppression as they are) and our discursive practices, 
are ones Pettit fails to recognize and interrogate.  
 





And yet, acknowledging and understanding the role that power and oppression play in our speech 
norms and discursive practices is integral to getting our protective speech infrastructure right. For 
example, Pettit himself is clear about the indispensability of supportive norms in upholding the 
speech infrastructure 174 , but fails to consider how oppressive social norms can corrode the 
infrastructure, and be continuously reproduced and perpetuated by it. Furthermore, in failing to 
account for the significance of power and oppression on our speech norms and praxis, Pettit is not 
in a position to analyze all of the (positive) supportive norms that would help offset the harmful 
impacts of power and oppression (e.g., those which help us more appropriately respond to the 
testimony of the oppressed, such as moral deference (Thomas 1983), or loving attention (Frye 
1983). When we realize that our speech norms are corrupted by power and oppression, we can 
think about the full range of supportive norms that might be necessary to offset that damage.  
 Furthermore, the attitudinal norms that Pettit argues are needed to support the speech 
infrastructure are impacted by speech itself. In other words, speech and social attitudes have a 
bidirectional relationship. If we allow for unlimited and unchecked corrosive speech (i.e., racist 
speech, sexist speech, transphobic speech), our social attitudes will undoubtedly continue to be 
impacted by them, worsening things like prejudicial stereotypes, implicit biases and negative 
cognitive associations. Implicit biases and negative cognitive associations then, in turn, have an 
impact on our speech norms and practices (Fricker 2007; Kukla 2012). There is, then, a vicious 
cycle between corrosive speech and corrosive attitudes and norms. The more corrosive speech 
there is, the worse the norms that support the infrastructure. And the same people keep losing.  
For this reason, we should be attentive to the relationship between speech norms on the one hand 
(as dictated by and encoded in our free speech infrastructure), and the social attitudes we create, 
perpetuate, or amplify on the other. Consequently, we need to create a free speech infrastructure 
that takes this bi-directional relationship seriously and works to combat the negative social 
attitudes and biases that corrupt speech norms and praxis. We can do so by trying to control for 
 
174 He says: “Public law may not be enough on its own… [it needs to be] rooted in norms that are supported 




the amount of biased and prejudicial speech that reifies these social attitudes and biases. Again, to 
the extent that these create a vicious cycle, it is necessarily to intervene wherever we can.   
To make what I have said more concrete, let’s return to microaggressions. As noted above, 
attempts to reduce or minimize microaggressions has been criticized as a violation of free speech. 
Such charges have been heightened on university campuses. However, contra the critics, I contend 
that not only are attempts to reduce microaggressions compatible with free speech (that is, they 
are not violations of academic freedom or free speech as the critics contend), rather they are 
essential parts of a well-functioning speech-protective infrastructure, one aimed at justice.  
Reducing microaggressions and neutralizing their harmful impacts on speech norms and 
communities are supportive norms that can make our speech infrastructure – on campus and 
beyond – more equitable and fair.  
As noted in earlier discussions of microaggressions throughout this thesis, the force of them lies 
in their coded messaging – they can send messages to their targets that they are inferior, “Other,” 
unwelcome, unrecognized, or otherwise lesser than, and they do so on the basis of biases or 
prejudices (implicit or explicit) about some facet of the target’s marginalized identity. While the 
critics of microaggression theory tend to mistakenly discuss microaggressions in isolation, as if 
they occur as one-offs, scholars who theorize about microaggressions know that they are harmful 
precisely because they are common, routine, and reoccurring (Rini 2021). In other words, the 
coded messages of microaggressions compound over time, ultimately causing a variety of harms 
to the target (Lombrozo 2017; Mallon and Evans 2019).  
Compiled overtime, microaggressions can make their targets more hesitant to speak up, and less 
likely to be taken seriously when they do (see discussions in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis). For 
the target(s), repeated microaggressions can degrade their self-confidence or self-trust. For 
everyone else around, repeated microaggressions reinforce stereotypes and biases about people of 
marginalized identities, contributing to negative perceptions and attitudes about them, which again 
can be implicit or explicit (see Runyowa 2015 for an overview of these consequences, particularly 
as they manifest on campuses; also see Williams 2017). Because repeated microaggressions have 




sorts of speech are considered normal and acceptable), microaggressions can certainly impact the 
speech norms, and the broader speech protective infrastructure, which Pettit describes.  
Recall, I have argued above that the relationship between speech, and the supportive norms 
required to prop up a speech protective infrastructure, is bi-directional: what we say impacts our 
social norms and attitudes; social norms and attitudes create the landscape in which we speak, what 
is said, and ultimately the effects our speech has.175 Insofar as pervasive microaggressions have 
the capacity to degrade the status of some people as speakers (or indeed, as humans), there is good 
reason to consider them when imagining what we want our speech protective infrastructure to look 
like, and what sorts of policies and norms we think it ought to include. 
Within academic contexts, it is imperative to consider how microaggressions can make certain 
(already vulnerable) students and professors less likely to speak (and/or to be taken less seriously 
when they do so), a more just speech infrastructure would take this into account, finding ways to 
effectively minimize and neutralize microaggressive speech within our campus contexts. Doing 
so, I contend, will begin to have a reparative impact on the social norms and attitudes that 
ultimately harm marginalized people and ultimately create conditions where marginalized people 
are better able to speak and be heard. When our speech protective infrastructure creates conditions 
for reducing or neutralizing microaggressions, it helps bring us closer to arriving at the means for 
achieving the maximal free speech “co-exercisable and co-enjoyable” for all.176  
Though I will not venture to give a comprehensive account of how a situation [mostly] free of 
microaggressions can be achieved, it is worth noting a few things that, while requiring fairly 
minimal effort, can help minimize microaggressions that often occur in academic settings, or help 
offset the harms that occur when they do. Some fairly straightforward things to normalize include 
 
175 For a helpful illumination of how this works, see McGowan (2009; 2019). McGowan explains that the exercitive 
function of speech is to enact permissibility facts (i.e., to set the background conditions and norms for speech and 
beyond). This determines what sort of speech is permissible or impermissible in a given context.  
176 I do not mean to suggest that the reduction of microaggressions and the neutralizing of their corrosive consequences 
is the only work that needs to be done to create a fully just speech protective infrastructure. To the contrary, I think 
other things are relevant, too. However, microaggressions are an important focus precisely because they are often seen 
as a normal and acceptable part of speech (e.g., relative to slurs or hate speech) and they are, as I discussed earlier in 




having it be routine and expected for everyone to indicate their pronouns (e.g., on their email 
signature or Zoom profile name, or when they are being introduced for a talk).  Having everyone 
indicate their pronouns in this way normalizes this practice, so that it is not only trans and 
nonbinary folks needing to do so (and thus outing themselves). Doing so also helps prevent 
(unintentional) instances of mispronouncing or misgendering. We can also consider the 
importance of being intentional about calling on non-white students and students who are not men 
in classroom spaces, talks, etc. Being intentional about bringing people into the discussion can 
help offset what too often happens – these students never being called on, and never feeling as if 
they have a voice in academic spaces. These sorts of examples are about creating positive norms 
that can help offset some frequent microaggressions that occur on university campuses.   
Another important, albeit fairly easy, thing to do is to consider the optics of physical spaces on our 
campuses. For example, if the philosophy lounge only has photos of older white male philosophers, 
we can alter the space to include photos of non-white philosophers, women philosophers, and 
queer or trans philosophers. Sometimes adapting the space aesthetically can influence people’s 
ability to feel, and to actually be, included. A similar possibility is to work on diversifying syllabi, 
so diverse or marginalized students do not receive reading lists comprised of works written 
exclusively by white men of European descent. Including a diversity of identities, voices, and 
perspectives is one way of signaling an openness to different experiences and ideas in the 
classroom (and also, that people other than white men of European descent can (and do!) write 
philosophy). Larger scale institutional changes might sometimes be necessary, as well. These 
might include renaming buildings that were originally named in honor of white supremacist or 
colonial figures, changing mascots that reflect stereotypical caricatures (e.g., of Indigenous 
peoples), or removing statues celebrating confederate soldiers. Insofar as our very physical 
environments can be microaggressive (i.e., environmental microaggressions), it is important to 
take seriously the impact that our built environments can have on our speech communities and 
learning atmospheres, and who is likely to feel included or excluded within them.  
In terms of norm setting, it is important to establish a community in which people are open to 
receiving feedback and constructive criticism when they have committed a microaggression (e.g., 




community members are willing to provide such feedback compassionately (e.g., where the end 
goal is helping each other learn, grow, and do better). An environment in which microaggressions 
are pervasive, yet nobody ever calls them out, is one that ultimately worsens corrosive speech 
norms and the stereotypes and biases which undergird them. Cultivating norms of disruption (e.g., 
of disrupting problematic speech and working to alter unhealthy speech norms) is imperative for 
creating an environment aimed at reducing the prevalence of microaggressions, and thereby 
working toward a more inclusive and just speech infrastructure – one in which all students and 
faculty feel able to speak and be heard on equal terms.  
Many “micro” things can be done to make spaces feel more welcoming and inclusive, and given 
the minimal effort necessary to implement such changes in exchange for a potentially significant 
impact, they are worthwhile investment in time and energy.  
In the previous section, I suggested that the three benefits Pettit assumes will arise when speech is 
protected are unlikely to manifest in a society like ours, which is stratified by unjust power 
imbalances and entrenched social oppression, both of which inform our speech norms and praxis. 
Ensuring that the benefits Pettit describes (i.e., the status benefit, the enfranchising benefit, and 
the responsibility benefit) will obtain for all members of a speech community is only possible 
when we are able to offset some of the corrosive impacts that power and oppression have on 
speech. Efforts to reduce microaggressions, I contend, can help us go some way toward 
neutralizing the effects of power and oppression on our speech norms, helping us come closer to 
realizing these three benefits, for all members of our speech communities. 
With respect to the status benefit – the idea that when speech is protected everyone has equal status 
as a speaker – the reduction of microaggressions in our classrooms and broader campus 
communities can help to reduce biases and stigma targeted at those who are typically on the 
receiving end of microaggressive speech, namely, people with one or more structurally 
marginalized identity. In this regard, it can help assure that they are in fact seen as having equal 
status as speakers, or it at least prevents their speaker status from being further degraded or 
undermined. With respect to the enfranchising benefit – the idea that when speech is protected 
silence is informative – the reduction of microaggressions can help create climates where people 




alleviate some of the reasons that people self-silence (instances of silence which do not indicate, 
as Pettit contends, their acceptance of or agreement with the status quo). So, a reduction in 
microaggressions (and the stereotypes and biases they exacerbate) can help bring us closer to a 
context in which silence is informative in the ways Pettit imagines, because there won’t be as much 
coerced self-silencing (or, what Dotson 2011 calls “testimonial smothering”). With respect the 
responsibility benefit – the idea that when speech is protected we can hold people responsible for 
the content of their speech – the reduction of microaggressions in our classroom environments and 
larger campus cultures can bring us closer to a situation in which people speak in ways that better 
reflect their actual views, and are at least less impacted by prejudicial stereotypes, implicit biases, 
and the like. This is because, as has been discussed, microaggressions function to reinforce 
stereotypes and biases in the minds of the microaggressor, the microaggressed, and bystanders 
alike. Reducing microaggressions, then, plays a role in decreasing prejudicial stereotypes and 
biases, and their influence on what people think, believe, and communicate. When this is the case, 
we move closer to a scenario like Pettit describes, namely, one in which people’s speech reflects 
their genuinely held values or beliefs, which we can then fairly hold them account for. In other 
words, when microaggressions are less pervasive and impactful in our speech communities, we 
get closer to a situation in which we can meaningfully attribute people’s words to them (e.g., as 
their own) and come closer to (appropriately) holding people responsible for the content of their 
speech.  
My claim here is that despite widespread panic around microaggression awareness trainings and 
efforts to reduce microaggressions on university campuses (e.g., Lilienfeld 2017; Haidt 2017) such 
efforts do not constitute an undue violation of free speech or of the protection of free speech. To 
the contrary, efforts to reduce microaggressions on our campuses can play an important role in 
achieving greater free speech and creating speech contexts in which all speakers can receive the 
benefits that the protection of free speech is thought to offer. Moreover, the efforts required to 
reduce many microaggressions are not particularly onerous, again demonstrating that such efforts 





Let’s revisit one example provided above. One tangible thing we can do to reduce 
microaggressions against our queer, trans, and non-binary students and campus community 
members is to normalize widespread sharing of gender pronouns. Doing so helps us to avoid 
singling out such students (e.g., if they are the only ones who must regularly indicate their 
pronouns), it helps create a community in which indicating your pronouns (and using pronouns 
outside the gender binary is normal), and helps to prevent the (often unintended) microaggression 
of mispronouning others. Establishing such a positive norm – one in which it is standard practice 
to indicate one’s pronouns at community events on or in classroom spaces – is not a violation of 
anyone’s free speech. To the contrary, it is one norm that can help create better, and more just, 
speech contexts – one in which all speakers feel respected and included.  
While implementing and adapting to such norms might constitute an uncomfortable shift for some 
people away from the status quo to which they are accustomed (i.e., a speech infrastructure created 
and maintained by those who already occupy positions of social, political, and/or institutional 
power), making adjustments like these is a necessary step to achieving Pettit’s core aim, namely, 
the creation of a speech infrastructure that protects speech equally for all, up to the maximum 
amount compatible with realizing equal protections for others. Thinking about the norms we 
cultivate, and whether they positively or negatively impact community members’ abilities to speak 
and be heard, is an important part of building a solid, and fair, speech infrastructure.  
 Possible Objections 
Before concluding, I would like to consider a few objections to my view and offer responses to 
each.  
I have argued that we need a speech protective infrastructure on university campuses which 
adequately accounts for power and oppression. This includes, I have argued, the implementation 
of supportive norms aimed at minimizing microaggressions and neutralizing the harms they bring 
about. I have offered a few suggestions about possible norms that could be implemented in the 
interest of doing so. However, one might argue that this is superfluous – that we don’t need to 




e.g., in the face of persistent microaggressions, or otherwise in response to bias, bigotry, or hate.177 
In other words, one might object that instead of working to implement norms to reduce 
microaggressions, we ought to instead introduce and support a norm of speaking back to counter 
such speech.  
First, I want to note that, despite my best efforts, I still find it generally unclear what the proponents 
of “speaking back” think this prescription for “more speech” entails. Are targets of 
microaggressions or other forms of hateful speech supposed to respond directly to what was said 
(e.g., to defend themselves against particular microaggressions and to messages they convey, for 
example)? Or, are they supposed to make a rational argument for their equality, or for why such 
microaggressions are problematic in harmful? Or, does shouting back an equally offensive remark 
count as legitimate speaking back? One might be “free” to do this, but it certainly doesn’t seem 
productive, especially in a campus context. Without clear direction for the target of hateful rhetoric 
as to what should be done with their abstract right to speak back in the face of microaggressions 
or hate, the prescription to simply speak back feels quite obtuse.  
Moreover, this vagueness aside, the prescription to respond to microaggressions and other forms 
of hateful speech by “speaking back” is most problematic because it puts the burden of response 
on the targeted person – the person who has been harmed – to attempt to rectify that harm or 
otherwise counter it. This, I believe, puts the burden in the wrong place. By analogy with physical 
harm, we would never prescribe “punching back” as a moral rule for someone who has been 
physically assaulted (at least, I wouldn’t think so, and not without other protections or means for 
recourse in place). And this prescription fails to account for the very same power imbalances and 
facts about structural oppression that Pettit fails to consider: as it stands, with our current speech 
infrastructure and the norms it ultimately functions to reify, not all speakers are in fact on equal 
footing. Furthermore, Laura Beth Nielson has demonstrated that this “speaking back” prescription 
is also empirically untenable: empirically speaking, targets of racist speech do not regularly 
engage in counter speech (Nielson 2012, 155-156). For many reasons (e.g., fearing for one’s 
 





safety, thinking the speaker is ignorant and not worth engaging), Nielson reports that targets of 
such speech are in fact most likely to try to ignore it, or try to leave the situation, though, ignoring 
it does not imply that harm has not occurred, or that whatever hateful speech was exchanged has 
not been internalized by the target. The prescription of more speech, or what has been called 
‘speaking back,’ simply won’t work without a supportive speech infrastructure that is attentive to 
power and oppression, that corrects for systemic credibility imbalances, and which ensures people 
aren’t compelled to smother their own testimony in the face of harmful speech. We do not currently 
operate within such an infrastructure. Even if we did operate in a perfectly just speech 
infrastructure, such that speaking back and being heard was possible, it might still be too heavy a 
burden to place upon a person being targeted with hateful rhetoric. The burden is more 
appropriately placed on the collective. This is why I have advocated for the joint project of forming 
and supporting norms of speech justice, e.g., norms aimed at reducing microaggressions in our 
campus contexts.  
A different objection might be raised against my broader approach, namely, an approach which is 
aimed at justice in the domain of speech (e.g., by way of reducing microaggressions), and which 
draws on defenses of free speech and the reasons we have for valuing free speech as a means of 
achieving it. An objector might point out here that using defenses of free speech to ultimately argue 
for a reduction in certain types of speech, such as microaggressions, is suspect, and especially 
when one considers the way these arguments tend to be mobilized in the opposite direction (e.g., 
in defense of those who believe they have a right, rooted in freedom of speech, to commit 
microaggressions).  
This objection can take two different forms: first, that even with trying to meet the “speech 
advocates on their own terms,” they will not be convinced because we have fundamentally 
different starting points (i.e., they might genuinely believe they are superior and that their speech 
ought to be disproportionately valued and protected, etc.)178; second, one might argue that there is 
a better route for arguing in defense of the sort of speech restrictions and norm changes that I am 
interested in, which doesn’t rely on using the advocates’ pro-free speech arguments at all.  
 




The first worry is that even though I am using language and arguments that will resonate with 
many pro-free speech thinkers (e.g., my argument is ultimately a defense of free speech, on a 
broader scale), some such thinkers are unlikely to be compelled by my argument, because they 
might not believe that certain people are in fact equally positioned speakers, worthy of equal 
respect as such (i.e., those with significant power might not recognize marginalized people as 
legitimate equals in the domain of speech or otherwise). (Note: I do not think Pettit falls in this 
camp, though other free speech absolutists might). I don’t have much to say to this, other than 
biting the bullet: the objector would be correct that I am unlikely to convince such a person of the 
need to create more robustly inclusive speech norms (e.g., those aimed at minimizing 
microaggressions). However, the argument is nevertheless worth making, because there are a lot 
of middle-ground people who could be convinced, who might, for example, be compelled-but-not-
totally-convinced-by the free speech advocates’ arguments, who might similarly be compelled by 
what I have said here, and throughout this thesis. In other words, my argument might reach people 
on the fence about the free-speech debates or debates around microaggressions more generally, 
who can be convinced, even if it cannot penetrate the minds of the bigots. I concede this.  
Second, one might argue that it is more convincing to argue in defense of the sort of speech 
restrictions that I have in mind without touching the speech advocates’ arguments at all. In Just 
Words, Mary Kate McGowan (2019, 163) has made this very argument. She contends that there 
are two routes for argumentation about the restriction of certain forms of harmful speech: the one 
I have taken here (to use and extend the arguments of the free speech advocates), and the one she 
prefers (what she calls the “parity argument”). The first route (the one I have taken) involves 
drawing on the values of free speech itself and making arguments based in those values. The 
alternative argumentative strategy is to make a “parity argument” (the route McGowan prefers). 
This second route involves finding an uncontroversially regulable category of speech, specifying 
precisely what the justification for that regulation is, and then arguing that a particular utterance 
or category of speech is regulable for the same reasons (McGowan 2019, 164). In other words, this 
argument draws on the imperative to treat like cases alike.  
McGowan gives an argument for why she prefers the second argumentative route, which, for lack 




she in fact proves the superiority of this particular argumentative move, I don’t think she (or I) 
actually need to. Rather, instead of showing which argument is “best,” insofar as they arrive us at 
the same conclusion (namely, a justification for certain sorts of regulations of or norms against the 
proliferation of harmful speech), then why not make both arguments? In other words, we can use 
all of the argumentative tools we have; after all, two strong arguments in favour of the desired 
conclusion is better than one!  
Simply put, I am not willing to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” when it comes to free 
speech arguments, even if I do think they are at times made from a disingenuous place (see, for 
example, Malik 2019 for a discussion of disingenuous claims of “censorship” and how they harm 
minorities). There has been a long tradition of insightful theoretical work on the value of free 
speech and I think it is a meaningful exercise to engage that work, see how it can be extended, and 
apply it to the cases of our contemporary concern. And, as noted above, doing so might have the 
added value of helping to shrink the apparent ideological divide in our fragmented and polarized 
intellectual and political landscape, and perhaps of being more convincing to those who already 
accept arguments for the value of free speech and are strongly committed to them. These possible 
advantages aside, I contend that there is room in our theoretical landscape for both sorts of 
arguments, and as people concerned with microaggressions and other forms of harmful speech, 
our cause is strengthened by making both.  
 Concluding Remarks  
In the proceeding sections, I have described an account of freedom of speech which draws on a 
metaphor of infrastructure to show how different elements (law, policies, and norms) come 
together to create a system that protects free speech, and, in so doing, confers a series of benefits 
upon speakers within that system (Pettit 2018). Though I think this approach is compelling (e.g., 
the idea that speech protection demands the use of law, policies, and social norms), I have pointed 
out weaknesses of the view as it has been formulated and advanced by Philip Pettit. Most notably, 
I have suggested that Pettit has mischaracterized our speech situation, failing to acknowledge the 




In challenging the underlying assumptions at work in Pettit’s view, I have sought to expand how 
we ought to think about the creation of a speech protective infrastructure, so as to make it more 
just and more equitable for all speakers. In attempting to neutralize the impacts of power and 
oppression on our speech landscape, we venture to create more equal opportunities for socially, 
politically, or institutionally vulnerable speakers to speak and be heard – or to at least start moving 
us in that direction. In order to create the free speech protective infrastructure we really need – 
indeed, the free speech infrastructure Philip Pettit seems to think we already have – we need to 
deal with the bias and bigotry that pervade our speech landscape. One way to move in this direction 
(though I do not contend that it is the only way) is to work to reduce the prevalence and impact of 
microaggressions, acts which further corrode the status of marginalized speakers and reinforce 
inequities in our speech landscape. Within the context of university campuses, efforts to reduce 
microaggressions are essential to making sure vulnerable students, staff, and faculty members are 
meaningfully – and not just superficially – included and, importantly, that the free speech 
infrastructure protects them, too.  
What I hope to have provided is an argument in favor of thinking more broadly about the 
background conditions for speech on university campuses, and at least some of the norms that 
must be cultivated to make speech conditions fairer for all within them. What I have not given you 
is a complete story about how to achieve this, that is, how to implement all of the right policies 
and supportive norms necessary to make it happen.179 On that note, however, it is worth revisiting 
the campus speech codes mentioned at the paper’s opening. I find it most appropriate to focus on 
my own institution, so I will consider Western University’s policy specifically.  
Recall, in August 2018, Ontario Premier Doug Ford ordered all Ontario colleges and universities 
to design and implement campus free speech codes, up to a standard established by his office, or 
else risk losing much needed provincial funding. Naturally, universities (including my own 
 
179 In fairness to myself, Pettit doesn’t really do this either. Rather, he notes that his “co-exercisable and co-enjoyable 
requirement” could lead us to “argue for other, more surprising regulations” (Pettit 2018, 67). He states that on his 
view, for example, the framework he has given would argue against allowing the sort of anonymous commercial and 
political speech that currently dominates social media, but he does not personally offer a policy suggestion for how to 




institution, Western University) were compelled to respond, and quickly. At Western, Ford’s call 
was responded to via the formation of an ad hoc ‘free expression’ committee, assembled by the 
provost and chaired by the Arts and Humanities Dean. Notably, the committee was not comprised 
of a representative sample of the most vulnerable or socially marginalized people on Western’s 
campus. Consequently, I believe, the resultant policy does the very thing I expressed concern about 
above: creates a policy that (even if implicitly) protects the status quo, possibly at the expense of 
more marginalized campus community members.  
Here is a stark example. The policy states that: “the University recognizes that the legitimate 
exercise of free expression has the potential to shock, anger, intimidate, exclude and contribute to 
the marginalization of University community members. It can also make it difficult for some people 
or groups to exercise their own freedom of expression” (Western University 2018, emphasis 
added). I think these words are telling for two reasons. First, the committee recognizes that 
unrestrained speech can (and likely will) result in harmful consequences to marginalized students, 
including intimidation, exclusion, and further marginalization. When “marginalization” is 
understood as a “face of oppression” (that is, a mechanism of oppression or a way that oppression 
manifests, cf. Young 1990), openly suggesting that it is permissible to further marginalize students 
seems particularly problematic, coming from an institution charged with serving all of its students 
equally, and which is, at least superficially, committed to the values of diversity, equity, and 
inclusion. Second, the committee recognizes that one of the consequences of unrestrained free 
speech for some is the loss of free speech for others. The ad hoc committee is willing to accept 
this tradeoff. I am not. There has to be a better way to strike a balance: to create fair speech 
conditions for all. Our institutions must be committed to finding it.  
In closing, I leave you with the following questions: What would our campus speech codes look 
like if we took the arguments above seriously, and we attempted to use them as the blueprint for a 
more just and equally protective speech infrastructure? What explicit policies would be 
implemented? What norms would we work to put into place? What norms would we begin to 
challenge? What sorts of speech would we welcome? What sorts of speech would we start to resist? 




our campus community, and not just those with greater power? How do we start to correct for the 
corrosive influence of power and oppression on our speech norms?  
I hope we figure this out. The debate feels more contentious than ever, and some of our most 
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VI.I. Recap: What This Dissertation Has Accomplished  
This dissertation has presented a collection of integrated articles which, taken together, aim to offer 
a robust philosophical picture of the phenomenon of microaggressions. Throughout the 
dissertation, I have ventured to make good on three distinct aims. These three aims are conceptual, 
epistemological, and moral. In these concluding remarks, I will first reflect on the ways in which 
I have made progress on each of these aims in the dissertation. I will then mention some avenues 
for future development of my research on microaggressions. 
In putting together this dissertation, I aimed to shed light on the following issues: how we ought 
to understand microaggressions conceptually; what links together diverse comments and actions 
as instances of the same thing; how we might defend the study of microaggression in the face of 
intense skepticism about their seriousness; how we should categorize different types of 
microaggressions; how we might understand the impacts of microaggressions for those on the 
receiving end; and finally, how microaggressions influence and shape the relationships of 
marginalized people to institutions such as medicine and academia. Overall, my goal was to offer 
a robust philosophical analysis that could help strengthen the case that microaggressions, with their 
ability to impact our social and political lives in subtle but significant ways, are worthy of our 
moral attention.  
I believe I have responded to these issues and met these goals in a number of ways. Let me take 
each of my primary aims – the conceptual aim, the epistemological aim, and the moral aim – in 
turn, to reflect on the ways I have made good on each.  
First, as I noted in the introduction to the thesis, the conceptual aim of the dissertation was to make 
progress toward an understanding of what microaggressions are, and how we should understand 
and categorize them. As I noted in chapter 2, philosophers had not yet made use of their unique 
training and skills in analyzing concepts to attempt to clarify what microaggressions are, or how 
we should understand them. Given growing criticism and skepticism about the microaggression 




concerns about the microaggression concept, which are generated by the difficulty involved in 
arriving a precise definition of it. In response, chapter 2 makes clear that philosophers have many 
ways of making sense of concepts that resist fixed definition, including the one I opt for, namely, 
a family resemblance approach.  
A central conceptual question driving my investigation in chapter 2 was the following: “What 
unifies the seemingly vast instances of what we call ‘microaggression’ together into one coherent 
concept?” In response, I ventured to give form to what links diverse instances of microaggressions 
together. I did so by employing a Wittgenstein-inspired “family resemblance” account of the 
concept of microaggression. I set out common conditions which contribute to this resemblance 
and make microaggressions (as different as they may be in practice) identifiable as instances of 
the same thing. I argued that such an approach is one possible route for making sense of the 
microaggression concept.  
In chapter 3, I aimed to address the issue of how we should approach conceptualizing and 
categorizing microaggressions, e.g., in theory and research. I advocated for a novel harm-based 
account of microaggressions, which reflects a substantive departure from the dominant act-based 
understanding of microaggressions, handed down to us from psychologist Derald Wing Sue 
(2010). This account of microaggressions argues that microaggressions ought to be theorized from 
the perspective of those on the receiving end, e.g., members of structurally oppressed groups. 
Taken together, these two chapters (chapters 2 and 3), offer an account of how we ought to 
understand and categorize microaggressions. On account of both, chapters 2 and 3 have progressed 
my conceptual aim. 
The second aim of the dissertation was epistemological. The thrust of this aim was to try to make 
sense of what epistemological commitments ought to guide our thinking about microaggressions. 
As Schroer (2015) has argued (and as I discuss in the introduction to this thesis) there is a tendency 
to “scientize” research on oppressive phenomena – to try to apply standards of “objectivity” and 
“empiricism” to the study of phenomena which are, at their core, lived, felt experiences. 
Microaggressions, I have argued, are best understood when examined from the perspective of those 
on the receiving end (see chapter 3). Testimony, I believe, is a valuable form of evidence when 




chapters 1, 2, and 3, I have tried to tease out and clarify what epistemological frameworks I believe 
ought to guide continued microaggressions research. I have argued (in chapters 1 and 2) that 
feminist standpoint epistemology offers the best epistemological starting point for theorizing 
microaggressions. Feminist standpoint theory contends that those on the receiving end of 
oppression are generally better suited to identify, recognize, understand, and name instances of 
that oppression (Toole 2019; Wylie 2013). Following this theory, I have argued that 
microaggressions should be theorized from the perspective of those on the receiving end of 
oppression and oppressive phenomena (see chapter 3), that doing so is more likely to help us “get 
it right” with respect to understanding microaggressions, identifying them when they occur (see 
chapter 2), getting clearer about why they matter morally speaking (see chapter 2), and that 
invoking feminist standpoint epistemology can help microaggressions researchers respond to their 
most vocal critics (see chapter 1). In each of these ways, this thesis has advanced its 
epistemological aim.  
The third and final aim of the dissertation was a moral one. Following the trajectory of Chester 
Pierce (1970), I believe that microaggressions are tightly connected to power, oppression, and 
privilege (see discussion of these concepts in the introduction of this thesis, and the discussion of 
oppression in chapter 1). The thrust of the moral aim was to provide some analysis of the moral 
significance of microaggressions, including clarifying the unique ways in which microaggressions 
are harmful (see chapter 3), and the way those harms manifest in particular institutional contexts, 
such as medical contexts (see chapter 4) and academic contexts (see chapter 5). Across these 
chapters, I shed light on the ways in which microaggressions can degrade important moral 
relationships, including ones of trust, in these contexts (see chapters 3 and 4). I also shed light on 
the impact microaggressions have on the equal standing of structurally oppressed people in 
academic spaces: on their epistemic standing (e.g., whether or not they are recognized and regarded 
as a knower), and the standing with respect to the contributions of their speech (e.g., whether they 
are likely to be taken seriously, or given uptake, when they speak) (see chapter 5). I have argued 
that microaggressions (and the social facts about power and oppression which they reflect) must 
be accounted for in our attempts to create the most robust free speech atmospheres possible. This 
is because, I have argued, pervasive microaggressions can threaten the ability of structurally 




Taken together, these chapters offer new ways of thinking about microaggressions, which are 
informed by insights from feminist philosophy, philosophy of language, ethics, and political 
philosophy. They will, I hope, contribute to a growing conversation about microaggressions among 
philosophers, and hopefully one between philosophers and those engaging in the empirical study 
of microaggressions (e.g., psychologists and sociologists).   
VI.II. What’s Next?: Future Avenues for Philosophical Research on 
Microaggressions  
I have just set out what I believe I have achieved with this dissertation. Now let me acknowledge 
some areas which I have not had the opportunity to develop here. In future work I hope to advance 
some of these questions, which, I believe, will add value to the emerging literature on the 
philosophy of microaggressions.  
One question this thesis has not ventured to resolve, and which I hope to explore in future work, 
involves how we ought to draw boundaries between microaggressions and other related, but 
meaningfully different, oppressive acts. For example, there is an important theoretical and practical 
question regarding how to separate out microaggressions from another harmful speech 
phenomena: slurs. Bringing microaggression theory into dialogue with the vast philosophical 
literature on slurs can help gain conceptual clarification of both phenomena. Taking the lead from 
the robust philosophical work on slurs, philosophers working on microaggressions should also 
work to clarify the mechanisms by which microaggressions transmit bits of social meaning, or in 
other words, how exactly microaggressions do things like reify stereotypes and reinforce social 
biases.  
Relatedly, there is a difficult practical question regarding when, if ever, microaggressions, 
constitute [legally or otherwise] actionable “hate speech.” While some instances of 
microaggression seem far from rising to this level, others (e.g., deadnaming a trans person) might 
plausibly seem closer. Much like slurs, the philosophical and legal literatures on hate speech are 
fertile ground for working out the conceptual and practical boundaries of the phenomena. I 
recognize that, as far as this dissertation is concerned, these theoretical and practical puzzles 




Another area for future development of this research involves the “scaling up” of the analysis. In 
other words, though I have focused in this dissertation on the way microaggressions impact one’s 
social standing, as well as their relationships to institutions such as medicine and academia, a future 
project will examine the role microaggressions play in shaping one’s democratic standing. 
Specifically, I want to examine the extent to which microaggressions influence “democratic 
equality” (e.g. being recognized and treated as a fully equal member of a democratic society, cf. 
Anderson 1999) and democratic participation (e.g., the ability to participate fully and equally in 
democratic discussion, deliberation, and debate). My intuition is that microaggressions can be 
shown to impede one’s ability to be a full and equal participant in a democratic society, viz., to be 
a full democratic equal.  
A final area for future research involves investigating the links between microaggressions and 
dehumanization. Many philosophers have argued that language can be an important tool of 
dehumanization. Dehumanization, as David Livingston Smith (2012) describes it, is a response to 
conflicting motives. On the one hand, there is some desire to harm some group of people. On the 
other hand, it goes against our wiring as members of an inherently social species to actually carry 
out harm to other humans, and more specifically, to kill, torture, or seriously degrade them. 
Dehumanization, he argues, is a way of subverting those inhibitions – of getting around our 
ingrained inclinations not to cause serious harm to other humans. The work around is to strip to 
groups in question – those who we desire to cause harm to – of that thing which stands in our way 
of carrying out such harm, namely, their humanity. The language used to describe groups of people 
is one tool for breaking down our sense of their humanity. As Lynne Tirell puts it, “Speech acts 
establish and reinforce a system of permissions and prohibitions that fuel social hierarchy” (2012, 
175). The language we use to describe groups of people enact permissibility structures that 
determine what is and isn’t viewed as acceptable treatment of them. Microaggressions are one type 
of speech which can contribute to the dehumanization of certain groups: they effect how we 
perceive, and ultimately how we treat, others. Spelling out the connections between 
microaggressions and dehumanization is one avenue of analysis which can help further illuminate 




By way of conclusion, the philosophical work done on microaggressions thus far, and the work 
that remains to be done, point to one overarching idea: language matters and the way we use 
language can be an incredibly powerful force in our social worlds. And, to quote a character from 
one of my favorite comic book franchises (Spider-Man’s Benjamin Parker, or “Uncle Ben”), “With 
great power comes great responsibility.” Attention to microaggressions renders unmistakably 
evident that our words hold great power – power to include or exclude others, power to influence 
our moral relationships with one another, and power to shape our social worlds in profound ways. 
Such power ought to compel all of us to take greater responsibility for our words and their effects 
in the world and upon those around us. We all have the ability and the power to hold ourselves and 
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